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Othellos Monsters: Kenneth Burke, Deleuze and
Guattari, and the Impulse to Narrative in Shakespeare
Bruce Boehrer

Bruce Boehrer is Pro
fessor ofEnglish
Renaissance literature
at Florida State Uni
versity. He has pub
lished two books on
Renaissance drama
with the University of
Pennsylvania Press,
and he is currently at
work on a book-length
study entitled "Shake
speare and the Ani
mals: The Social
Instrumentality of
Animal-Metaphor in
the Early Modern
English Drama."

1.

Writing half a century ago, Kenneth Burke argued
that to one degree or another all persuasive discourse
obeys a "principle of courtship” whose purpose lies in
“the transcending of social estrangement” (208). As
Burke explains this principle,
[i]n its essence communication involves the use
of verbal symbols for purposes of appeal. Thus it
splits formally into the three elements of speak
er, speech, and spoken-to, with the speaker so
shaping his speech as to “commune” with the
spoken-to. This purely technical pattern is the
precondition of all appeal. And “standoffishness”
is necessary to the form, because without it the
appeal could not be maintained.. . . Rhetorically,
there can be courtship only insofar as there is
division. (271)

Burke identifies this primordial and self-sustaining
“standoffishness” — which corresponds roughly to
the notion of desire in Lacanian psychoanalysis and
to that of différance in Derridean theory1 — as a
defining element of “pure persuasion” (269) and as an
irreducible quality of self-interference present to
degree or another within all rhetorical performance.
No major work of English literature better exem
plifies the courtship-function of rhetorical
than does Shakespeare’s Othello. As Alan Sinfield,
one, has
the play’s “action advances
through a contest of stories” (30) whereby Iago’s tale
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of adultery undoes what Othello’s tales of travel and heroism have achieved for
him. Thus, although Othellos preoccupation with narrativity has been estab
lished by a number of previous critics,2 I would like to reexamine it in light of
Burke’s analysis and the concept of “standoffishness” that grounds it. My points
in conducting this examination are three. First, I believe that if Othello com
prises an extended act of courtship, the self-interference intrinsic to that
is
concentrated disproportionately within a single dramatic role: that of Iago.
Second, I would note that, in his capacity as the principle of rhetorical self
interference incarnate, Iago repeatedly conceives the
of union as a violation
of perceptual categories: not only those of race and nationality but also of rank
and gender and ultimately of species itself. In terms of this latter point, it
would be easy to see Iago’s obsession with violated boundaries as voicing a gen
eralized anxiety over the collapse of social
in which case Othello begs
to be
in Burke’s phrase, as a document of “‘social lewdness’ mythically
expressed in sexual terms” (208). However — and this is my third and final
point — the interest in crossing lines is not Iago’s alone, and when it appears in
the language of other characters it figures not so much as a transgression to be
shunned but rather as a consummation to be wished. To this extent, it embod
ies a rhetorical impulse for the elucidation of which we must look beyond the
work of Kenneth Burke to the more recent theoretical writings of Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, where it surfaces as the principle of deterritorialization.

2.
In a reading of Othello that figured, on its first appearance, as
of the foun
dational documents of the New Historicism, Stephen Greenblatt has drawn
notice to the play’s “ceaseless narrative invention” (235), an invention that tends
both to convert eros to storytelling and to translate storytelling into eros.
Greenblatt, Othellos characters “have always already submitted to narrativity”
(237), and thus the tale of Othello’s doomed love for Desdemona is, among
other things, also the tale of Desdemona’s love for the tale of Othello’s life.
Othello himself narrates matters as follows, nesting the story of his life within
the story of
love within the scene of his trial within the play of his undoing:
I spoke of most disastrous chances:
Of moving accidents by flood and field,
Of hair-breadth scapes i’ th’ imminent deadly breach,
Of being taken by the insolent foe
And sold to slavery, of my redemption thence
And portance in my [travel’s] history;

These things to hear
Would Desdemona seriously incline;
But still the house affairs would draw her thence,
Which ever as she could with haste dispatch,
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She’ld come again, and with a greedy ear
Devour up my discourse. (1.3.134-9, 145-50)

This passage gives us Burke’s principle of courtship in triplicate, at least:
Shakespeare woos
Globe audience with the tale of Othello, in which Oth
ello woos another audience — the Venetian senate — with the tale of Othello
woofrig yet another audience — Desdemona — with the tale of Othello. Nor
is Desdemona the only character to experience the erotic pull of this overdeter
mined narrativity; as the Duke observes of the Moor’s performance, “I think
this tale would win my daughter too” (1.3.171). The express tendency of the
narrative drive in this scene is toward a union simultaneously rhetorical and
erotic in character. Thus when Othello reaches out to the Venetian senate by
recapitulating his act of outreach to Desdemona, readers and viewers of Shake
’s play, too, participate in a pattern of storytelling superimposed upon
itself, reencountering itself in different settings so that the very act of listening
to the Moor’s tale becomes an act of structural communion with other listeners
in other contexts, all of whom seem to repeat the originary model of Desde
mona, devouring up Othello’s discourse.
I say that this structural repetition seems to originate with Desdemona, but
in truth it does not. In
Desdemona’s role as Othello’s archetypal audience
derives from yet another, prior model: the aggrieved Brabantio himself. Again,
Othello’s account of his love for Desdemona provides the central evidence here:
Her father lov’
oft invited me;
Still question’ me the story of my life
From
to
— the [battles], sieges, [fortunes],
That I have pass’d.
These things to hear
Would Desdemona seriously incline.
(1.3.128-31,145-6; emphasis added)

This storytelling, the
and extension of Brabantio’s “love” for Othello,
becomes in turn the catalyst, extension, and — as Desdemona plucks up her
spirits and asks Othello to tell more stories directly to her (150-5) —
of
Desdemona’s love for the same man. The storytelling-relation-that-is-also-alove-relation is apparently no respecter of genders; developing between men, it
simply reimprints itself within the dynamic of heterosexual courtship before
transferring itself, in further turn, to the legal context of Othello’s trial and to
the theatrical context of Shakespeare’s play. The result is a kind of courtship
one cannot adequately
in terms of the masculine homosocial dynamic
that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and others have viewed as exemplary of much
Shakespearean love-discourse. In that dynamic women tend to serve as the
markers of a prior and supervening attachment between men,3 but for Othello
the attachment is not so easily stratified into the relation of privileged signified
(a man’s love for another man) and subordinate signifier (a man’s relation to a
woman related to a beloved man). Rather than standing for Brabantio, Desde
mona in an important sense becomes him.
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In doing so, I would argue, she threatens to attain the condition of absolute
communion that comprises the ideal end of Othellos rhetoric: a condition in
which fathers and daughters, senators and groundlings, tales and their innu
merable retellings all coalesce, achieving a polymorphous reciprocity — per
haps, given the erotic nature of Othello’s storytelling, even a polymorphous
perversity — that nullifies the social and psychic divisions presupposed
the
rhetoric itself. This condition especially transcends the fundamental distinc
tion between speaker and auditor, a point manifest in Desdemona’s response to
Othello’s tale:
She swore, in faith ’twas strange, ’twas passing strange,
’Twas pitiful, ’twas wondrous pitiful.
She wish’d she had not heard it, yet she wish’
That heaven had made her such a man. (160-3)
The line “she wish’d / That heaven had made her such a man,” with its famous
syntactical ambiguity, points toward the dissolution of personhood that results
from successful rhetoric and successful courtship. Poised against the possibili
ty that heaven might indeed make Desdemona such a man — in one sense of
the phrase or another — is Desdemona’s own unwillingness to hear a story that
is difficult to endure precisely because it assails the bounds of her being. As
Burke has remarked, there can only be courtship so long as there is division.
Desdemona’s reluctance to hear the story that fascinates her serves simultane
ously to register the attraction of the promised communion and the anxiety that
it provokes.
Yet it is in the figure of Iago that this anxiety takes up particular residence,
with the result that Iago initiates the dominant counter-movement of Shake
speare’s play: a concerted pattern of resistance to the principle of communion
exemplified by Othello’s rhetoric. At bottom, it is Iago’s job to sustain division,
and by sustaining it to sustain all the varied rhetorical operations — the innu
merable acts of courtship and appeal and solicitation — that presuppose
Thus, where Othello’s storytelling
a primary moment of conjunction
whereby father and daughter, Brabantio and Desdemona, achieve equivalence
in their relation to the Moor, Iago nurtures a sense of loss:

Awake! what ho, Brabantio! thieves, thieves!
Look to your house, your daughter, and your bags! (1.1.79-80)
And again,

[’Zounds], sir, y’are robb’d! For shame, put on your gown;
Your heart is burst, you have lost half your soul. (86-7)
And later, employing the same pattern of imagery to arouse jealousy in Othel
lo:
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he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed. (3.3.159-61)
Iago’s fascination with money, with getting it and spending it and hoarding
it and stealing it, is of course a staple of
character. My point here is that
this fascination
more than material profit and loss; it registers linguis
tic loss as well, a linguistic loss well represented by the theft of one’s “good
name.” Moreover, once it is abstracted from particular material transactions
and contexts, the preoccupation with what is missing informs Iago’s behavior
on a grand scale. For instance, recent scholars in queer theory have rightly cau
tioned us not to read
modern literary documents as expressive of a bina
rized economy of heterosexual and homosexual desire, an
that it is
anachronistic
ascribe to early modern sexual thought and social practice;4
yet, in an almost uncannily prophetic way, Iago himself
just this sort
of binary impulse by organizing the personal relationships of Shakespeare’s play
according to the laws of urinary segregation. He gets along famously with men,
after all, and his facility in managing Roderigo and
and Brabantio and
Othello contrasts both against
invidious, highly charged relations with Des
demona and Emilia and against Othello’s initial solidarity with Desdemona. In
effect, Othello’s belief in the existence of a fictive love triangle between him
self, Desdemona, and Cassio serves as the ex postfacto expression of a real, pre
existent triangle between Iago, Othello, and Desdemona. This latter triangle,
in turn, receives double consecration in Othello’s holy union with Desdemona
and in the “sacred vow” (3.3.461) with which Othello and Iago later seal their
confederacy. This vow, almost a homoerotic betrothal ceremony,5 renders the
binarisms of Iago’s character into a structural principle of Shakespeare’s play;
Othello may either choose his wife or his ancient, his woman or his man. In
either case, gain goes hand in hand with loss.
Nor does Iago’s preoccupation with loss confine itself to questions of gen
der; it operates
on the level of genre, where Iago’s language displays a
clear preference for certain modes of articulation, certain speech acts. Although
Greenblatt has viewed Iago’s
as a kind of “narrative fashioning” that
extends and recapitulates the narrative preoccupations of other figures (237),
one remarkable feature of Iago’s character is the way in which it stakes out pet
modes of expression distinct from those of other characters, particularly Othel
lo. Thus, where Othello tells tales and gives commands, Iago offers advice,
solicits advancement (or complains about its absence), issues warnings, and
negotiates agreements. These latter are all classic
of courtship, in
Burke’s sense of the term, and of courtiership as well; thus they are appropriate
to a figure who inhabits a divided world, who fraternizes mostly with men, and
with men whose interaction is governed by intricately devised systems of mili
tary and courtly rank and protocol. In any case, Iago’s language is populated by
signature gestures of appeal and solicitation, beginning with
first long
speech (“Why, there’s no remedy. ’Tis the curse of service; / Preferment goes
by letter and
” [1.1.34-5]); continuing through his cultivation of
Roderigo (“I hate the Moor. . . . Let us be conjunctive in our revenge against
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him” [1.3.366,367-8]); and extending ultimately to his successful temptation of
Othello himself (“You would
satisfied? . . . / Would you, the [supervisor],
grossly gape on?” [3.3.393,395]). In
where Othello says “Let me tell you
a story,” Iago says “Let me make you a deal.”
This discursive preference, in turn, entails certain consequences on the level
of character. With his repeated petitions and promises and offers and incen
tives, Iago displays certain
for the “comedy of non-interaction” that
Gabriele Jackson has identified in Ben Jonsons early work (1). For Jackson, the
characters of Jonsonian comedy are “sundered from the outside world by urgent
attention to an inner clamor” (26); they ricochet off of one another like billiard
balls while in pursuit of the idiosyncratic obsessions that define them. As for
Iago, a similar dynamic invests his dealings with others, since those dealings are
consistently predicated upon the furthering of individual suits. Whether the
suit in question is Iago’s own (his
quest for military promotion; his suc
cessful quest for revenge) or someone else’s project pursued with his encour
agement (Roderigo’s effort to seduce Desdemona; Brabantio’s
action
against Othello; Cassio’s petition to Desdemona for aid in regaining
lieu
tenancy), the dramatic actions associated with Iago are all of a piece,
the pursuit of an idée fixe under whose influence the suitor in question some
how loses the ability to communicate with others. Even Iago himself, whose
capacity to recognize and capitalize upon the obsessions of others is of course
formidable, seems unable, in the end, to understand that his wife might find his bodies,
or
ainy intolerable;
lapse in judgment.
For the suit we
to least, a major
be this is, at the
advantage,
or entangled in a project of the sort encouraged by Iago, the project itself
becomes a means of establishing and maintaining a certain personal distance,
and once again, that distance is the very sort without which rhetoric as
courtship would
unthinkable.
To this extent,
may in fact regard Othello and Iago as complementary
expressions of the two contradictory imperatives that invest and sustain rhetoric
according to Burke’s formulation of the matter. On one hand, Othello embod
ies the impulse to commune, unite, to extend and escape the self in ways that
ultimately entail a rewriting and eventually an unwriting of personal identity.
On the other hand, Iago exists to keep the self — and selfhood — intact; he
employs language to maneuver for personal
and he does so by gen
erating and exploiting various kinds of misunderstanding. Indeed, Iago’s dis
cursive habits are almost a parody of Othello’s. The Moor’s stories change their
audience by enforcing an exchange of identities, a kind of cross-pollination
whereby speaker and listeners enter and inform one another; Iago’s plots and
agreements, conversely, are founded upon the illusion of exchange, upon the
hearer’s misguided apprehension that there has been a meeting of minds where
none has actually occurred. As for the idea that minds —
or selves
— might actually achieve a state of dynamic mutuality, Iago has a notorious
way of imaging this possibility, and it is to this pattern of imagery that I now
turn.
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3.

In his compendious Institutes of the Laws of England, Edward Coke concludes
his brief discussion of the
of buggery by noting that this “detestable and
abominable sin” (sig. I3v) was first criminalized during the reign of Henry VIIL
Uncharacteristically, Coke explains the Henrician anti-buggery statute via
anecdote; it was formulated, he observes, because “a great Lady had committed
Buggery with a Baboon, and conceived by it, etc.” (sig. I4r). Coke does not
name
source for this story, and its concluding “etc.,” suggesting both the
inevitable and the unimaginable, equally tantalizes and infuriates. From the
late-twentieth-century standpoint, of course, the monstrous birth that Coke
describes is a biological impossibility, and yet its very factitiousness renders it
all the more unnerving. A narrative invention that exceeds the possibilities of
the world as we know it, Coke’s baboon-child simultaneously embodies a social
regime’s anxieties about transgression of the order of nature and figures forth
the unselfconscious determination of that same regime to transgress the nature
that grounds its anxiety.
As for the anxiety itself, I have already argued that Iago lends concerted
expression to something very similar: an obsessive concern with the possible
loss of the self
the language that subtends a concern represented in large
part through febrile fantasies of gender- and race- and species-mixing. These
last are perhaps Iago’s most notorious turns of phrase, and they draw upon the
same
and the same patterns of thought that inform Coke’s baboon
anecdote. For Iago, the miscegenous lovemaking of Othello and Desdemona
threatens to produce just the same sort of denatured conception; being “cover’d
with a Barbary horse” (1.1.111-2), Desdemona will become the dam to a brood
of centaurs; Brabantio
“have coursers for cousins, and gennets for germans”
(113), and the scions of his house will not speak but neigh. Such stuff owes its
origin to a twofold discursive tradition: on one hand a pattern of legal and the
ological thinking (exemplified by Coke, among others) that conceives various
sexual conjunctions as socially and morally objectionable because they violate a
variously conceived order of nature, and
the other hand a
discourse
(well represented by the obstetrical texts of Ambroise Paré)6 that purports to
document the monstrous results of such unnatural unions (see figure 1). Work
ing with the two separate but interrelated strands of this tradition, Iago can
Figure 1. Figure of a colt with a
mans face, from Ambroise Pare,
On Monsters and Marvels 6.
Cf. Othello 1.1.111-3: “You’
have your daughter cover’d with
a Barbary horse, you’ll have
your nephews neigh to you;
you’ll have
for cousins,
and gennets for germans.”
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even read the medical discourse of obstetrical mon
strosity proleptically into the act of “unnatural”
procreation itself; that is the point of his famous
euphemism for sex, “making the beast with two
backs” (1.1.116-7; cf. figure 2), for this compact
and poisonous description endows the lovemaking
of Othello and Desdemona with a deformity pre
figuring that of the equine offspring the lovemak
ing will purportedly produce.
To this extent, Iagos
upon a medicojuridical vocabulary of sexual monstrosity may even
foreshadow the later development of a Foucauldian
scientia sexualis, the vast disciplinary project — of
transforming sex into an object of dispassionate
scientific observation — that Foucault found to be
characteristic of western societies from the eigh
teenth century onward.7 As Jurgis Baltrusaitis has
demonstrated, the teratology of authors like Paré
derives from a medieval mode of “réalisme fantas
tique” supplemented by Teveil d’
pensée réal
iste” (331), and this particular discursive quality,
the very concern for professional observation and
documentation that distinguishes Iago’s source
Figure 2. Figure of two twins
material from Othello’s, allies the former with an
having only one head from
emergent scientific discourse of undeniable power
Pare' 15. Compare Othello
prestige. In his meditation
 upon the social
1.1.115-7: “Your daughter
constructedness of sexuality, Foucault contrasted
and the Moor are now makthis western scientia sexualis with an eastern ars
ing the beast with two backs.
erotica exemplified by sex treatises such as the
Kama Sutra (57-8), and it would be tempting to
discover a similar opposition in Othello. However,
what Shakespeare gives us is less an ars erotica than an eroticized ars narrandi,
through which Othello, too, like Iago, can activate a
of physical
monstrosity:

of antres vast and deserts idle,
Rough quarries, rocks, [and] hills whose [heads] touch heaven,
It was my hint to speak — such was my process
And of the Cannibals that each [other] eat,
The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads
[Do grow] beneath their
(1.3.140-5)
As Lisa Hopkins has recently noted, Othello’s character “is inserted into
pre-existing discourses of travel that must radically inform and structure his
ostensibly experiential account. Even as Othello thinks he tells his story, it in
fact tells him” (163). Yet, as I have just pointed out, one may say precisely the
same thing about Iago. Ultimately what separates Othello from Iago in this
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respect is not so much
their subjection to
narrativity but rather
the precise kind of
narrativity to which
they are subject; Oth
ello’s monsters remain
distinct from Iago’s,
both with regard to
their ontological sta
tus and their literary
antecedents. As to
the latter of these
points, Othello clear
ly draws upon differ
ent source material
than does his ancient:
not the discourse of
medical abnormality Figure 3. Figure of a female monster without a head, front and back
views, from Paré 36. This illustration may be viewed as a
(cf. figure 3) and thepathologized counterinstance of Othello’s “men whose heads /
ologico-judicial cen
sure, but rather that of [Do grow] beneath their shoulders” (1.3.144-5).
the medieval travel
ogue and bestiary tradition. Moreover, this preference for certain kinds of
source matter has broad implications for the nature of monstrosity itself, which
emerges in Othello’s language not as an index of individual depravity and per
version but as an emblem of the breadth and diversity of creation. Where
Iago’s monsters narrow the world — dividing it into the familiar and the per
verse, the former to be protected and the latter to
eradicated — Othello’s
monsters widen it, attesting to the lure of the exotic as well as to Othello’s own
ability to render the fantastic accessible. To this extent Othello’s handkerchief
is like his Anthropophagi — a narrative construct whose strangeness carries
with it a charge of erotic fascination even as it conflates the fabulous with the
quotidian:
That handkerchief
Did an Egyptian to my mother give;
She was a charmer, and could almost read
The thoughts of people. She told her, while she kept it,
’Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father
Entirely to her love. . . .
[T] here’s magic in the web of it.
A sibyl, that had numb’red in the world
The sun course two hundred compasses,
In her prophetic fury
’d the work;
The worms were hallowed that did breed the silk,
And it was dy’d in mummy which the skillful
Conserv’d of maiden’s hearts. (3.4.55-60, 69-75)
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Again here, as in his speech to the Venetian senate, Othello uses the story
telling function to collapse distances and elide contexts. The gift of Othello’s
handkerchief is in part the gift of its story, which in turn is the story of its gift,
from sibyl to Egyptian charmer to Othello’s mother to Othello’s father to Oth
ello himself to Desdemona, the story of this gift ending with the gift’s origins
and being entirely prefigured in the “prophetic fury” of the sibyl’s work, which
in turn is repeated within the myriad retellings of the tale it has itself antici
pated. Likewise, Othello’s storytelling once again draws upon particular
sources, its evocation of Egypt and enchantment
the “mummy” drawn from
maiden’s hearts all suggesting that great original of western travel writers,
Herodotus, and the tradition of
and romance descending from his
work. In the case of Othello’s handkerchief-narrative, the nature of the story
telling has shifted a bit; it has begun to assume a threatening cast, not
inviting Desdemona to identify with it but also browbeating her for not having
identified with it closely enough. This fact may in itself bear witness to the
strain under which Othello’s narrative invention has been placed by Iago’s
insinuations, but it also attests to the extraordinary quality of the
itself. Othello’s tale may attach
impossibly heavy weight of meaning to
something as common and trivial as a handkerchief, but that, in a sense, is Oth
ello’s fonction as a dramatic character: to transform everything into a kind of
thick description. His signature gestures — the characteristic recourse to a nar
rative function that conflates disparate times and places and people by giving
them common
endlessly recursive roles within the narrative itself; the
reliance upon a literary tradition grounded in catalogues of marvels such as
those assembled by the travelogue writer and the bestiarist; and the tendency to
dwell upon tales of the strange, wondrous, and marvelous in such a way as to
render them attractively exotic rather than repulsively unnatural — all of these
combine to produce a particular rhetorical effect, an unusually powerful drive
toward what Burke has called “the transcending of social estrangement.”
In the final section of this essay, I will try to characterize the apparent
objective of this rhetorical function more precisely,
to do so I must move
beyond the rhetorical analysis of Burke to a more recent theoretical vocabulary,
developed by Deleuze and Guattari specifically provide a means of thinking
beyond the construction of individual character and personal identity.
4.
Unlike Burke, whose concerns lie mostly with the form and nature of rhetoric
as it is, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari seek to theorize an alternative to the
social relations that make such rhetoric possible. If Burke views “standoffishness” as a precondition of all linguistic appeal, Deleuzian analysis might well
argue that that is because Burke describes language as a product of “state phi
losophy” (Thousand Plateaus xi): that is, as a structure of meaning predicated
upon the unity
self-identity of “the thinking subject,” an identity that is
recapitulated in the concepts the subject creates “and which it lends its own
presumed attributes of sameness and constancy” {Thousand Plateaus xi). In
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short, if language nourishes an irreducible alienation of the speaking subject,
that is because language itself is first and foremost not a
of “transcend
ing social estrangement” (this being only a secondary and incidental effect of
linguistic appeal) but in fact a means of fabricating the unitary “I.” For any sub
ject operating in the world of Burkean rhetoric, ego-construction is the first —
and last — order of
its primacy
confirmed by the rhetorical
drive to overcome the alienation that defines it.
But might it be possible
deploy language so that it does not “immure
itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority” (Thousand Plateaus xii)? Could
one remove the principle of standoffishness from its position as simultaneous
ly the motivating force and the preeminent product of semiotic exchange? To
do so, Deleuze
Guattari argue, one must re-theorize identity and its rela
tion to linguistic expression, a relation whose traditional commitment to ideas
of interiority is signaled by the etymology of the word “expression” itself (from
exprimere, literally “to press out”). The challenge here is to rethink the
as a multiple and mutable construct, formulated through relations of externali
ty and through a logic of metonymy rather than metaphor. Deleuze and Guat
tari thus lend particular privilege to tropes of flight and escape, both literal and
openness
ive,
that lead from an ordered
therefore restrictivebeindex
center and
a variit,
in 
to conceived outside. In Deleuzian terminology, the ordered center comes
ously
be known as a “territory”: that is, an enclosed material or biological or spa
tial or linguistic or conceptual space to which have been assigned particular
structural principles and qualities (of identity, property, value, etcetera). The
practice of flight from such enclosures, on the other hand, is what Deleuze and
Guattari call “deterritorialization.” In the last few pages of this essay, I would
like to suggest that the latter concept offers a useful way of understanding Oth
ello’s approach to narrative, which is more complex than standard alienation
based semiotic models give it credit for being.8
In one sense, Othello’s commitment to patterns of exteriority is obvious
enough. He is, as Iago notes, “of a free and open nature” (1.3.399),
this
contrasts markedly with Iago’s guardedness and duplicity. What one
sees of Othello is what one gets, up to and including a physical blackness sur
prisingly free from any pejorative significance as an external
of personal
character or racial inclination. (As Janet Adelman has recently demonstrated,
the pejorative racial associations in Shakespeare’s play originate with Iago, for
whom they externalize a sense of inward deficiency that can
well accounted
for by object-relations psychology.)9 In effect, the story of Othello’s downfall
is the story of how he loses this exteriorized sense of self, exchanging it for the
paradigm of self-division that informs Iago’s character. As Hopkins has put
Iago “is able to effect a gradual shift in Othello’s horizons of narrative expecta
tion” (168). The end result of this shift is that Othello and Desdemona engage
in a pattern of sustained misunderstanding, recently traced by Harry Berger, Jr.
(“Trifling” passim), whereby they conspire to lose — and then to forget that
they have conspired to lose — Desdemona’s handkerchief. To this extent, Iago
manages to install a kind of linguistic self-interference in Othello’s and Desde
mona’s relationship; he makes their own words conspirators against them.
But as far as Othello’s own instincts are concerned, signs are not separate
from subjects, nor signifiers from signifieds: instead, “signs are "embedded’
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situations, not fully separated from bodies, specific places, rituals, gestures, sto
ries, etcetera, yet not entirely fixed in their relationship to one another” (Bogue
98). Again, Desdemonas handkerchief offers an outstanding case in point. On
one hand, its
is inextricable from the bodies, places, and rituals
with which it is associated, yet at the same time those bodies, places, and ritu
als shift place in and through and around each other. Thus, for
thing, it
becomes naggingly difficult to track the feminine pronoun references in Othel
lo's description of the handkerchief:
That handkerchief
Did an Egyptian to my mother give;
She was a charmer, and could almost
The thoughts of people. She told her, while she kept it,
’Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father
Entirely to her love . . . (3.4.55-60)

This peculiar array of linguistic shifters
to fix the meaning of the
handkerchief by attaching a massive weight of personal importance to it. Yet
at the same time, Othellos language generates this personal importance not out
of a single, singular individual, but rather out of an accumulated weight of per
sons, so that the final feminine pronoun in this same passage (72), amazingly,
refers neither to Othello’s mother nor to the “Egyptian charmer,” but to the
“sibyl” who sewed the handkerchief that the charmer gave to Othello’s mother.
Thus it is perhaps an appropriate final
that when Othello mentions the
handkerchief again, its meaning remains the same — it is a love token whose
loss represents the loss of love itself — but its history has been revised via an
entirely different set of personal associations: “It was a handkerchief, an
antique token / My father gave my mother” (5.2.216-7).
In cases such as this, narrative representation works for Othello much as it
does in the Deleuzian account of signification in primitive communities. Oth
ello’s tale proceeds collectively and extra-personally,
lines of transfer
which individual bodies are important precisely insofar as they can stand in and
for one another. As Deleuze and Guattari observe,
A Gourma story begins: “When the mouth was dead, the other parts of
the body were consulted to see which of them would take charge of the
burial. . . .” The unities in question are never found persons, but rather
in series which determine the connection, disjunctions, and conjunctions of
organs. (Anti-0edipus 142)

This sort of relation, which Deleuze and Guattari term “plurivocal,” character
izes primitive modes of representation in which the body stands first and fore
most as “a part of the earth” upon which various situationally specific marks of
relation and alliance may be coded. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari argue,
“Our modern societies have undertaken a
privatization of the organs” (1423), a privatization of which I consider Iago to be an outstanding dramatic rep
resentative.
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Again, one may liken the effect of Othello’s storytelling to a classic exam
ple of deterritorialization drawn from the field of biology. Deleuze and Guattari point out that certain tropical wasps and
formulate a symbiotic
relationship that also involves an element of physical mimicry (Thousand
Plateaus 10 [see figure 4]). What distinguishes this relationship, however, is not
so much the obvious quality of physical resemblance but rather the symbiosis
that the resemblance renders visual; the wasp, feeding upon the orchid, trans
fers pollen that reproduces the plant, while the plant, propagating itself through
the transfer of pollen, yields life-sustaining nectar to the wasp. The mimicry in
this relationship is neither a cause nor an effect nor a vehicle of the symbiosis;
wasps can pollinate flowers without looking like them, and flowers can nourish
wasps without looking like them. What seems to be enacted in this particular
case, thus, is not a simple relation of interdependence, nor a simple relation of
mimicry, but something more complex: a moment in which the wasp becomes
an orchid, completing the orchid’s reproductive cycle and entering into an asso
ciation of physical resemblance, just as the orchid performs a reciprocal
of
becoming-wasp. As Deleuze and Guattari comment upon such cases, “A
becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resem
blance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification. . . . We fall into a false
alternative if we say that you
either imitate or you are.
What is real is the becoming
itself. . . , not the supposedly
fixed terms through which
that which
passes”
(237-8).
If nothing else, Deleuze
and Guattari’s model of sym
biotic transformation affords
us a
perspective on the
Moor’s intimacy with Desde
That relationship is
founded, after all, upon the
linguistic complementarity of
husband and wife; Desde
mona wishes “[t]hat heaven
had made her such a man” as Figure 4. Wasp-orchid rhizome. Comme des Garçons.
Othello (1.3.162), thus locat
ing herself within a process of becoming-Othello to which the Moor himself
contributes in describing her as his “fair warrior”
(As Iago observes
with disapproval, “Our general’s wife is now the general” [2.3.315-6]). More
over, such language points to the very literal deterritorialization of space —
of personal relation to space — that accompanies Desdemona’s elopement. For
not only does marriage translate Desdemona out of the protective enclosure of
her father’s
and into the midst of a military campaign upon foreign soil;
it also alters her scripted relation to the space she inhabits. Hence her initial
encounters with Othello are constrained by her obligation to perform house
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work — “Still the house affairs would draw her thence, / Which ever as she
could with haste dispatch, / She’d come again
with a greedy ear / Devour
up my discourse” (1.3.147-50) — while her personal role
Cyprus, on the
contrary, is most prominently distinguished by her vigorous intercessions on
behalf of Cassio. This substitution of outside for inside, of foreign ground for
homeland, and of military command decisions for household chores involves an
escape from concurrently encoded, mutually reinforcing notions of domestic
and national and sexual and vocational territory, and to this extent it may easi
ly
described in terms of Deleuzian lines of
If her relationship with Othello offers Desdemona a way out of social and
spatial confinement, in turn, that is because the storytelling function of Othel
lo’s character offers her a line of flight of a particularly far-reaching variety: a
of “transcending social estrangement” that reconfigures the selves who
participate in it, rather than simply reinforcing a defensive alienation coexten
sive with the signifying process itself. In short, for Othello and Desdemona
there seems to be something consciousness-altering about the business of
telling stories: something expansive and liberating and capable of reconfigur
ing the terms within which one experiences the world. It is not my purpose
here argue that Othello’s narrative gift necessarily affects a theater audience
in similar fashion, but it is certainly worth considering the circumstances under
which a dramatist could invest the telling of tales with the peculiar rhetorical
properties that it clearly possesses for Shakespeare’s tragedy. At the least, such
circumstances may say something about how narrativity could be theorized —
and perhaps even experienced — in the Jacobean theater.
In the first instance, then, we may recall that Othello’s stories, with their
propensity to
time and space, repeat the signature gestures of Shake
spearean metatheatrical discourse. From Henry V’s rhetorical question, “Can
this cockpit hold / The vasty fields of France?” (Prologue. 11-12) to Peter
Quince’s claim in A Midsummer Night's Dream that “This green plot shall be
stage, this hawthorn-brake our tiring-house” (3.1.3-4), Shakespeare’s dramatic
technique famously superimposes the foreign ground of fictional narrative upon
a fundamentally bare theatrical space. This theatrical space, in turn, drew its
audience appeal from linguistic representation to a degree that twentieth-cen
tury readers and playgoers, accustomed as we are to different conventions of
dramatic performance, may easily underestimate; as Stephen Orgel has noted,
“[t]heater in 1605 was assumed to be a verbal medium. And acting . . . was a
form of oratory” (16-17). This fact, in turn, implies a particularly tight homol
ogy between Othello’s narrative performances for Desdemona, Brabantio,
etcetera and the narrative performances that were the stock in trade of the
Shakespearean public theater. Thus, developing within a social context in
which its closest analogues and (to the disgust of antitheatrical Puritans) com
petitors for audience attention included such spoken-word media as preaching,
ballad singing, and secular oratory, Shakespeare’s theater discovers its own dou
in the character of Othello. A Deleuzian model of deterritorialization may
thus expand our understanding of how the Renaissance theater could be intu
itively apprehended by its writers and actors
possibly even some of its view
ers.

Published by eGrove, 1998

19

Journal X, Vol. 3 [1998], No. 2, Art. 8

133

Bruce Boehrer

In other words, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming may hold
implications not only for the dramatic relationship between Othello and Des
demona but also for the practical relationship between the forms and the
objects of Shakespearean theatrical representation. To think of storytelling as
a process of becoming is, given the predominantly linguistic nature of the
Renaissance public theater, to suggest that we may understand the stage in the
same way: not simply as a space of imitation; nor as a vehicle for what Deleuze
and Guattari call “a correspondence between relations” (whereby, for example,
Richard Burbage, playing Othello, might address a Globe audience in a
that recapitulates the relations between the character Othello and his various
audiences); nor as a space of Burkean “courtship,” in which every effort at the
transcendence of social estrangement is recuperated into a parallel gesture of
ego-construction. Instead, using Othello as a model,
might propose
alternative view of the Shakespearean theater organized not through the struc
tural dichotomy of being and imitation, but through the more fluid and inde
terminate process of Deleuzian becoming. If nothing else, this fluidity and
indeterminacy
help to account for the peculiar emotional and political
charge associated with the
English popular theater both by its advocates
and its detractors, for both groups arguably find themselves responding, in dif
ferent ways, to the theater’s capacity for rendering human relations transspecif
ic, transpersonal and to this extent transhuman as well. I believe this mode of
theatrical
is particularly well represented in Othello’s final speech.

5.

Othello’s last words comprise his crowning achievement as a storyteller because
they challenge most directly the distinction between actor and character (or, in
more purely narrative terms, between subject and object of representation). In
this respect one may recall Robert Weimann’s analysis of Shakespearean Figurenposition, the spatial disposition of the actor’s body so as to “generate a
unique stage presence that establishes a special relationship between himself
and
fellow actors, the play, or the audience” (230). For Weimann, this spe
cial relationship is an outgrowth of the traditional opposition between upstage
and downstage positions (locus and plated) in the medieval theater, and it leads
to a continuum of dramatic representation that on one end (the platea) privi
leges
actor’s interaction with
audience and at the other extreme privileges
the character’s interaction with other characters. Harry Berger, Jr. has recently
revisited this distinction in order to observe that the actor, as actor, cannot
so easily scripted into an exclusive relationship with the audience, for the sim
ple reason that in his role as a dramatic character the actor is always inevitably
and simultaneously interacting both with other dramatic characters and with
other actors. As Berger asks, “Is Hamlet as Hamlet aware of his fellow actors
or of his fellow characters?” (“The Prince’s Dog” 48). The question is ultimately
unanswerable, for in Deleuzian terms actor and character deterritorialize
another, forming a theatrical parallel to the mutually sustaining relationship of
orchid-wasp to wasp-orchid. As I have argued above, this relationship is also
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refigured, on the level of character alone, through the interaction of Othello and
Desdemona.
In short, the actor threatens to disrupt the essential “standoffishness” or
“division” constitutive of Burkean rhetoric, for the actor himself is always
already subject to multiple ego-structures and multiple modes of articulation.
If, as Deleuze and Guattari maintain, “the unconscious itself [is] fundamental
ly a crowd” (Thousand Plateaus 29), the actor renders this tendency toward pro
liferation particularly explicit, and with threatening implications for any unitary,
self-identified notion of character or personality. With his final words, thus,
Othello elides the roles of actor and character in a way that also forces an eli
between character and audience. “Soft you; a word or two before you go”
(5.2.338) introduces his speech with a pronoun
that points ambiva
lently to the character Lodovico, who is about to bear the wounded Iago off to
torture, and to an audience that is likewise preparing to depart the theater as the
play’s performance draws to an end, while the very next line — “I have done the
state some service” — arguably registers parity between Othello’s role as a ser
vant of the Venetian senate and the King’s Men’s role as servants of the English
crown. Having thus, in his speech’s preamble, made available an elaborate par
allelism between the roles of actor, characters, and
Othello then pro
ceeds to a series of requests, commands, and declarations that render these roles
not only parallel but inextricable and mutually sustaining.
“I pray you, in your letters, / When you shall these unlucky
relate, /
Speak of me as I am” (340-2): Othello asks Lodovico to “relate” his deeds in
“letters” that “speak” of him accurately, and the juxtaposition of contradictory
modes of discourse, one (the written) appropriate to Lodovico and another (the
spoken) more fitting to a theater audience, is arguably more than coincidence.
The operative verb “speak” reappears
line later (“Then must you speak / Of
one that lov’d not wisely but too well” [343-4]), whereas Othello can revert
a clear reliance upon the written word eight lines after that (“Set you down this”
[351]); as a reader or spectator tracks these usages from writing to speaking to
speaking and back again to writing, their aggregate effect is to superimpose
audience upon character. Moreover, in their form as commands or exhortations
dictating a particular spoken or written message, these constructions elide audi
ence with
each onlooker, recalling and relating to others the events of
Othello’s death, steps into the position prepared for him/her by the actor per
forming the role of Othello: “Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate, / Nor
set down aught in malice” (342-3). Telling his own story to us, Othello antic
ipates us (and Lodovico) telling it in turn to others, in the parallel universes of
extratheatrical reality and of dramatic fiction, and we, by telling the story in our
turn, not only recapitulate and perpetuate the narrative function exemplified
Othello himself but also enact the future
demanded by the play’s own
narrative impulse.
This complicated pattern of anticipation and interdependence may also
repeat itself in Othello’s disparaging references to ethnic others: the “base
[Indian]” (or, in the Folio reading, “Judean”) who, like Othello, “threw a pearl
away / Richer than all his tribe” (347-8); and the “malignant and . . . turban’d
Turk” whom Othello recalls slaying in Aleppo (353). On
hand, these
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remarks clearly register the sense of ethnic inferiority that Othello has
by the end of his play; in dispraising the “base [Indian]” and “malignant . . .
Turk,” Othello dispraises himself. Yet this dispraise simultaneously functions
as the vehicle for an assertion of superiority; Othello rises above his base and
malignant self by repeating a gesture of punishment drawn from his own past,
and by doing so he renders the relations between actor, character, and audience
more involuted than ever. “I took by th’ throat the circumcised dog, / And
smote him — thus” (355-6): who is the actor here?
it Burbage playing the
role of Othello, or is it Othello playing the role of Othello, or is it Othello play
ing the role of the “circumcised dog” who receives punishment from Othello in
his role as Othello,
Burbage who, as Othello playing the “
dog,”
receives punishment from himself? And who is the audience? Is it the actor
playing Lodovico, or is it the Venetian senate whose judgment Othello antici
pates, or is it the Othello who anticipates and preempts that senates judgment,
or is it the Globe audience whose judgment Othello likewise anticipates and
seeks to influence or preempt through his performance — an audience that in
its judiciary capacity inevitably recapitulates the workings of the senate
which Othello’s words are also addressed?
The moral of this essay is not that any
of these notions of actor, or
character, or audience must prevail, nor is it that Othello successfully achieves a
sustainable discursive condition in which the “standoffishness” of Burkean
rhetoric is rendered void. But I would, at the least, maintain that Othello envi
sions the possibility of such a condition, and that through the startling narra
tive juxtapositions and conflations of its principal character, the play offers us a
glimpse of what such a condition might be
In the process, too, it may give
us a kind of insight into Shakespeare’s intuitive sense of the theater: of its
appeal and function, and the peculiar nature of the power it may exert over
actors and audiences alike. At
one thing is clear: Othello’s story
telling, for whatever reason, exerts a time-tested ability to manipulate his audi
tors, insisting that they become storytellers — his storytellers — in turn. It is
an insistence to which this essay, like others before it, cannot help but respond.

Notes
1. In the case of Lacan, desire exists as the unassuageable consequence of
the speaking subject’s entry into consciousness and the symbolic order. It
develops through the infant’s mirror-stage estrangement from its mother as
well as from the self-estrangement consequent upon linguistic representation,
and it provides the enduring sense of lack that linguistic utterance is designed
to repair upon immediate local levels, but which stands as the ultimately
ineradicable precondition for utterance itself. Thus, for Lacan, “Discontinuity
. . . is the essential form in which the unconscious first appears to us as a phe
nomenon” (25), while the idea of a unitary consciousness develops as “a sort of
double of the organism in which this false unity is thought to reside” (26). For
Derrida, the immediate focus of différance is the formal self-estrangement of
the signifying function: the fissure that opens up in linguistic representation
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between signifier and signified, the latter of which is primordially different
from and deferred by the former, with the result that “[t]he center [of a signi
function] is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not
belong to the totality .. ., the totality has its center elsewhere” (279). The pri
ority of estrangement within both of these theories of language and conscious
ness helps to relate them to Burkean analysis.
2. For a range of noteworthy examples, see Greenblatt 222-54; Sinfield 2951; Wayne 153-79; Bates 51-60; and Hopkins 159-74.
3. See Sedgwick 35, for instance: Shakespeares “[s]onnets present a male
male love that, like the love of the Greeks, is set firmly within a structure of
institutionalized social relations that are carried out via women: marriage,
name, family, loyalty to progenitors and posterity, all depend on the youths
making a particular use of women that is not, in the abstract, seen as opposing,
denying, or detracting from his bond to the speaker.” In this context, “women
are merely the vehicles by which men breed more men,
the gratification of
other men” (33).
4. Bruce Smith is only
of many recent scholars who have noted that
“[n]o
in Shakespeare’s day would have labeled himself a ‘homosexual.’ The
term itself is a clinical,
coinage of the clinical,
nineteenth
century. ‘Bugger’ and ‘sodomite,’ the closest equivalents in early modern Eng
lish, . .. [lack] exactitude, since ‘buggery’ was also used to refer to bestiality and
‘sodomy’ could cover a variety of heterosexual acts. ... For individuals and their
self-identity this definition, or lack of definition, had enormous consequences”
(11). Thus, as Alan Bray has noted, “To talk of an individual in this period as
being or not being ‘a homosexual’ is an anachronism and ruinously misleading”
(16).
5. Carol Neely, for one, thus notes that “Iago offers to compensate” for
Othello’s loss of Desdemona “with his own love,” and that act 3, scene 3 “con
cludes with Othello’s attempt to replace his love for Desdemona with a . . .
bond with Iago” (91).
6. The relation between discourses of criminality and morbidity is perva
sive in the Renaissance, as well as being fundamentally theological in nature. In
his study of birth abnormalities, for instance, Paré claims that “most often these
monstrous and marvelous creatures proceed from the judgment of God, who
permits fathers and mothers to produce such abominations from the disorder
that they make in copulation, like brutish beasts, in which their appetite guides
them, without respecting the time, or other laws ordained
God and Nature”
(5). Thus Paré’s medical abnormalities serve to punish criminality, just as
Coke’s laws serve to punish “unnatural” and “sinful” behavior: “Buggery is a
detestable and abominable sin . . . against the ordinance of the Creator and
order of nature” (Coke sig. I3v).
7.
See Foucault passim, especially 53-73.
8. Lisa Hopkins, in particular,
that Iago’s approach to narrative rep
resentation is “far more sophisticated” than Othello’s (168), which figures “nar
ration [as] a transparent mode” (163). Yet Hopkins also rightly observes that
Iago “is a poorer narrator and stager than Othello” (168), and the present essay
seeks to account for Othello’s narrative gift as something other than a lack of
sophistication.
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9. For Adelman, “Othello’s black skin” comes, through the process of pro
jection, to serve as “the container for [Iago’s] own interior blackness” (130):
“Insofar as Iago can make Othello
his own blackness as a contami
nation . . . , he succeeds in emptying himself out into Othello” (144).
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The reader, the thinker, the loiterer, the
flâneur, are
of illuminati just as
much as the opium eater, the dreamer,
the ecstatic. And more profane. Not to
mention that most terrible drug — our
selves — which we take in solitude.
—Walter Benjamin, “Surrealism”

I’ve begun to find the loneliness of cruising almost
unbearable, my own loneliness as
as that of oth
ers. Strolling for sex, I now sense a terrifying solitude
my potential partners share — or that I imagine they
do. "Empathy," according to Benjamin, "is the nature
of the intoxication to which the flâneur abandons
himself in the crowd” Flâneur" 55). The flâneur, he
writes, is the man who fills the empty space created
in him by isolation "with the borrowed — and ficti
tious — isolations of strangers” (58). I also find elec
tronic cruising unbearable, chat rooms equally empty
spaces I appreciate Aaron Betsky having called, if not
unbearable, "unreal” (182). I’m that old.
So I’ve been considering an erotic space in which
I’ve never felt lonely. I’ve been remembering episodes
—
ones — involving New York City subways:
the queerest, if not the cruisiest, space of my urban
childhood, adolescence, and youth. Episode One
(childhood): Broadway Local, evening rush hour,
1966. I crawl onto the lap of a black man and fall
asleep. He pretends to
oblivious, according to
mother. Episode Two (adolescence): F train, evening
rush hour, 1973. I’m molested on the way home from
high school by a white man. I pretend to be oblivi-
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ous. Episode Three (youth): Lexington Avenue Express, morning rush hour,
1986. Im cruised by an Arab man on the way to work but don’t speak to him
until we both get off at Grand Central.
I’ve also been remembering literary
real as well as unreal. I’ve
been considering subway episodes in The Motion of Light in Water, Samuel
Delanys 1988 autobiography, and in The Swimming-Pool Library, Alan
Hollinghurst’s 1988 novel. (Hollinghurst and I are Ronald Firbank fans.
Delany and I went to the same high school.) Delany thinks subways them
selves stroll. He pictures them in adolescence at
own pedestrian pace:

July dawns you could still wander the small streets [and see] fires here and
there beside
or another still-standing tenement wall. Off beyond the
Jacob Riis Houses . . . the East River’s
oils nudged the city’s gran
ite embankments or bumped the pilings beneath the Williamsburg Bridge:
girder, cable, and concrete rose from among . . . the movie marquees on
Delancey Street to span the night waters — where cars and subways and
after-dark cruisers took their delicate amble above the blue-black current
banked with lights — before striking deep into Brooklyn’s glittering flank,
above the
Yard. (19)
Delany also pictures subways as somewhere to ogle strangers and
friends — the former no surprise to anyone who’s ever ridden one, the latter no
surprise to anyone who’s attended a “special” public high school. (Kids at
schools
ours — Stuyvesant, Brooklyn Tech, Music and Art — use public
transportation for up to several hours a day.) He can recall having looked “at
hands on bus drivers,... on a friend in school, on subway conductors, [and] on
strangers across from me on the train — black, white, and Hispanic — for
years” (72). (The man is a hand fetishist.) And he can recall — with irony —
having fictionalized an underground communion with Joey, a sexy pal also por
trayed as an idle, isolated flaneur.

Not much happened to Erik Torrent as he made his way through the
pages of [the novel] Lost Stars, . , , Mostly he wandered around the city,
thinking about his problems with his mother. ... I’ made him fifteen,
rather than fourteen — who could possibly be interested in the adventures
of a fourteen-year-old
age — and Joey’s — when I began it)?
there was no way to tell, from reading it, if Erik did or did not go to school.
(Who could possibly be interested in reading about something as dull as
school? Even a school
[Bronx] Science.) From time to time he
in
the subway station, having deep and intense conversations with his bril
liant, witty, compassionate, but darkly troubled (and always nameless!)
friend. (76)
Yet shortly after graduation — not to mention shortly after dropping out of
college, not to mention after marrying Marilyn Hacker (another Science-ite)
— young Delany begins to see subways as terrifying. He develops a “subway
fixation” (374), a fear of either falling or throwing himself under one. The fix
ation, however, isn’t merely phobic. It’s a phobic attraction:
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By the end of October ’64, while Marilyn went to work . . ., I was making
one or two circuitous, ambling trips each day to the Second Avenue subway
station at Houston Street. . . , where, finally, past the turnstile, I would sit
at the top of the stairs from the underground concourse to track level,
clutching the banister rails, feeling myself drawn to the platform, while
some unlocatable force impelled me
pushed me to throw myself
before the next incoming train. When, below, I saw the first cars rush, in
roaring beside the platform, I’d hug my chest and face to the bars and hold
my breath till I broke into a sweat. (I didn’t want to kill myself. Nothing
in my life specifically dissatisfied me — making the compulsion even more
unnerving!) I only realized how much I needed help one evening when a
young policeman
up and pried me loose from the bars I was holding
with his billy club to shoo me out of the station with the logical question
that, in my obsession, I’d somehow never asked: “If you’re afraid of the sub
ways, why do I see you come sit here every day?” (306-7)

Delany did get help, from a therapist named Dr. G. And he and Hacker did
separate.
Delany never actually cruises the subway in this autobiography. Nor does
Delany’s alter ego in the novel The Mad Man (1994), even though he cruises
every other part of the city. It’s a failure — or success — that reminds me of
Benjamin, who
into and out of, but never on, the Paris Métro. (“Is there
anyone who has not been stunned, emerging from the Métro into the open air,
to step into brilliant sunlight?” he writes in One-Way Street [484]. “And yet the
sun shone just as brightly a few minutes earlier, when he went down.”) And
while Will Beckwith, the aristocratic flaneur who narrates The Swimming-Pool
Library, does cruise the London Underground with considerable success, those
subway episodes are framed by ones that emphasize his isolation — in particu
lar his isolation from the heteronormativity that Delany finally transcends,
ironically enough, by transfiguring the subway he’d found so frightening.
(Beckwith would prefer to use a car, the vehicle Betsky calls “the ultimate icon
of cruising” [148], but is driven underground by having had his license sus
pended. “So I made the best of the Tube,” Beckwith writes, “and found it often
sexy and strange, like a gigantic game of chance, in which
got jammed up
against many queer kinds of person. Or it was a sort of Edward Burra scene,
all hats and buttocks and seaside postcard lewdery. Whatever, one always had
to try and see the potential in it” [47]. Dr. G. helps Delany by having him
imagine the subway as transformative. “Think of what it does,” he says.
“You’re walking through one part of the city. Now you suddenly go down
underground. You
’t see anything of the world above. Then, after a loud,
racketing ride, you suddenly come upstairs, like a swimmer breaking through
the surface. You walk out and everything is completely different — changed.
You’re in a whole new place. Now you say you’ve been taking the subway here
to the hospital every day. That’s very
— maybe unnecessarily so. But the
next time you come, as soon as you go down the steps, don’t let yourself get lost
in where you are. Forget about being afraid or not being afraid. . . . Concen
trate on your destination [instead]” [333].) True, Beckwith does make the best
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of it, ignoring an "older [white] admirer” who nearly molests him in between
Bond Street and Notting Hill Gate on the Central Line ("one of the strap
hangers, a man whom I spotted eyeing the erection which even the shortest
journey on tube or bus always gives
inclined to swing or jolt towards me as
the train lost or gained speed, and the pressure of
knee on mine, and of his
eyes in
lap, irritated me” [93-4]), picking up a younger white admirer in
between Notting Hill Gate and Holland Park (they don’t converse until they
both get off), and otherwise abandoning himself to the intoxicating, if ficti
tious, isolations of strangers. "I was certainly not alone in this carriage in slid
ing my thoughts between the legs of other passengers,” he writes. ""Desires,
brutal or tender, silent but evolved, were in the shiftless air, and hung about
each jaded traveller, whose life was not as good as it might have been” (269).
But the novel begins with a primal scene that none, of this activity eradicates, a
scene in which an initial fantasy of the isolation of black men who actually work
for a living is corrected by two others: a fantasy of their vocational communion,
and a fantasy of their domestic communion with wives. (Beckwith prefers
remain idle; he also
black men.)
I
home on the last train. Opposite
sat a
of London
Transport maintenance men, one small, fifty, decrepit, the other a severely
handsome black of about thirty-five. Heavy canvas bags were tilted against
their boots, their overalls open above their vests in the stale heat of the
Underground. They
about to start work! I looked at them with a kind
of swimming, drunken wonder, amazed at the thought of their inverted
lives, of how their occupation depended
our
but could only be
pursued, I saw it now, when we were not travelling. As we went home and
sank into unconsciousness gangs of these men, with lamps and blow-lamps,
and long-handled ratchet spanners, freakishly functional, rolled slowly and
clangorously forwards from sidings unknown to the commuter. Such lone
ly, invisible work must bring on strange thoughts; the men who walked
through every tunnel of the labyrinth, tapping the rails, must feel such reas
surance seeing the lights of others at last approaching, voices calling out
their friendly, technical patter. The black was looking at his loosely cupped
hands: he was very aloof, composed, with an air of massive, scarcely con
scious competence — I felt more than respect, a kind of tenderness for him.
I imagined his relief at getting home and taking his boots off and going to
bed as the day brightened around the curtains and the noise of the
built up outside. He turned his hands over and I saw the pale gold band of
his wedding-ring. (1)

And the novel’s final subway reference involves a similar scene in which the
black man’s erotic attention has turned from wife to child:
I told [James] of a thing that had happened on the train. It was while I was
coming to see him and had taken place just in front of me, an ordinary
thing and yet calmly beyond the turmoil of my own mood, in fact wonder
fully self-sufficient and entire. Among the crowd that got on at Tottenham
Court Road were a black
with a baby: they took the two places
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against the glass partition, so that the man and I sat... knee to knee. Once
he had looked at me politely as I shifted to make room for him he had no
interest in me at all — and I hardly took notice of him. His wife held the
impassive and very young child in her arms: despite the heat it was dressed
in a quilted one-piece suit, but with the hood back. My thoughts
all
elsewhere, though I saw the man, about thirty, I suppose, lean over the
baby’s open flawless face, and smile down on it, out of pure pleasure and
love. His fingertips moved from his own softly bearded lips and gently
stroked and almost held within their span his child’s lolling wispy head.
His other hand lay loosely in
lap, and it took me a while to see that he
was hiding and coaxing — yes — a hard-on in his respectable grey slacks.
I was not aroused by this; but did I dwindle, if only for a moment, in the
fact of their glowing, fertile closeness? I felt perhaps I did. (279-80)
All these episodes — my own, Delany’s, Hollinghurst’s — suggest that
although the subway isn’t the kind of space Betsky calls queer, and although it
isn’t somewhere flâneurs stroll, it is, to be a bit obvious, unique, uniquely urban,
and uniquely
And to be less obvious, if rather optimistic (or nostalgic),
the subway is a space, perhaps the only space, in which gay (or proto-gay) men
can both discover their sexualities and discover that these sexualities involve
(fictitious)
of communion — of intimacy — that don’t, or needn’t, neces
sitate —
necessarily precipitate — the kind of sexual communion that can
seem equally fictitious, if only afterward. (What about women? What about
flâneuses? That’s not for me to say, and both Betsky and Benjamin imply that
there’s nothing to say.) For Betsky, queer public space is a deformation of oth
erwise useless space, an appropriation for the perverse purpose of gay sex. It’s
also, like queer private space, the domain of middle-class white men. This
doesn’t describe the subway,
otherwise useful space that whites no longer
dominate and in which
can’t have sex. For Benjamin, the flâneur, unlike
the pedestrian who "wedges” himself into the crowd, “demand[s]
room
and [is] unwilling to forego the life of a gentleman of leisure” ("Flâneur” 54).
The flâneur, moreover, controls his locomotion. This does not describe the
usual subway rider, a worker — or student — who either sits or stands, in no
position (during rush hour) to demand elbow room, and at the
of a
machine that does the strolling for him, only much too quickly and according
to a predetermined course.
Who, then, can help us understand the subway, annotate the Underground,
commemorate the Métro itself? Michel Certeau, perhaps, who writes about
the ""travelling incarceration” of the railroad (111). (Benjamin, in a passage sim
ilarly informed by Baudelaire’s sense of ""spleen,” calls the train station a
""prison-world” [""The Work of Art” 236].) For de Certeau, railroad cars, like
subway cars,
erotic speculation, ""the strange fablés of our private stories”
(112). But because they contain private toilets, railroad cars, unlike subway
cars, also enable passengers to have sex: ""Only the restrooms offer an escape
from the closed system. They are a lovers’ [sic] phantasm” (111). For de
Certeau, railroad cars, like subway cars, enable fantasies of individual autono
my: ""the Robinson Crusoe adventure of the travelling noble soul that [can]
believe itself
because it [is] surrounded by glass and iron” (114). (Beck-
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with’s impression of the “self-sufficient” integrity of the black family, as
opposed to his "dwinding sense of self, is both anomalous, given that subway
riders usually travel alone, and indicative of the author’s subliminal homopho
bia.) But because one sees cities, towns, and landscapes through that glass, rail
road cars, unlike subway cars, are saddening: they proffer “the (‘melancholy’)
pleasure of seeing what one is separated from.” Subway tunnels, of course, are
dark ( You
t see anything of the world above”; there are no “phantasmago
rias of [protean] space” in which to abandon oneself, no crowded scenes in
which “the city is now a landscape, now a room” [Benjamin, “Paris” 159,156]),
subway windows are reflective, and other passengers one’s only prospect. In
other words, subway riders see themselves alone, yet imagine themselves
together. And they’re glad to do so.
A note on seeing. Benjamin wasn’t saddened by
what he was sepa
rated from while taking a “solitary ride” on a Moscow street car.
I was feeling quite contented with this forced, nearly pointless trip through
a part of the city with which I was completely unfamiliar. For the first time
I noticed the absolute similarity between certain parts of the outskirts and
the harbor streets of Naples. I also saw the enormous Moscow radio trans
mitter, whose shape is different from any other I have seen. On the right
side of the avenue that the streetcar was following there were occasional
mansions, on the left side were scattered
or cottages, open field for
the most. The village character of Moscow suddenly leaped out at you
undisguisedly, evidently, unambiguously in the streets of its suburbs. There
is probably no other city whose gigantic open spaces have such an amor
phous, rural quality, as if their expanse were always being dissolved by bad
weather, thawing snow, or rain. (Moscow Diary 112)

Nor was he gladdened by the subway-like experience of not seeing through a
Moscow street
window. “Through the ice-covered windows you can never
make out where the vehicle has just stopped. If you do find out, it is of little
avail. The way to the exit is blocked by a human wedge” (“Moscow” 112). Two
appropriate responses to these passages are that Benjamin and de Certeau
needn’t agree with one another, and that riders always know where subways
stop, because they see station signs along the platforms. (If Imagist, they see
— and imagine — other signs as well. To quote “In a Station of the Metro,”
by Ezra Pound: “The apparition of these faces in the crowd; / Petals on a wet,
black bough.”) But it’s also important to recognize that Benjamin prefers to
see cities, or at least to eroticize city-dwellers, in fleeting glimpses — a prefer
we may not share, or a visual pleasure we may wish to prolong. “The
delight of the city-dweller,” he writes, “is not so much love at first sight as love
at last sight” ("Flaneur
And public transportation, as Benjamin himself
acknowledged, tends to prolong the fleeting glimpse:
“Interpersonal relationships in big cities are distinguished by a marked pre
ponderance of the activity of the eye over the activity of the ear. The main
reason for this is the public means of transportation. Before the develop
ment of buses, railroads, and trams in the nineteenth century, people had
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never been in a position of having to look at one another for long minutes
or even hours without speaking to one another.” This situation was ... not
a pleasant one. Flâneur" 38, quoting Georg Simmel)
A note on imagining. Although neither Benjamin nor de Certeau helps
theorize Delany’s subway fixation, common sense — if not personal experience
— does. Common sense (which Barthes denigrates as doxa) tells us that the
subway — New York’s in particular — is
especially terrifying and potential
ly dangerous space, “haunted by the specter of disaster” (Williams 187). Both
criminal and technological catastrophe lurk at the back of the mind. Is he
going to mug me? Is he going to murder me? Are we going to crash? Why
are we stalled? What if there’s a track fire? What if there’s a bomb? It’s a long,
almost unconscious litany. And so if the railroad, as de Certeau suggests, “com
bines dreams with technology” (113), the subway combines both dreams and
nightmares with technology — a unique combination that must result in a wider
range of
and fantasies, or phobic attractions, than Delany’s alone can
represent. I, for
along with other Science-ites, have always been fascinat
by the infamous “third rail.” Touch it — just touch it — and you die.
Dreams and nightmares. I’m speaking metaphorically, of course. Even
though, despite the litany, it’s easy to snooze there — a function of the narcot
ic quality of uncontrollable locomotion as well as of the fact that sleep enables
us folly to ignore irritating invasions of personal space — and even though the
tunnels are dark, subway cars are too bright — too fluorescent — to seem noc
turnal. No flickering gaslight. No nineteenth-century noctambulisme
("Flâneur" 50). No rider appears other than he is. No one appears as you may
envision him. And no one now emerging from the Métro is stunned to be step
ping into brilliant sunlight. Seeing and imagining, in other
remain dis
tinct, nonphantasmagorical, because the use of a subway isn’t like the use of a
back room. It’s not like the “descent” to la chambre noire where, according
Barthes, “I invariably expose my loneliness” (105).
I also keep remembering another episode — a recurrent one. A recurrent
and rather prolonged dream. Episode Four (adolescence): F train, evening rush
hour, 1973 through 1976. Two severely handsome young men, both in blue
jeans and flannel shirts, both softly bearded (one’s a redhead, one’s a brunet),
both white, I’m afraid — two young men always sit opposite me between Roo
sevelt Avenue and 179th Street. Are they co-workers? Are they college stu
dents? Invariably, their knees touch. Do my thoughts slide between their legs?
Not yet. I think they’re friends. I think they’re more than friends. I think —
and it doesn’t occur to me that I’m being heteronormative, homophobic, or
racist — I think they’re my future. No, not “think.” Hope.
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All is possible, but all is in doubt. All
things have lost their concert. In the
very dawn of his humanist affirmation,
the individual is assailed by the very
doubts, the very criticisms, the very ques
tioning with which Copernicus and
Galileo set free the dormant forces of the
universe, expanding it to a
that the dwarfed individual, in response,
must gigantically display his unleashed
passions, his unbridled pride, the cruel
uses of his political power, the Utopian
dream of a new city of the sun, the
hunger for a new human space with
which to confront the new, mute space of
the universe.
—Carlos Fuentes
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In 1610 Galileo fascinated and shocked Europe with
the publication in The Starry Messenger of the obser
vations he made using the telescope. The conse
quences of this small volume were more far-ranging
than probably even Galileo anticipated. While his
claims about new stars and new satellites
of
considerable interest in scientific circles,
book
also altered not just what people knew but how they
knew it. In her classic treatment of this subject, Mar
jorie Nicolson argues that of all the developments
associated with the “New Science” it was the tele
scope that most profoundly changed how people
understood the world (“Telescope” 234-5). Although
Galileo's Starry Messenger
be a somewhat unusu-
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al case, its example nonetheless represents a significant conflict between read
ing and observation as ways of acquiring knowledge. Galileo’s text reveals the
extent to which many of the new methods of science depended increasingly on
observation rather than on textual authority. Thus, Galileo documents his
findings through illustration and description, rather than through a textual
authority such as Ptolemy. Moreover, transforming telescopic vision to textual
representation is the only means
which Galileo
share his findings since
he obviously cannot furnish the reader with a telescope. Reading therefore
becomes the medium through which the instrument of the telescope initially
becomes known. If what is seen through the telescope is inevitably not the
same when seen on the page, then neither is what is seen on the page the same
when read through the cultural changes produced by the telescope.
A well known incident in Part II of Don Quixote (1614), published four
years after The Starry Messenger, exemplifies the tension between reading and
observation produced by the invention of the telescope. Without considering
the possible impact that the telescope may have had on Cervantes’ conception
of Don Quixote, Edward Dudley
recently argued that Cervantes confronts
through Quixote a world full of “new modes of knowing” such that the novel
“becomes a response to the questions that the New Science posed about the
possibilities of knowing” (2).1 As a text that theorizes more rigorously perhaps
than any other how reading changes the
you see, Don Quixote explores in
the adventure with Clavileño how the telescope alters what you see. This
episode can be understood as a fantasy that enacts the conflict that the new
ways of seeing exemplified by the telescope brought to older practices of read
ing. Although Sancho, being illiterate, is of course one of the remarkably few
characters in Quixote who is not a reader, it is on this fact that the episode with
Clavileño turns. In this adventure, Sancho Panza
what he thinks is a voy
age into space on the magical wooden horse Clavileño. As if he were using a
telescope, Sancho’s simulated ride on the horse becomes the means by which he
is able to explore starry distances without ever leaving the ground. As someone
who insists that what he sees is true, Sancho becomes a
here for philoso
phers of the New Science who wanted to rely not on texts but instead on per
sonal observation as a means of learning the truth about the world. Himself
not a follower of textual authority, Sancho thus aligns himself with the practices
of the New Science when he suggests that it was curiosity — his desire “to
know what is forbidden and denied me” — that made him, he says, take off his
blindfold mid-flight (Cervantes 731).2
When Sancho gives his account of his “observations” of and from the
moon, he invokes contemporary reaction to what scientists such as Galileo
reported having seen through their telescopes. Listening to Sancho’s com
pletely unexpected account of how he “discovered the whole globe” in the sky,
Sancho’s audience responds with many of the objections that contemporaries
had to the equally startling reports of Galileo’s discoveries with the telescope.
Claiming that he took off his blindfold upon reaching the region of fire, San
cho first insists that he looked down to see an earth the size of a mustard seed
peopled by men the size of hazel nuts. The duchess challenges
“it
is clear that if the earth appeared to you like a grain of mustard seed and each
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man like a hazel nut, one man alone would have covered the whole earth” (734).
As the duchess’s complaint implicitly
the telescope shows objects at
a great distance only through a kind of distortion. Despite his protests, Sancho
concurs with the duchess since he acknowledges that his view cannot determine
how a part (hazel-nut men) is related to a larger whole (a mustard-seed plan
et).
Understanding this episode from the perspective of the telescope depends
on recognizing that Sancho’s
occurs because, unlike Quixote, he is
not a reader. Arranged by the duke and the duchess, this “adventure” begins as
an elaborate re-enactment of their readings in
The horse of brass
from Cleomadés, the hippogriff in Orlando furioso, the fantastic voyages in the
Arabian Nights, perhaps Lucian’s True History — these are among the romance
subtexts that inform the way that the duke and duchess construct this adven
ture.3 Where Quixote knows such literary subtexts intimately, Sancho responds
to the “experience” that the duke and duchess create by insisting on the truth of
his personal observations as he has experienced them through the medium of
Clavileño. Sancho thus describes how after passing the moon he left the horse
to play with the goats of the “Cabrillas” constellation (nanny goat, Pleaides).
Upon being challenged by Quixote as to the impossibility of having played with
these starry goats, Sancho substantiates his claims by describing the colors of
the goats. He avers that
saw colors in the stars — red, green, and
goats
— that were invisible to everyone else. As if in response to those who ques
tioned whether the telescope would work the same way in the supralunar realm
as it did in the sublunar one, Sancho transforms this challenge to his experi
ence’s observational validity into an improbable if irrefutable defense of his fan
tastic story.
In this episode Cervantes ultimately refuses to resolve the conflict between
observation and reading brought about by the new technology of the telescope.
Although this story invokes the telescope only as a subtext, it is consistent with
how the telescope entered the European imagination.4 Seizing upon its fan
tastic qualities, both critics and admirers of the telescope imagined its power in
texts that dramatized the utopian possibilities it seemed to represent. As with
Sancho’s magical ride, the telescope was
with the “Utopian dream”
that Carlos Fuentes describes in his introduction to Don Quixote, because it was
instrument of distant vision. Insofar as the telescope was often credited with
remarkable powers, it is unsurprising that it would be incorporated into a
that in some sense made it possible better to see this world by refracting it
through images of a distant world: the utopia.5 What the telescope and the
utopia share is not simply a powerfully distorted image of the world, since what
the utopia attempts as a genre is significantly more than just a fantastic imag
ining of the unattainable.6 As Fredric Jameson has demonstrated, utopias are
structured to put two conflicting possibilities in relation to one another as a way
of working out otherwise unresolvable cultural problems. If critics have noticed
the prominence of utopia as a genre in works that deal topically with the inven
tion of the telescope, then it is because these utopian fictions themselves con
stitute what Jameson identifies as a “process” that explores the conflict between
reading and experience associated with the telescope as a new way of seeing
(81).

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol3/iss2/8

36

150

Editors: Vol. 3, No. 2 (1999): Full issue

Journal x.

In a provocative reassessment of the way that the early modern utopia
develops, Marina Leslie has recently argued that utopias are neither "straight
forward social blueprint” nor fixed literary genre but rather “a complex textual
practice enmeshed in a web of historical contingencies” (1). She thus argues for
the need “to consider utopia as a kind of edgy, multiple, and palimpsestic way
of reading (2; emphasis added).7 In this essay I would like to extend Leslies
argument by in some sense inverting it. As recent work in textual studies and
the history of the book has begun to make clear, reading is a contested activity
in this period and, as such, reading as a means to knowledge comes at times
be perceived as
almost unrealizable ideal. Though not usually seen as linked
texts, Johannes Kepler’s Dream (1634) and Margaret Cavendish’s Description of
a New World Called the Blazing World (1666) represent two compelling exam
ples of how an emphasis on observation and experimentation makes reading
problematic in the context of early modern scientific
These two
utopias do not just give readers
of the new technology; they also make
the methods of the new technology a part of the reader’s experience of the text.
Keplers Dream is a description of how the earth is perceived from the perspec
tive of the moon. This alternative view of earth is then set inside an elaborate
fairy tale frame narrative and annotated with hundreds of footnotes.
Cavendish’s Blazing World describes the voyages of a protagonist who somehow
escapes into an alternative realm where her experiences with scientific
tion become a means for looking back at the earth. Kepler and Cavendish fol
low the practice of earlier utopias in using an elaborate frame narrative as a
structure that separates the reader from whatever ideal world is being imagined.
Both texts thus show how the frame is therefore both a means of access to an
imagined ideal and a barrier ever realizing
Reading is in most early modern utopias not unlike the bridge across the
river Andydrus in Thomas More’s Utopia: although we may never know how
long it is or precisely how it gets us closer to Utopia, it nonetheless allows us
reach, however tentatively, impossible ideals through imaginative self-projec
tion (Marin, “Toward a Semiotic” 266; More 5). It is in this context that Peter
Ruppert thus speaks of utopias as “tentative and provisional explorations” that
only achieve a “dynamic process of discovery” through the active engagement of
the reader (23-4). The insistence on texts as physical artifacts (see, for instance,
the Aldine Press editions in the Utopia) thus emphasizes how reading provides
key access to these otherwise unapproachable imaginative territories. For
Kepler and Cavendish, reading is considerably more important and yet also
considerably more vexed, since in their texts the frame narrative becomes a kind
of meditation on the act of reading in which we are engaged. Depicting read
ing as instances of distortion, delusion, and dream through an association with
the telescope, the frame in these utopias becomes a narrative realization of the
act of reading. Understanding the ways in which reading involves a kind of dis
tortion comparable to that of the telescope, Kepler and Cavendish construct
their utopias as a
of creating, albeit in fictional form, a site/sight where
reading theory and observational practice can be imagined if not realized. Aug
menting recent work in the history of early modern reading practices, this essay
considers these practices as they were theorized by
and Cavendish
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themselves. For
and Cavendish, reading is not so much the way to
utopian ideal as it is that ideal.
The manner in which these two texts are utopias about reading can be seen
in how they
published. Kepler’s Dream was published jointly with his
translation into Latin of Plutarchs Defacie orbe lunae.8 Cavendish’s Blazing
World was likewise published jointly with her Observations Upon Experimental
Philosophy. Kepler translates — and sometimes mistranslates — Plutarch as
part of an ongoing attempt to reconcile a traditional understanding of reading
with new practices in science. Kepler rereads the most self-consciously fictive
parts of his classical sources to transform them into scientifically relevant doc
uments. The Dream uses the utopia as a genre to integrate the ways of reading
that Kepler associates with Plutarch,
and Lucian into the new kinds of
knowledge being discovered through the telescope. If Kepler used the Dream
to reconcile humanistic reading practices with his
Margaret
Cavendish sought in the Blazing World to accommodate her readings of recent
scientific texts to
understanding of herself as a writer. Cavendish’s utopia
examines what it means to read contemporary works in natural philosophy —
and in particular those that claim to exemplify the “New Philosophy” that she
associated with experimentalism. By publishing these texts together with their
utopias, Kepler and Cavendish depict how the practice of reading becomes
complicated by new visual technologies.

Johannes Kepler’s Dream was the first fictional work to see the earth from a
specifically Copernican perspective.9 Kepler did not conceive of the Dream as
"proof” of the Copernican hypothesis, since he never seems to have truly
doubted it. Rather, the Dream is an argument for the Copernican hypothesis
that nostalgically projects a utopian world in which seeing and knowing were
joined as they apparently had been in the pre-Copernican world. Despite the
fact that Kepler claimed that the purpose of the Dream was "to use the exam
ple of the moon, to build up an argument in favor of the motion of the earth”
(36), the work was of comparatively little scientific importance. Critical dis
cussions of the Dream have generally separated Kepler’s presentation of
sci
entific
at the center of the text from the complex textual apparatus that
surrounds
Kepler’s readers have thus emphasized the scientific accuracy of
his representation of what the earth would look like without recognizing that
Kepler is also indulging in a fantasy world in which mediation and distortion
would not interfere with what we see and know (Nicolson, "Kepler” 276-7;
Manuel and Manuel 212; Lane vii). Understood in this context, Kepler’s fan
tasy about unproblematic knowledge works as a kind of solution to the
lenges set out in the frame narrative.
Kepler seeks this solution not only as a scientist but as a reader. As has
often been
the final form of the Dream stands as a correction to mis
readings of earlier versions of the text that had led to witchcraft charges being
brought against Kepler’s mother.10 Actually, though, Kepler’s attempt
amend earlier readings of his text became over the course of a number of years
part of a larger attempt to develop a theory that reflected upon the reading
practices that informed
scientific work. For if Kepler is best known for his
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use of observational data to construct new star charts and tables, it should also
be remembered that it was Tycho Brahe, not Kepler, who did the observing. As
a scientific observer, therefore, Kepler was also a reader. As Anthony Grafton
points out, Kepler relied on written descriptions from other astronomers as a
kind of visual aid for
observational work. He thus used Cardanos "crisp,
well-chosen adjectives to compensate for weakness of his own eyesight . . .
seeing] what a comet’s tail actually looked like” ("Kepler”
More general
ly, Kepler’s work testifies to an active and wide-ranging use of classical sources.
J. V. Field demonstrates in this context how the importance that reading had
for Kepler has become an impediment to subsequent attempts to understand
his work. Kepler’s commentaries on his own work thus reread both classical
authorities and his own earlier writings (Field 163-7,172-6).
Grafton con
cludes, while new scientific practices may have changed the
in which read
ing was discussed, it nonetheless remained the model for "all complex forms of
learning” ("Kepler” 565).
’s work as a whole demonstrates in this context
"how much the
of reading meant to him” (563).11 Kepler theorizes in the
Dream the interest in reading that Grafton identifies as being characteristic of
the early modern period as a whole. The questions about reading and observ
ing that structure Kepler’s more strictly scientific
become the narrative
subject of the Dream. Kepler keeps returning to this otherwise intellectually
insignificant text — revising, restructuring, explaining, adding notes to the
notes — because it gives him a way to think through in narrative form
own
scientific practices.
In contrast to the scientific texts that Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer
have described as transforming
modern readers into vicarious observers,
readers of the Dream are not observers.12 Kepler initially uses the fictional
form precisely
he wants to describe something that no one —
mat
ter how good the telescope — could see from earth. The literal separation of
reader from observer is prominent in a letter that
wrote to Paul Guldin,
which is included in a "selenographical appendix” at the end of the published
version of the Dream. Kepler’s letter thanks Guldin for giving him a telescope
and presents him with a copy of the Dream, suggesting that the text will be a
compensation for the telescope. Kepler is not simply employing the rhetoric of
courtly patronage; he intends his remarks literally, saying that

Since you are the first from whom I hear that this treasure [the telescope]
is to pass into my possession, you are also the first to whom I think I should
offer some fruit of literary enjoyment. ... If you direct your mind to the
towns on the moon, I shall prove to you that I see them. (150-1)

Having just given Kepler the astronomical tool that would have allowed him to
"direct” his eyes to find proof of these new observations, Guldin can only see
through his imagination. What is true for Guldin is also true for other con
temporary readers of the Dream: they must use their imaginations since it is
not
for anyone — with or without a telescope — to see what the earth
looks like from the moon.
Kepler therefore constructs this text so that it is in some sense a dream
about reading and observation. One day, after reading about the legendary his
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tory of Bohemia, the narrator falls asleep and dreams that he is reading a book
about a man named Duracotus. A fictional version of Kepler, Duracotus is able
to learn about the moon and stars through the discoveries and revelations of a
daemon spirit who shows him a
of Levania (the moon) that comprises
the central part of the text. If Kepler is reading at the outset of the narrative,
he is also involved in "watching the stars and the moon” (11). Yet, even as
Kepler invokes these two methods of acquiring
he rejects them as
insufficient insofar as it is through a dream that he has his vision of the moon.
His dream in turn replicates these conflicting acts of observation and reading.
In dreaming that he is reading yet another book — one obtained at the Frank
furt book fair —
reminds his readers that this book fair was the best
source for new scientific books that were innovative,
or even cen
sored.13 Yet, at the
time, this dream about reading is itself presented as a
kind of astronomical observation: the dream begins with the drowsiness
brought on by a late night watching stars and ends with a storm that would
have made astronomical observations as well as astronomical dreams impossi
ble (11, 28).
Like Keplers narrative, Duracotus is associated with forms of reading and
observation that define contemporary scientific practice. Duracotus learns not
just Danish but modern methods of science when he studies with the
astronomer Tycho Brahe at his observatory complex on Hven. In the Dream,
Uraniborg is represented as a
that combines modern observational tech
niques with modern reading practices. As Kepler knew from having served as
Brahes assistant at Uraniborg, Brahe had an enormous, room-sized brass quad
rant affixed to the wall that became a key tool in the "highly precise method of
observation” with which Brahe "fought against the very nature of human vision
and emerged victorious” (47 n.
Yet, as Kepler suggests, studies at Urani
borg also emphasized reading along with observation: Brahe had an extensive
library collection, a paper mill, and a printing press.14 Duracotus has thus
learned both by using new observational tools and by reading books: "things
which you saw with your own eyes or learned by hearsay or absorbed from
books” (14). Uraniborg
in the frame narrative as the best attempt
bring together reading and observation as the two dominant means of acquir
ing new scientific knowledge. Kepler suggests in this reflection on Uraniborg
that even Brahe's dream could not, in this world, be fully achieved: despite his
training, Duracotus does not "acquire new knowledge” through the methods
taught at Uraniborg but through the
from the daemon, whom Kepler
associates with knowledge. The purpose of Kepler's elaborate frame narrative,
then, is to portray the acts of reading and observation as important but finally
never adequate means of acquiring knowledge.
In his copious footnotes, Kepler addresses his
to different kinds of
. He names particular individuals; he addresses readers of his earlier
works; he imagines that spectators who had observed his astronomical demon
strations are now reading this work (39 n. 8; 108 n. 154; 57 nn. 44, 46, 47).
Often employing the imperative, Kepler repeatedly gives his readers instruc
tions on how to read his Dream: "Interpret this physically” (64 n. 57); "Refer
back to Note 28” (49 n. 31); "You who are annoyed, forgive me” (65 n. 59). In
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so doing, Kepler’s footnotes inscribe the figure of the reader into the text as he
both anticipates and tries to script the
of his readers. At the same
time, Kepler is in the notes also his own best reader. As a record of Kepler’s
different and changing interpretations of his own work, the notes exemplify the
range of his reading practices. Kepler at times reads his Dream as an allegory
in a manner in keeping with the hermeneutics of medieval theology; he demon
strates his familiarity with the reading practices of humanist philology by gloss
ing his text with notes on relevant scholarly literature; elsewhere he provides
scientific explanation and interpretation more characteristic of the New Sci
ence. In this context, Kepler’s notes to the text likewise problematize the rela
tionship between reading and observing. When he discusses the origin of the
Dream, Kepler insists that his work preceded both observational studies and his
reading in classical sources. Thus, at the outset, Kepler describes how “exceed
ingly amazed” he was that his ideas corresponded so closely with Plutarch’s
“because they did not at all come to me from reading this book” (32 n.
In
discussing the mountains on the moon — one of the most famous conclusions
of The Starry Messenger — Kepler similarly insists that “this detail of the Dream
is older than the Dutch telescope” (125 n. 207). At these moments Kepler
seems to participate in a positivistic view of his own scientific
Yet,
Kepler’s text elsewhere gives other, conflicting accounts for the sources of his
ideas.15 What is important is finally not where Kepler got his
but that his
notes reproduce the structure of the
in suggesting that knowledge does
not come from either reading or observing.
As the frame narrative to the Dream suggests, Kepler shares with
Cavendish a recognition of the limitations to both reading and observation in
the practice of science. Since Copemicanism makes it clear that man is not the
measure of his universe, Kepler imagines in Levania a world and a people who
are the measure of their universe. Kepler thus depicts the inhabitants of Leva
nia as a fantastic consequence of the physical reality of their world: having both
a “monstrous size” and a “short lifespan,” the physical being of these creatures
is in keeping with the astronomical circumstances of their world (27).16
emphasizes how man is neither the measure of his world nor physically suited
to apprehend other worlds. With a darkness uncharacteristic of imaginary voy
ages during this period, Kepler
in detail how those who investigate
this world will suffer pain until they are almost “torn to pieces” (71 n. 68). The
Levanians by contrast realize a relationship to their physical environment that
allows them direct and unmediated access to knowledge. They need neither
books nor telescopes to know their world. Even as Kepler purports to be
demonstrating the Copernican theory, he represents the Levanian world
through a pre-Copernican understanding of man.
Where the frame narrative identifies a conflict between observation and
reading as the key problem of modern knowledge, the utopia at the heart of the
narrative imagines a world that reconciles this conflict through its physical real
ity. The utopian central section inverts the normal situation in which we make
claims about the earth based on our observations of the moon. Kepler asks us
instead to imagine being on the moon while looking back at the earth. In try
ing to portray what the earth looks like from the moon, Kepler renames these
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celestial bodies to accord with the way this change in perspective also alters how
they appear to observers. The moon that we see primarily as white (lebhana,
luna, selene, selas) becomes Levania, while the earth that they perceive as rotat
ing is the Volva (volere) (78 nn. 89, 90). As we have seen, Levania's lunar world
is one where knowledge is
from evidence that is clearly and continual
ly visible to an eye unaided by the telescope:
is knowing. The most
remarkable feature of the Levanian landscape is that the earth — four times as
large as the moon — can always be
in the sky. It is, the daemon says,
"always visible . . . fixed in place, then, as though it
attached to the heav
ens with a nail” (22). Because the Volva appears to Levanians as if it were four
times the size of their own globe, the Volva’s "size and brilliance ... is practi
cally never hidden, even at new Volva.” As a result, this world
a natural
solution to two of the most pressing epistemological problems of the seven
teenth century: telling time and determining the longitude. The Volva thus
becomes a visible celestial manifestation of the truth.
Consequently, Kepler’s Dream can describe a world in which knowledge is
based on direct observation in a
that is not physically possible on earth.17
The constancy of the Volva allows the Levanians to determine both the hour
and their location simply by looking up at the sky. What Kepler’s original read
ers would have recognized immediately is that the Levanian world solves the
problem of how to keep time and determine longitude. As the work of David
Landes suggests, this was a serious problem in the seventeenth century (Lan
des 84,132,145; Howse 2-54). In his Learned Treatise of Globes (1639), Robert
Hues complained that through sailors’ ignorance of how to calculate latitude

there have been many errors committed in navigation, and many whole
countries also removed out of their owne proper situation, and translated
into places of others. (169)
Although the miscalculations of ships on such north-south passages were rela
to
in comparison toreference
those made on east-west voyages, errors occurred
ly fewcreate
because there was no reliable
to make such calculations. Since at least the
time of Ptolemy’s Geography it had been known that calculating longitude
entailed comparing the time in different parts of the globe.18 The different
proposals for doing this were all predicated upon one of two assumptions about
the earth’s position in the universe or, more particularly, about man’s ability
find some fixed point of
to the universe. The first group sought
find or
a reference point inside the boundaries of the planet. Peter and
Phillip Apian, Guillaume de Nautonier, and even the mad Mathematician of
Cervantes’s El coloquio de los perros located this standard of measure within the
earth itself when they looked for declination from the magnetic pole. After it
was realized that the ore content of mountains and other large land masses
made standard declination impossible, two British mathematicians suggested
that a series of "fixed points” be artificially constructed on the surface of the
earth. In this proposal lamented by Dr. Arbuthnot as having "spoiled one of my
papers of Scribelerus, which was a proposal for the longitude not very unlike,”
William Whiston and Humphrey Ditton suggested that vessels moored at
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intervals along travel routes should shoot off flares each night at midnight,
according to Peak of Tenerife time.19 Gemma Frisius, William Cunningham,
and proponents of the chronometer method gave man the power to create such
a point of reference with what Cunningham calls the "parfaite clocke artificial-ly made” — a perfectly sound plan that was just not yet feasible (110).
Each of these methods essentially sought to dissociate time-telling from
reliance on non- or supra-terrestrial phenomena and, in doing so, to
a
self-contained, self-referential earth. The second, more popular solution the
longitude question sought a point of
outside the boundaries of the
earth in the form of predictable
phenomena that could be observed and
recorded at different points on the globe simultaneously. In this model, the
skies themselves became a kind of clock. These methods calculated longitude
by observing the relative positions of different-celestial bodies: the moon to the
sun (Ptolemy’s lunar eclipse method), Jupiters satellites to Jupiter (Galileo’s
planetary eclipse method), or the moon to the fixed stars (Johann Werner’s
lunar distance method). In relying on phenomena that were in some way dif
ficult to observe, such methods were, as Kepler concludes, "very laborious and
uncertain” (98).
Kepler’s utopia circumvents the impediments to knowledge on earth
because the monstrous size of Volva ensures that for the Levanians time is
always known. Where most observers after Galileo looked at the moon’s spots
as evidence of its changing nature, Kepler directs
readers’ attention to a
comparable progression of spots visible on the earth itself.20 Not indications of
inconstancy, these spots instead mark the passing of time.

Volva itself also distinguishes the hours for them. For even though it does
not
to have
motion in space, nevertheless, unlike our moon, it
rotates in its place and displays in turn a wonderful variety of spots.... This
is the only uniform measure of time. (23)
The panoramic succession of
produced by the Volva’s rotation is plain
ly visible to the naked eye — a man (Africa) seems repeatedly to be kissing a
girl (Europe) in a long dress (eastern Europe, the Baltic regions), who stretch
es back her hand (England) to catch a leaping cat (Scandinavia). No special
knowledge of star movements or calculations is necessary: most simply, each
new attempt by the man to kiss the girl
the passage of another hour. The
story that the Levanians see in the sky makes the same demand of its viewers
that Sancho Panza makes on his audience when he tells Don Quixote his goat
story: you must keep count for the story to work (Cervantes 152-4). Unlike
the progression of the fixed stars across the sky, the spots mark intervals, not
sequence. The dial, the fixed point behind the moving hands, is not in some
distant sphere. In contrast to seventeenth-century solutions to the longitude
problem, Kepler’s watching Levanians themselves take the place of the fixed
dial. Neither a rigorous prerequisite to observation nor a laborious calculation
to be drawn from it, knowledge depends upon the presence of a viewer to keep
count of the passing hours. Requiring neither telescopes nor books to know
their world, the Levanians enjoy the "measure” no longer possible in Kepler’s
post-Copernican astronomy.
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Although Kepler’s description of Levania appears in many ways to be
objectively and scientifically accurate, he suppresses details that do not support
his fantasy. For instance, facts that do not support a radical connection between
seeing and knowing are never mentioned. The text does not acknowledge that
finding the latitude on Levania would be nearly as difficult as finding the lon
gitude is on earth. Kepler obscures the latitude problem by mentioning it only
in the context of the “convenience” of determining longitude on Levania:

they indicate the longitude of places with reference to their motionless
Volva, and the latitude with reference both to Volva and to. the poles,
whereas for longitudes
have nothing but the lowly declination of the
magnet. (22)
Although the comparison between the earth’s longitude and Levania’s latitude
goes unremarked in this passage, the opposite connection between the earth’s
latitude and Levania’s longitude is insisted upon elsewhere in the Dream pre
cisely because it can be assimilated into the model of visible knowledge. In this
respect, Kepler compares the Volva’s presence on the horizon to “the greater and
smaller altitudes of the pole, even though we do not see the pole with our own
eyes.” For a sailor or astronomer, the most logical terrestrial analogue to the
Volva’s “always visible” presence on the Levanian horizon would be the star
Polaris at the North Pole. Since Polaris is a real and visible natural body, it pro
vides information about location to the inhabitants of earth in much the same
that the Volva would on the moon. Instead of discussing the Pole star,
however, Kepler’s narrative emphasizes the Pole, an abstract (and invisible) con
cept. In making this choice, the Dream again suggests that the Levanian world
can be apprehended immediately and intuitively in ways that the sublunar one
cannot. Ultimately, the Dream is a utopia that admits the physically necessary
limitations to human knowledge in order to project a world and place that does
not have such limitations.

In her Observations upon Experimental Philosophy
Margaret Cavendish
up the philosophical problem raised in the Dream by arguing that tele
scopes, microscopes and other tools of observation constitute only “deluding
Glasses” and “Experiments.” She asserts that “[s]ense deludes more than it
gives a true Information, and an exterior inspection through an Optick glass, is
so deceiving, that it cannot be relied upon” (sig. dl). Where a text with this title
might in this period ordinarily be expected to document trials, demonstrations,
or “experiences,” Cavendish’s Observations is instead a rejection of the scientif
ic practices exemplified by such work. The full force of Cavendish’s critique of
experimental and observational science only becomes apparent when read
through her utopian rethinking of contemporary scientific practice in the Blaz
ing World. Cavendish chooses to append the Observations to the Blazing World
to establish experimentalism as the context for her fictional work. Rejecting
the science of observation in favor of the imagination of readers, the Blazing
World makes experimentalism the site for its utopia about fiction and the nature
of reading.
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In this respect, Cavendish’s utopia is the culmination of a line of inquiry
begun with her first scientific work, Philosophical Fancies (1653).
subse
quently revised this work as the Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655,
1663), a much more fully realized response to her reading in recent works in
natural philosophy. In these subsequent editions, Cavendish responds to what
she has been reading in Hobbes, Descartes, More, and Van Helmont. The
somewhat ironically entitled Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy offers
a critique of the scientific practices that she associated with Robert Hooke’s
Micrographia
Hobbes’s work on optics, and Robert Boyle’s Experiments
Touching Colours (1664). Although it is difficult in many
to delineate
the development of Cavendish’s intellectual opinions in these works, it is clear
that her attitude towards the practice of science in this period
as a
result of her experiences as a reader of science. Speaking of her husband as her
“only tutor” and herself as “unlearned,” Cavendish describes how after the pub
lication of her first
she “applied [her] self to the reading of Philosophi
cal Authors, of purpose to learn those names and words of Art that are used in
Schools” (Cavendish, Life sig. a3r).
became a reader so that she
become part of the ongoing intellectual debates that interested her. Presenting
herself as one who wrote as a reader, Cavendish in the early editions of the
Philosophical and Physical Opinions used her status as a reader of recent works by
Hobbes, Descartes, and van Helmont to authorize her writing. In the Obser
vations and the Blazing World, Cavendish’s rejection of recent work in experimentalism and optics is predicated in part upon her earlier attempt to take part,
if only as a reader, in contemporary scientific debate. Here she writes as some
one who will not be read in order to reject reading as it was being defined in
the works of experimental philosophers.
a fictional response to her readings in the New Science, the Blazing
World might be understood as telling in
the history of reading as a con
tested activity in early modern science. Seeing Cavendish in this
contrasts
with the more familiar view of her as one who did not
As Cavendish rec
ognizes, experimental philosophy was the type of science that most excluded
readers like her. The problem with the New Science, for Cavendish, is not just
that it depends on “arts” — such as the telescope — that involve distortion and
delusion. Equally important, the methodology of experimentalism limits the
reader’s access to new forms of
Thus, in her joint publication of the
Observations and the utopian Blazing World, Cavendish rejects contemporary
scientific practice in favor of a utopian fantasy in which readers get to make
their own worlds. On the other hand, Cavendish’s decision to write a utopia
should not suggest that she was primarily frustrated in her isolation from con
temporary scientific thought. As recent studies demonstrate, many of Margaret
Cavendish’s scientific opinions were in themselves not that far from the main
stream of contemporary intellectual thought.21 Cavendish’s philosophical writ
ing, as she herself recognizes, is in many ways no more strange than Descartes’s
vortices, Hobbes’s materialism, or Charleton’s atomism. As Eve Keller con
cludes, it is important that we not ignore “the contemporary viability of her
own attempts at natural philosophy” (450) 22 In suggesting that what distin
guishes Cavendish is thus not so much what she
knew, or even under
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stood, recent discussions have focused on how as a woman Cavendish lacked
the authority to write on these subjects.
This argument might be extended, however, by recognizing as a more fun
damental problem that Cavendish’s works were not read because she herself
lacked the preliminary qualifications to be accepted even as a reader of scien
tific texts.23 As Shapin and Schaffer suggest, the reader became a key figure in
the development and dissemination of seventeenth-century science. Although
observations and experiments would ordinarily be considered merely “proba
ble,” affirmation from distinguished witnesses could transform what was only a
“probable” into an “accepted” truth. Readers were important in this process as
a way of multiplying witnesses to
greater consensus (Shapin and Schaf
fer 60). In this regard, Cavendish’s case demonstrates that just as there were
limitations on who qualified as an observer, there were, in ways that have not
been fully recognized, also comparable limitations on who qualified as a read
er. Margaret Cavendish is not qualified to be a true reader of these texts to the
extent that
would not have been accepted as a
witness at the demon
strations held by the Royal Society and other learned groups.24 Cavendish was
implicitly not accepted as capable of truly assenting to — let alone “confuting”
— work in contemporary science. This sense in which she was thus not recog
nized as a reader more fully explains why Cavendish’s published work received
no serious attention during the seventeenth century.25 While this claim is a
logical extension of what has been identified as Cavendish’s position in gener
al, it becomes important because Cavendish’s works — and the Blazing World
in particular — respond to her own recognition that she was not read.
Although Cavendish claimed that she did not write to
she was
clearly deeply concerned with readers’ responses to her work.26 Cavendish’s
sense of herself primarily as a reader can be seen in her attitude towards her
own
Her insistence that she wrote “to please myself rather than to
please such Crabbed Readers” who might criticize her works does not obvious
ly come out of an indifference to what readers thought.27 Cavendish’s works
almost all include elaborate prefatory epistles that seek to direct the terms
under which her work is read. The Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1663),
for instance, includes a letter from the duke of Newcastle to his wife, a second
from her to him, a letter to her “Noble Readers,” another simply “To the Read
er,” “An Epistle to the Reader,” and finally “Another Epistle to the
”
The earliest version of this text, The Philosophical Fancies
begins with
three different letters directed to three different kinds of readers. Even the
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, although more restrained in many
ways, nonetheless contains letters to the duke, to the “Most Noble, and Emi
nently-Learned” readers of Cambridge University, and to the “Courteous
Reader.”
Cavendish relies on this elaborate textual apparatus not out of ignorance
of contemporary conventions in publishing. Rather, she is also imagining,
somewhat idealistically, the possibility that her readers would in some sense
rewrite her
through their responses. Thus, in the CCXI. Sociable Letters
(1664), she responds to a writer who condemns the practice of printing letters
praising a work. She disagrees by saying that she wishes that “whereas I have
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One Friend to Praise my Works, although Partially, I had a Thousand, or rather
Ten thousand Millions, nay, that their number
Infinite, that the Issue of
my Brain, Fame, and Name, might live to Eternity if it
possible” (163).
Cavendish is here indirectly defending her practice — which she began after
critics suggested of her early works that they must have been written by some
one else — of including such a letter of praise from her husband in almost every
book she published.28 At the same time, Cavendish is also supposing that she
might have "infinite” millions of readers who would write to praise her works.
Even as she imagines that she will be able to create readers through her writ
ing, she also hopes that such readers would be able to create her through their
reading. Thus, Cavendish’s interest in reaching readers is not so much the
expression of an egocentric desire for fame as it is a recognition of how central
her own experiences as a reader were in defining — as well as limiting — her
understanding of the world.
Where
writes from the perspective of a scientist trying to commu
nicate a kind of imaginative observational experience to readers, Cavendish
responds as a reader who was unable to obtain the "truth” from the observa
tional accounts of writers such as Robert Hooke. Understood from Cavendish’s
perspective, a text such as Hooke’s Micrographia limited the reader in the sense
that a reader
only ever see as much as the illustrations showed. The very
elaborateness — the microscopic realism — of the engravings merely empha
sizes that the text becomes a substitute for, rather than an encouragement to,
experience itself. Thus, Cavendish constructs the Blazing World to redefine the
access that her readers have to the "truth” of her text.
Cavendish employs a frame narrative to create a transition into a world in
which her autobiographical character is allowed to reign over the scientific soci
ety from which the author was excluded. The Blazing World therefore begins
in a romance world with a young man "travelling into a foreign Country,” and
falling "extremely in
with a young Lady” (1). The young man determines
to pursue his love by kidnapping her, but his boat is lost in a storm. When the
boat passes through the North Pole into another world called the Blazing
World, only the lady survives. The lady’s marriage to the emperor of this new
world allows her to establish a group of learned societies, which become the
vehicle for both a critique of experimental science and a demonstration of the
methodological superiority of what Cavendish referred to as "rational thought.”
In debates that ironize proceedings at the Royal Society, representatives of dif
ferent societies are repeatedly forced to admit that they cannot answer the
empress’s questions because they cannot see something. Astronomers cannot
determine what air is because they cannot see it (22); chemists do not know
whether all
have circulatory systems because these interior motions are
not visible "neither of themselves, nor by the help of
optick instrument”
(35); natural philosophers are unable to observe "the interior, corporeal
motions” of vegetables and minerals (41). In the same
that Cavendish
addresses her Observations upon Experimental Philosophy to what she refers to as
"Modern Experimentall and Dioptrical Writers,” Cavendish
mentions the
experimental philosophers and the astronomers both first and at greatest
length. Together, these two methods of scientific inquiry epitomize what is for
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Cavendish the greatest weakness of contemporary science:
upon visu
al evidence.
In establishing the boundaries of her fictional world, Cavendish thus uses
astronomy in ways that challenge its reliance upon unverifiable visual evidence.
In particular, reading into the frame of her narrative world evokes the act of
looking through a telescope. At the beginning of the narrative when the lady
first crosses from her world into the Blazing World, Cavendish addresses the
reader directly for the first and only time to explain the peculiar twinned plan
ets and their relationship to our world:
least you should scruple at it, and think, if it were thus, those that Eve at the
Poles would either see two Suns at one time, else they would
want
the
light for six months together, as it is commonly believed; You must
know, that
of these Worlds having its own Sun to enlighten it, they
move each
in their peculiar circles; which motion is so just and exact,
that neither can hinder or obstruct the other; for they do not exceed their
Tropicks, and although they should meet, yet we in this world cannot so well
perceive them, by reason of the brightness of our Sun, which being nearer to
us, obstructs the splendor of the Suns of the other Worlds, they being toofar
off to be discerned by our optick perception, except we use very good Telescopes, by
which skilful Astronomers have often observed two or three Suns at once, (3;
emphasis added)

It is precisely at this point that a new world opens up in Cavendish’s text. This
new world is not the Blazing World, an alternative realm that readers would
have anticipated from Cavendish’s title. Instead, the unexpectedly new world
in Cavendish’s text is the lady’s native world: before this point there is nothing
in the text to indicate that her world is not our world. Prior to this, the term
"world” is only used once in the opening
and is preceded by a definite
article. Here, suddenly, the text moves directly from the expected, generic
romance alternation between actual and ideal to a more complicated division
that now includes the Blazing World as a third realm.
Cavendish’s description of the complicated physical relationships between
the three planets is ostensibly an assertion of the plausibility of her narrative
world. Yet, it is not improbable planetary motions that are a problem; at issue
rather is
ability to know anything about such a world. Cavendish’s sugges
tion that the worlds she describes are real but not visible "except we use very
good Telescopes” initially situates this utopia just beyond the range of unaided
vision. Science — the knowledge of "skilful Astronomers” — appears to pro
vide the most certain access to and confirmation of her fictional
The
conclusion that these astronomers may see these worlds in the
way that
they see "two or three suns at once,” however, reduces their claims to the status
of optical
What science can attest to is no more than a disappearing
parahelion. Even as the frame narrative models reading on the act of looking
through the telescope, Cavendish insists that it is not astronomers with tele
scopes but instead "skillful” readers with
who will be able to discover this
strange new world.
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Like Kepler, Cavendish intends the reader to see things which would not
be visible in any lens. This contrasts with most literary writers who responded
to the new visual technology by using their texts to show readers — if often
parodically — what you
see through the telescope. John Donne thus
imagines that Galileo is able to bring the moon to the earth in Ignatius, his Con
clave (1611), while Francis Godwin’s Man in the Moone (1638) depicts a world
of people ten, twenty, and thirty times larger than life. Where Donne and
Godwin mimic the function of the telescope, Cavendish uses her narrative to
show readers worlds that the telescope’s augmented vision occludes.
Cavendish’s intention of showing
a world that exceeds new technolo
gies of vision can be seen in the inhabitants of this world:

the men . . .
of several Complexions: not white, black, tawny, oliveor ash-coloured; but some appear’d of an Azure, some of a deep Purple,
some of a Grass-green, some of a Scarlet, some of an Orange-colour, & c.
(14-15)
Vividly and visibly outside the monochrome range of “white, black, tawny,
olive- or ash-coloured,” the people of this world are truly a people of color.
Tempting as it may
however, it would be a mistake to understand
Cavendish’s depiction of the “several complexions” of this world as an attempt
to reconceptualize contemporary understandings of racial identity, or even, as
Rosemary Kegl suggests, as evidence of “the flexibility of race as a category dur
ing the seventeenth century” (135).
In this description of the people of the Blazing World, Cavendish is reread
ing her own fiction through an understanding of discovery provided by her
rejection of the telescope. In Cavendish’s early prose romance, “Assaulted and
Pursued Chastity” (1656), the heroine Travellia/Affectionata finds herself in a
distant and strange

they in the boat never saw such complexioned men, for they
not black
like Negroes, nor tawny, nor olive, nor ash-coloured, as many are, but of a
deep purple; their hair as white as milk, and like wool; their lips thin, their
ears long, their noses flat, yet sharp, their teeth and nails as black as jet and
as shining.... All those of royal blood were of a perfect orange colour, their
hair coal black, their teeth and nails as white as milk. (63, 68)
In this earlier story, a contemporary fascination with ethnography informs
Cavendish’s belief in natural hierarchy. As someone who supported sumptuary
laws that would make social standing physically visible to all, Cavendish here
postulates a race in which class would be marked not by clothing but by skin
color. When Cavendish rewrites this passage in the Blazing World, however, a
different understanding of what it means to be able to know things by seeing
them leads her to imagine not
colors of people but a whole rainbow: azure,
purple, green, scarlet, and orange. More spectacular than anything produced in
Boyle’s Experiments Touching Colours, the people of this world refract the
spectrum of visible light.
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Throughout the Blazing World the power and majesty of the realm derive
from the range of color in the people and the whole colored world itself. Thus,
a special sort of diamonds that sparkle with the spectrum of light becomes an
icon of the empress’s power over her subjects: the Imperial State room is made
of diamonds that “seemd just like so many Rainbows” (12) and her buckler of
office “shewed like a Rainbow” (14). For Cavendish, these colors are produced
by natural vision; although optic devices such as the telescope might augment
vision in some respects, they limit the range of visible color to a monochrome.
Where earlier telescopes allow astronomers to see the Blazing World only as an
illusory parahelion, now in its inability to show more than a monochrome, the
telescope misses the magnitude and power of this “Blazing” world. In its very
vividness, the Blazing World becomes something that cannot be seen through
the artificial, and hence limited, means of the telescope.
Towards the end of the fiction, Cavendish herself recognizes the ways in
which she is rejecting not just experimental and observational science but the
ways of reading that they imply. In
episode involving the empress’s
of scribes, Cavendish reimagines the events that led to the writing of this book.
The empress decides that she needs a scribe to assist with her intellectual pro
jects. She first hopes to enlist “the Soul of some ancient famous Writer; either
of Aristotle, Pythagoras, Plato, Epicurus, or the like” (89). In order to suggest
that these philosophers are no longer relevant to the New Science, Cavendish
has the empress’s guiding spirits inform her that these “learned, subtle, and
ingenious Writers” were too sure of their own opinions to “have the patience to
be
” From the ancients she then turns to “
of the most
mod
ern Writers, as either of Galileo, Gassendus, Des Cartes, Helmont, Hobbes,
More, & ” If the classical philosophers have been excluded
of their
ancient opinions, the empress is excluded because of these “fine ingenious writ
ers” are so “self-conceited that they would scorn to be scribes to a woman.” In
this moment Cavendish asks us to think about what it would mean if Galileo
or Hobbes, for instance, had not been too “self-conceited” to write for a woman.
If other scientists had been willing to write to and for her, Cavendish implies,
then she would not have had to write the Blazing World. These authorities are
invoked only to be rejected as
characters
this is the point at
which Margaret Cavendish enters her own text as a character: she becomes the
self-writing character. Although critics have noted how Cavendish’s fictional
works almost always include some autobiographical version of herself, the Blaz
ing World is distinctive in having two different autobiographical versions of
Cavendish. Where the empress constitutes
autobiographical reflection of
Cavendish as a reader of science, Cavendish introduces herself under her own
name in this moment as the writer of an utopian science.
While Cavendish rejects the science that she associated with the Royal
Society as the basis for knowledge at the outset of the Blazing World, she sub
sequently suggests that it can play a role in society. In the Observations,
Cavendish characterizes the work of experimentalists and others not as science
but as forms of art. By relying on
microscopes, “and the like inspec
tions,” this type of science produces illusions (sig. b2). After rejecting science
as the basis of knowledge at the beginning of the Blazing World, Cavendish
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subsequently suggests in the central section of the text that the "arts” of science
can be important in theology and politics, an assertion that is needless to say in
direct contradiction to the claims of the Royal Society to remove itself from any
involvement in either of those areas.29 After first reforming
then dissolv
ing her scientific societies, Cavendish’s empress turns her attention to the social
circumstances of the state. Although she has rejected the scientists’ claim to
knowledge, the empress now uses their assistance to create two central chapels,
representing heaven and the other hell. In these temples, the “art” that
made science an inadequate means of knowledge in the Observations is exploit
ed to create spectacles “so artificially contrived” to delude the ignorant people
(62). Science cannot produce truth for Cavendish, but it can create “deluding”
shows that are powerful enough to
“a constant belief” (63).
By setting the Blazing World in opposition to the new worlds being discov
ered by natural philosophers, Cavendish seems
present a radical choice
between being a reader and being a scientist. Kepler, however, wants to inte
grate old reading practices with new observational methods. His utopian
ture is to recognize the conflict in that desire and thus to imagine a world in
which neither reading nor observation is necessary. Even as Kepler’s utopia
looks back to a pre-Copernican certainty, Cavendish’s Blazing World imagines
a realm in which anyone can create her own theory of how the world works. In
this respect, she embraces uncertainty
rejecting the dogmatism and institu
tionalization that she associates with scientific authority. In the end, though,
Cavendish likewise imagines a world in which there would be no need to jus
tify empirically one’s scientific visions. If neither of these utopias solve the con
flict between reading and observation that each identifies, their failures are not
of the imagination. Rather, Kepler and Cavendish attest the need to produce a
theory of knowledge that could also produce new theories of reading.

Notes
1. In his elegant and consistently illuminating introduction to Don Quixote,
Fuentes makes a similar point when he discusses how Sancho’s “empiricism”
cannot overcome Quixote’s unwavering belief in the truth of what and how he
reads (xviii-xix).
2. Contemporary thought was, at best, ambivalent about the moral and
theological dangers attached to scientific curiosity. For a discussion of how
astronomy and knowledge of the stars is transformed from a subject of revela
tion outside the “ ” of man into a matter of scientific inquiry, see Lewalski
46-50. Sancho’s curiosity does indeed seem to have given him significant new
ambitions in the ways that Milton’s Raphael predicts: as a result of having seen,
as he says, the comparative insignificance of the earth, Sancho declares after his
investigation into the stars that he would rather “rule the sky” than have his
long-promised island (Cervantes 736).
3. As always in Don Quixote, Cervantes is reworking a variety of texts and
topics. Sancho’s “ride” is also modelled, as he himself suggests, on the voyages
that Eugenio Torralba claimed to have taken.

Published by eGrove, 1998

51

Journal X, Vol. 3 [1998], No. 2, Art. 8

Elizabeth A. Spiller

165

4. On the key importance that the telescope had as an informing metaphor
in the early modern period, see Blumenberg 617-74; Reiss 31-3, 54; Rorty 1113,38-51.5. Indeed, Thomas More himself seems anticipate the telescope as a utopi
an instrument in Hythlodaeus’s description of the "most expert” astronomical
knowledge of the Utopian scholars: “they have ingeniously devised instruments
in different shapes, by which they have most exactly comprehended the move
ments and the positions of the sun and moon and all the other stars which are
visible in their horizon” (More 91). Before its invention, a version of the tele
scope can of course be imagined by More as a tool of “exact” knowledge. After
ward, the telescope generally moves out of the central section of the utopia and
into the framing narrative in a way that emphasizes the problematics of the
context;See my discussion of John Donne and Francis
dge it seems to bring.
tures
Godwin below in this
one key exception is Saloman’s House in the
New Atlantis (1627).
6. Discussions of the historical development of the utopia in this period
that connect this genre to science as well as politics include, among others,
Manuel and Manuel, Reiss, Boesky, Founding Fictions, and Leslie.
7. Leslie rightly emphasizes that even aside from historical considerations
utopias are hard to fix as a literary genre because the philosophical commitment
to reform that characterizes utopian writing has as a narrative consequence a
self-conscious need to revise and rewrite earlier utopias. Nonetheless, early
modern utopias after More do seem to share certain identifying narrative fea
texts Fictions 14-17.
; 'see Boesky, Founding
hisdefine
8. Although the Dream was published posthumously, Kepler left instruc
tions that these two
were to be published together. A letter to Matthias
Bernegger suggests that he originally hoped to include with them an edition of
Lucians True History. See Romm 101.
9. On the impact that Keplers work had on literary figures such as John
Donne, Francis Godwin, John Wilkins, Cyrano de Bergerac, and John Milton,
see Nicolson, “Kepler” and “Cosmic Voyages.”
10. Originally written as a set of propositions while Kepler was a student
at Tübingen, the work subsequently was circulated in manuscript around 1608.
References to the witch Fiolxhilde resulted in witchcraft charges against his
mother. Over the next twenty five years Kepler continued to rework
man
uscript in order to correct the terrible misreading of the original manuscript: “I
therefore decided to avenge this dream of mine for the affair just cited [con
cerning his mother] by publishing the book, which will be another punishment
for my adversaries” (41 n. 8). See Nicolson, “Kepler” 260-67.
11. For two excellent
from different perspectives, of the impor
tance of reading as a practice in the development of early modern science, see
Grafton, Defenders, and Sherman 29-52, 79-100.
12. On how readers become “virtual witnesses,” see Shapin and Schaffer
60-65.
13. Galileo’s
Messenger, for example, was immediately published in
a Frankfurt edition and would almost certainly have been available at the 1611
book fair. On Kepler’s participation in the literary culture that helped
this new visual sensibility, see Grafton, “Humanism.”
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14. An illustration of the famous mural quadrant is included in Brahe’s
Astronomiae instauratae mechanica (1598). Kepler’s representation of Uraniborg
as a model of modern scientific practice differs significantly from that of
Andreas Libavius, who associated it with dark, arcane forms of knowledge. See
Hannay and the reassessment by Shakelford.
15.
See, for example, 124 n. 202; 129 n. 211, 54 n. 43.
16. Although Kepler describes early versions of his work as having associ
ated these physical characteristics of Levania and its inhabitants with its polit
structure, the revised text is careful to eliminate such potentially topical
comments (129-30 n. 213).
17. In an influential argument about the changing attitudes toward visual
perception in this period, Svetlana Alpers identifies Kepler as someone who
recognizes that distortion is inherent in any lens, whether it be the lens of the
eye or of various observational tools like the telescope. Alpers thus concludes
that Kepler defends the use of optical tools not so much by arguing for their
integrity as by demonstrating that natural vision is characterized by a similar
distortion, the “deception of vision.” As a utopia the Dream does not need to
reconcile natural and artificial observation since it imagines a world without the
falleness of man (Alpers 34-5). For two excellent accounts of the visual culture
that Kepler was influential in redefining in Northern Europe, see Kaufmann
and Ruestow.
18. The earth rotates 360 degrees/24 hours (15 degrees/hour); a time dif
ference of, say, 3 hours and 5 minutes translates into 45 degrees, 60 minutes of
longitude.
19.
Letter to Swift, 17 July 1714; quoted in Howse 49.
20. On the impact of Galileo’s claim in the Starry Messenger that he could
see that the moon was “not smooth, uniform, and precisely spherical” but rather
spotted, “full of cavities and prominences,” see Boesky, “Milton” 24.
21. For excellent rethinkings of Cavendish’s science in its contemporary
context, see Stevenson; Rogers 177-211; and Sarasohn.
22. In making this argument, Keller recognizes a key implication of Shapin
and Schaffer’s assertion that the “losers” in the history of cognition are often as
significant as the “winners.”
23. What women were expected to read was not Galileo,
instance, but
popularizations such as John Wilkins’s The Discovery of a World in the Moone
(1638). The affiliation between women readers and such popularizations is
suggested by the fact that Cavendish herself seems to have been transformed
into a central character in de Fontenelle’s A Discovery ofNew Worlds, which was
both widely read in France and quickly translated into English by Aphra Behn.
24. Cavendish’s famed visit to the Royal Society in 1667 merely proves this
point. Although she did attend the society, it was only once and only as a
tator who herself became a spectacle for Society members such as Pepys. For
accounts of this visit, see Mintz; and Grant 15-26.
25. James Fitzmaurice’s research is especially suggestive on this point: he
reports that many of the presentation copies of Cavendish’s
appear never
to have been read at all (“Margaret Cavendish” 302).
26. In important ways, Cavendish is her own first reader. Although she
claimed — and her critics have often repeated this assertion — that she
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read her own works, the evidence suggests otherwise. Fitzmaurice suggests that
Cavendish read her works with care and attention when she hand-corrected the
published volumes of her work with a clear sense of the kinds of readers she was
addressing in the different texts (see “Margaret Cavendish” and “Some Prob
lems”).
27. Cavendish, “To the Readers of my Works” in Orations, quoted in
Bowerbank 405.
28. The duke’s first letter was initially written, according to Cavendish, to
counter the rumor that someone else — a man — was the true author of her
books. William Cavendish’s letter is of course an imprimatur that relies not just
on his class or gender but more importantly on his position as the husband who
had what
recognized as a legal responsibility over his wife. As such,
William Cavendish’s letter ironically can assert that she wrote these
only
by itself claiming “authority” of and over them.
29.
See, for instance, Sprat.
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Everyone who writes about Elizabeth Bishops
poems must comment on her "powers of observa
tion.” It’s a rule. Randall Jarrell’s famous
remains one of the pithiest of these com
ments: "All her poems have written underneath I
have seen it” (235). And many critics, before and
since Jarrell,
their readings of Bishop’s poems on
the assumption of her realism. Lloyd Frankenberg
writes, "hers is a clearly delineated world” of "perception[,] precision, compression” (331, 333). Walker
argues that the true subject of her poetry is the
act of perception itself (14). Frank Bidart in
trib
ute to Bishop writes, "I’m scared of observing as
much as Miss Bishop does” and discusses the "drama
of perception” lying beneath her exact descriptions.
The staggering amount of concrete, evocative, careful
details in her poems, the
her poems make any
reader see the world she
calls attention to
her as an observer. But the emphasis and overem
phasis on Bishop’s "powers of observation” has
become a real hindrance to understanding many of
her poems, including some of those most antholo
gized and discussed. Reading Bishop’s poems as tiny
verbal recreations of the world she sees reduces her
accomplishment to the "typically female art of the
miniature” (McNeil 397) and makes of her poems lit
tle dollhouses without threat or interest. Any num
ber of critics have taken that next step, from reading
Bishop as a careful observer to seeing her as a minia
turist, merely imitating stilled scenes perfectly but
without imagination. Andrew Motion argues that
Bishop "transforms things which are dangerously
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proliferative and random into contained visions of themselves” (313). Spiegelman claims, “We do not normally think of Bishop as a poet of
the ten
sion in her poems is mostly internalized, and confrontations, when they occur,
are between the self, traveling, moving, or simply seeing, and the landscape it
experiences” (169).
Spiegelmans statement points up exactly the problem with overemphasiz
ing detail at the expense of the whole poem; we lose the struggle, the play
between the observer and the observed, that is at the heart of Bishops rela
tionship to perception and questions of human connection to some external
world. Denis Donoghue acknowledges this when he writes that “the received
sense of Bishop’s work, so far as I can judge it,
her poetry sound far more
domestic than it is” (246). The details in Bishop’s poems “rarely coincide with
the evidence to which they
” Again and again, Bishop questions the
human ability to see the world in a way that is both accurate and meaningful;
she questions the ability of the senses to apprehend their surroundings and the
function of human imagination in the context of perception. One of the best
examples of these questions of perception, this proliferation
ultimate fail
ure of detail, is “The Fish.” It is also one of the poems most often quoted to
tout Bishop’s triumph as
“observer,” an embroiderer of the “real” world into
some poetic tapestry.
“The Fish”
already become a classic, one of Bishop’s most well-known
and widely anthologized poems. In a letter to Robert Lowell of February 27,
1970, Bishop writes:
I think I’ll try to turn that damned “Fish” into a sonnet, or something very
short and quite different. (I seem to get requests for it every day for
anthologies with titles like Reading as Experience Experience as Readings
anthologizer insisting that he is doing something completely different
from every other anthologizer. But I’m sure this is an old story to you.)
(Quoted in Giroux 515)
Bishop’s comic anthology titles suggest the
that readers have tended to see
“The Fish”: as a recreation of experience, a triumph of exact observation, rather
than an exploration and comment on perception, the act of perceiving, and even
perhaps the impossibility of perceiving at all. Instead of offering us a miniature
fish, Bishop offers us a complex consideration of our own longing
an impos
sible empirical connection to the world beyond the self.
To come to understand this complex consideration, we must first under
stand that, on a literal level, the poem is all wrong. The whole experience is
impossible. A student of mine, Nathan Tanner, who was a first mate on a fish
ing charter and an accomplished fisherman, first brought to my attention the
impossibility of the experience Bishop chronicles in “The Fish.” He told me
that he could not write a discussion paragraph about the poem
he hated
I told him to write about why he hated it. Nathan hated it for the same rea
sons that most critics liked it: the observations. They were,
said — and I
confirmed this information — all wrong. “He was speckled with barnacles”: no
fish can have barnacles; barnacles can grow on whales because whales are mam
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mals but fish have a protective layer of mucous that prevents barnacles from
adhering to their skin. “I looked into his eyes / which
far larger than
mine”:
one can hold a fish with an eye larger than a human eye half out of
water beside a little rented fishing boat without toppling into the
To
hold a fish of this size out of the water would require fifty-pound rigging at
least. “With all their five big hooks / grown firmly in his mouth”: five
cannot
firmly into the mouth of a fish. In salt water, metal hooks rust and
dissolve within days.
How do we make this information coincide with Bishops well-document
ed “powers of observation”? Did she just get the details wrong, even though she
lived and fished in Key West for years? Did she misremember the experience,
even though she actually did catch this fish and, by her own account, eat it? I
doubt
I think the problem is not with the poem but with our usual reading
of the poem as realistic, as an attempt at representing a real experience. Instead
of a record of experience, “The Fish” is a fable. In fact, from the very first
words, the poem invokes the
tradition in its most basic form: it tells a fish
story. However, the fish story in this poem is an inverted one; the normal
sequence in which the inconceivably enormous fish and the brave fisherman
fight fiercely until the fish “gets away” is replaced by one in which an obvious
ly female speaker fights a mental and spiritual battle to “see” the fish and
describe him, a struggle for empirical understanding that replaces the physical
struggle to land him while still evoking the latter struggle’s terms of domina
tion and perhaps even death.
The repetition of the pronoun “he” in the first lines of the poem empha
sizes the degree to which the speaker imposes a human identity on the fish, as
she battles and “he” refuses the challenge:
I caught a tremendous fish
and held him beside the boat
half out of water, with my hook
fast in a corner of his mouth.
He didn’t fight.
He hadn’t fought at all.
He hung a grunting weight,
battered and venerable
and homely. (1-9)

This insistence on the pronoun “he” alerts us to the fact that, in order to make
the fish, and the struggle land him, meaningful in human terms, the speak
er has anthropomorphized the fish. The fish has been drawn (both literally and
metaphorically) into the speaker’s world and into the speaker’s perspective. The
adjectives that the speaker attaches to the fish all emphasize this
and
replacement. “Battered” suggests the violent nature of the fish’s contact with
the human realm. “Venerable” and “homely” both reveal the aspect of the fish
through the lens of the human eye and its emotional attachment, a lens through
which all information about the world beyond the self must pass. But the fish
has disappointed the
and the speaker’s expectations, has immediately

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol3/iss2/8

60



Editors: Vol.
3, No. 2 (1999):
Journal
x Full issue

174

challenged her preconceived notions of the 4 correct” fable by refusing to fight.
The fish’s apparent refusal is a construction based on the speaker’s desire to
fight with the fish, to have a moment of struggle that is meaningful in terms of
the human fable. This desire for meaning also inheres in her desire to "see” the
fish, to “land” it in a metaphorical sense. In an effort to do this, the speaker in
the poem moves across a perceptual spectrum, from an objective
that
attempts to catalog detail but will not (or does not want to) suggest human
meaning, to a subjective view that allows emotional connection to create a more
anthropomorphized version of the fish that is capable of communicating
human meaning but will not (or does not want to) catalog
detail.
Obviously, no human can reach absolutes moving between these poles; we can
not see a reality not brought to us by human senses, nor can we apprehend our
selves as subject without some object. In fact, it is this indeterminacy within
perception that the poem explores and emphasizes. These two poles of human
perception, though they represent useful and worthy ways of seeing in many
different situations, also indicate the potential for play, the unstable and often
elusive quality of perceiving the material world beyond the self.
The result of this modulation between subjective and objective in the poem
is that the fish becomes “fabulous.” It becomes, like the gingerbread house in
“Hansel and Gretel” or (even more) like the talking fish in the Grimms’ Broth
ers tale, both impossible and real enough to eat. The modulation, the
ment between
and unreal (or surreal) detail, means that the poem presents
the fish neither as a representative of the “ultimate outsider” — a projection of
the “other” to be admired but never understood —nor as emblematic of the self
— a projection of personal fears and desires. Instead, the speaker seems to vac
illate between these possibilities, holding the fish and the reader in a kind of
perceptual
countering objectivity and sentimentality:

Here and there
his brown skin hung in strips
like ancient wallpaper,
and its pattern of darker brown
was like
shapes like full-blown roses
stained and lost through age.
He was speckled with barnacles,
fine rosettes of lime,
and infested
with tiny white sea-lice,
and underneath two or three
rags of green weed hung down. (9-21)
The similes “like ancient wallpaper” and “like full-blown roses” drag the fish
into the human world by force of comparison, but though they seem to help us
to see the fish on one
(we can picture what it looks “like”), on another level
the. similes distort; the fish
away. The comparisons in the similes combine
with the inaccurate observation of the barnacles and the green weed hanging
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down to create a sense of something awry, perilously awry, a strangeness this
most domestic fish story. What we see is real but impossible. We see the fish
through the speaker’s imagination and suddenly realize, like Hansel and Gre
tel, that we have wandered into the woods and are faced with something at once
pleasing, terrifying and out of the question. In one way, Bishop does in these
lines what Donoghue notices throughout her work; she “patiently engag[es]
with the otherness of the natural world, drawing by the force of provisional
comparison, toward the world she already knows” (250). On another level,
however, the provisional comparison itself breaks down; the world she knows
gets mixed up in a world she imagines, a world that she
real for both her
self and for us but that none of us can physically see. The description of the
fish is “askew” in the sense in which Prunty uses the
the similitude both
“likens and also opens up a gap” (193).
The modulation between subjective and objective description becomes, in
the lines that follow, a vacillation between perspectives in the poem, between
the fish’s perspective, so far as it can be imagined — “his gills were breathing in
/ the terrible oxygen” — and the human perspective — “the frightening gills, /
fresh and crisp with blood, / that can cut so
” (21-6). This back and forth,
this play of the imagination, expresses both the speaker’s desire to see the fish
and her desire to make the story, the fable, meaningful. The mention of “the
frightening gills ... that can cut so badly” marks a new movement in the poem,
as if the mention of the wound, the vulnerable reality of the human body, pro
pels the speaker to a consideration of the internal reality of this other body,
whose “insides,” hidden from view, must be created by the imagination rather
than by any empirical examination. They are, as Bishop says in “The Monu
ment” (an earlier poem from North & South), “what is within (which after all /
cannot have been intended to be seen)” (76-7). The internal world that we
move into is as fabulous and awry as the external one we have left. When we
go inside in Bishop’s poems — into the monument as above, into the interior
in “Arrival at Santos,” into an inscrutable house in “Sestina” — the danger
always increases. McNeil, speaking of “The Monument” suggests that “perhaps
the signifying structure also has an inside and an outside, like the body” (406).
The fish, like both the monument and the gingerbread house from the German
folktale, is a signifying structure, but it is also a
and not a made thing,
like house or monument. Still though, the speaker and the reader are drawn
inward, and it is this movement into the other body that represents both the
utter loss of sensuous reality and the deepest moment of connection:

I thought of the coarse white
packed in like feathers,
the big bones and the little bones,
the dramatic
and blacks
of his shiny entrails,
and the pink swim-bladder
like a big peony. (27-33)
“In” is a central concept throughout Bishop’s work. In her short story “In
Prison,” the speaker says, “One must be in; that is the primary condition” (182).
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At the end of “Arrival at Santos,” the tourist/speaker says cheerfully and omi
nously, “we are driving to the interior” (40), just as the caravels in “Brazil, Jan
uary 1,1502” are being drawn into the interior by the “maddening little women”
who are “retreating, always retreating” (51, 53). Over and over again in Bish
op’s work being “in” represents both the greatest hope for understanding and
connection and the most frightening moment of self-annihilation. Donoghue
sees the preposition “in” becoming, for Bishop, the entire presence/absence
dichotomy, representing both the interiority of mind and the loss of self and
people and places (247). In “The Fish,” going “in,” imagining one’s
way into this other body, is even more perilously askew than any attempt at
describing the outside. Again, as in the earlier description, similes draw what
we cannot see
know toward the seen and known; the white
“packed in
like feathers” is both convincing and impossible. The stunning description of
the “swim-bladder / like a big peony” illustrates the drama that Bishop herself
reads into the fish in “dramatic
and blacks,” a drama that itself cannot be
seen or known.
However, this going “ ” is also oddly transformational. From this point
on, a new awareness suffuses the poem and Bishop repeats over and over the
verbs of visual attention: “I looked,” “I admired,” “I saw,” and most important
ly, “I stared.” Her reference to the fish’s eyes connects her perspective to the
fish’s while refusing to anthropomorphize the creature. Here the speaker seems
to test the range of the powers of human observation, moving between a senti
mental view, a view capable of assigning emotional meaning but one that fails
to differentiate between self and not-self, and an objective view, that risks the
scientific belief in the report of the senses, that posits human ability to observe
disinterestedly. However, Bishop finally avoids, either sentimental self-projection or scientific distance. Instead, she draws a fabulous fish through an escape
not from but through the empirical, into the imaginative:
I looked into his eyes
which
far larger than mine
but shallower, and yellowed,
the irises backed and packed
with tarnished tinfoil
seen through the lenses
of old scratched isinglass.
They shifted a little, but not
to return my stare.
— It was more like the tipping
of an object toward the light. (34-44)
The isinglass recalls the lens of human perspective, the action of the human
senses on the material world, and also refers to the fish, both directly, because
isinglass
the lens of his eye, and indirectly, because isinglass is made
from fish bladder. Going “in,” all the
in, allows a perspective that is imag
inative, that escapes the objective/subjective polarity by being both meaningful
and true. I believe this is the perspective of the fabulous.
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One good way to demonstrate that the fish is fabulous is to hold it beside
the Man-Moth. Bishop’s Man-Moth is clearly a fabled creature, deriving from
a newspaper misprint for "mammoth” combined with Bishop’s imaginative love
of surprise. Like “The Fish,” “The Man-Moth” explores the battle between the
individual and the contingent world and questions human perception. The
speaker of “The Man-Moth” speaks from the “Here, above,” the realm not of
the Man-Moth but of the other fabled creature with whom the Man-Moth is
contrasted: Man. Man and Man-Moth gain identity through their differing
reactions to their surroundings, their perceptions and their failure to perceive.
Like the fish, Man and Man-Moth both require the reader to enter them imag
inatively in order to understand them; they require of us an act of deliberate
complicity in imaginative creation.
In the first part of the poem, Man seems to stand outside imaginative per
ception. He belongs to a world that is closed to him because he fails to show
enough interest to
attention to any phenomena other than those that touch
him directly:

He does not see the moon; he observes only her vast properties,
feeling the queer light on his hands, neither warm nor cold,
of a temperature impossible to record in thermometers. (6-8)
All the questioning of the empirical that is implicit in “The Fish” is explicit
here: Man “does not see” because he is too busy observing the moon’s “vast
properties.” He can feel only what seems to come into contact with his body
and then experiences that light as “neither warm nor cold.” He is caught in a
polarized perception. In direct contrast, the Man-Moth becomes a kind of poet
who can escape the poles of human perception by an act of imaginative con
nection. He not only sees the moon but feels compelled to risk himself in order
to investigate its true nature:

the moon looks rather different to him. He emerges
from an opening under the edge of one of the sidewalks
and nervously begins to scale the faces of the buildings.
He thinks the moon is a small hole at the top of the sky,
proving the sky quite useless for protection.
He trembles, but must investigate as high as he can climb. (11-16)
The Man-Moth’s belief that the immensity of the sky could be punctured, that
the moon is not an object but
opening, makes his reality much more precar
ious than Man’s, since it allows the possibility that other boundaries, like the
body, could also be “quite useless for protection.”
As a fabled figure, the Man-Moth, like, the fish, is drawn into the human
world and somehow also draws that world to himself. In the final stanza, the
distance between Man and Man-Moth, this boundary that the poem has care
fully constructed, proves permeable. Addressed to the readers in the second
person, readers suddenly stand in for the mythic Man:
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If you catch him,
hold up a flashlight to his eye. It’s all dark pupil,
an entire night itself, whose haired horizon tightens
as he stares back, and closes up the eye. Then from the lids
one tear, his only possession, like the bee’s sting, slips.
Slyly he palms it, and if you’re not paying attention
he’ll swallow it. However, if you watch, he’ll hand it over,
cool as from underground springs and pure enough to drink. (41-8)

Here Man and Man-Moth suddenly partake of each other in the same sort of
moment that the fish and the fisherwoman
in “The Fish.” It is a
moment of potential domination —
almost sexual penetration — but one
that involves an act of imaginative rather than actual entering. The ManMoth’s tear connects it directly and obviously to other mythical creatures, such
as
and leprechauns, who must surrender their treasure when sought or
summoned. However, the suggestion that the tear must be drunk, that the
other must be internalized to be
“caught,” connects the Man-Moth with
the fish and with a whole pattern of
in Bishop’s work that involve abol
ishing the self in order to preserve it (Motion 322).
On August 21,1947, Lowell wrote Bishop from Yaddo and complimented
her on “The Fish”: “I’m glad you wrote me because it gives me an excuse to tell
you how much I liked
New Yorker Fish Poem. Perhaps its your best.
Anyway I felt very envious in reading it. I’m a fisherman myself, but all my fish
become symbols alas” (6). In “The Fish,” Bishop creates an entity that is two
things at the same time, both symbol and fish. It will not, as Lowell says,
“become” a symbol because Bishop endows it with so much detail, so much of
the evidence we rely on to know. She
her reader see the fish. However,
the detail with which Bishop endows the fish is meaningful rather than empir
ically real. In fact, the repeated verbs of observation eventually succeed not in
“seeing” the fish, either subjectively or objectively, but in allowing the speaker
to take the fish inside herself, to internalize it, through the force of her scruti
and her attempt at empathy. The riveting visual exactness of Bishop’s
description of the “five old pieces of fish line” (51)
what she sees seem
absolutely real and convincing to us, even though it is impossible. This is
ly the way
good fable functions: we believe in the world we have entered
with all its beauties and dangers; even though we have no material evidence of
candy houses or wicked witches or talking fish, we can create them imagina
tively.
When Bishop moves from the exact description of the imagined fishline to
a metaphorical comparison that makes the imagined more and more real, she
insistently draws the world of the fish into her own reality, internalizes the
other, rather than projecting the known onto the unknown:
from his lower lip
— if you could
it a lip —
grim, wet, and weaponlike,
hung five old pieces of fish-line,
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or four and a wire leader
with the swivel still attached,
with all their five big hooks
grown firmly in his mouth.
A green line, frayed at the end
where he broke it, two heavier lines,
and a
black thread
still crimped from the strain and snap
when it broke and he got away.
Like medals with their ribbons
frayed and wavering,
a five-haired beard of wisdom
trailing from his aching jaw. (48-64)

Bishop
created a fish that balances between two worlds. It is neither a "real”
fish — that is, an accurate representation of a fish — nor an anthropomor
phized fish; it is “half out of water” and half submerged. By making the fish
fabulous, the speaker simultaneously moves out of the self and into the fish
pulls the fish into her world, creating a moment of epiphany, of connection —
a victory. It is, as Prunty says, a “relational victory” (249), in the sense that
single perspective, objective or subjective, and no single actor, fish or woman,
wins. The victory that fills “the little rented boat,”
the fish itself, is fabu
lous, unascribed and unascribable; everything has won. The image of the “lit
tle rented boat,” however, also reveals how brief, how transitory this victory is.
Victory is won by a precarious balance forged by the imagination, by the impos
sible made imaginatively real for an instant. This might remind us of the talk
ing fish from the Grimm’s Tale who says, “Fisherman, fisherman, you’ve caught
enough. Lots and lots of tasty fishes. If you set me free, I’ll grant you some
wishes” (“Grimm’s”). In both fables, catching the fish and setting it free mean
that both fish and fisherman get what they want; the victory is universal.
In the image of the rainbow, the
hitting the pool of bilge, Bishop again
creates extraordinary beauty out of the terribly transitory and apparently ugly
sensuous reality. In the final lines of the poem, all contingent reality is briefly
transfigured by the victory that the
fish affords. The lines between the
world that can be
and the world that can only
imagined blur:
I stared and stared
and victory filled up
the little rented boat,
from the pool of bilge
where oil had spread a rainbow
around the rusted engine
to the bailer rusted orange,
the
thwarts,
the oarlocks on their strings,
the gunnels — until everything
was rainbow, rainbow, rainbow!
And I let the fish go. (65-76)
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Although Robert Dale Parker objects to what he calls the “cheerily sentimental
word rainbow,” saying it “violates the modesty and indirection that [Bishop]
was to win such admiration for” (58), the image of the rainbow and Bishop’s
ecstatic repetition of the word encompass the entire theme of the poem and
close the fable effectively. Like the fish itself, the rainbow cannot exist except
in the eyes of the perceiver. A rainbow is a phenomenon created by human
vision, not by external
nevertheless, we see it, just as we see Bishop’s
impossible fish. Physically, then, the rainbow is a sign of an internal or invisi
ble condition. In the Judeo-Christian tradition of Noah’s Flood, the rainbow
became the symbol of both the great destruction of the world by water and the
restoration of the divine covenant with the faithful: a transient image of a last
ing promise.
In many fables, animals speak and act like human beings, and this is
because human beings create the narrative and human eyes draw the world into
their gaze, into their world. Like all fables, Bishop’s imparts a useful truth. At
the end of the poem, the world becomes “rainbow”
the speaker sees
rainbows. The rainbow is an arch that connects the world of the “other,” rep
resented by the fish, to the human world. The real fish escapes her boat, her
scrutiny, her structure — her flawed and fabulous vision of it. But the rainbow
remains, reminding us, perhaps, that the fish, too, remains in the poem as a
creature of fable, neither recognizably human nor recognizably fish. Bishop’s
fish is not a
it is the fish.
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Albena LutzkanovaVassileva is a Ph.D.
candidate in the Pro
gram in Comparative
Literature at Emory
University. She is cur
rently working on a
project, “Reference,
Trauma, and History:
The Testimonies of
Western (American,
British) and East
European (Russian,
Bulgarian) Postmod
ernism,” which chal
lenges the increasingly
popular beliefthat
postmodern literature
and deconstruction
have cut offliterary
and theoretical dis
coursefrom reality,
thereby obstructing
and invalidating our
access to history.

Ulysses, Joyce's groundbreaking novel, is generally and
rightfully crowned as the preeminent modern accom
plishment, an epitome of the classical modernist nar
rative. Nevertheless, throughout the years, the novel
has become a provocative seedbed of theoretical
issues. Ulysses seems persistently to undermine the
idea of an unequivocally modernist status and to
invite a plurality of alternative exegeses. The ensuing
inquiry in no
seeks to defy Ulysses the aura of
modernism. It simply suggests that, although it
would be reductive to label the novel postmodernist,
the examination of its incipient postmodern tenden
cies is in some measure appropriate.
The first part of this study will look at those
moments where the novel goes against the grain of
traditional expectations and marks the encroachment
of postmodernist sensibility upon the allegedly mod
ernist narrative. It will explore the rationale behind
reading Ulysses as a herald of postmodernist fiction by
focusing on the “Wandering Rocks” chapter of the
novel. The second part will go further in claiming
that Ulysses refuses to
assimilated to
major
paradigm, including the postmodernist one. I will
argue that the novels status as always challenging the
totality of a canon subscribes it to the condition of
minor within the corpus of literature. The analysis
will center on the “Proteus” episode and will seek to
establish Ulysses as minor not in the demoted sense of
the word, but in terms of what Gilles Deleuze and
Guattari institute as minor literature.
Critics of Ulysses have debated whether the novel
evinces a dead end in fiction or nestles the seeds of a
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new beginning. Ulysses has been seen as a focal work, linking poststructuralism
with tendencies incipient in modernism. This kind of thinking seems seminal
in bridging the space between widely dissimilar literary movements, in delin
eating continuity rather than instituting a break. Gerald Graff, among other
critics, asserts that “postmodernism should not be seen as a break with roman
tic and modernist assumptions but rather as a logical culmination of the
premises of these earlier movements” (32). Thus a natural development lead
ing from Joyce to poststructuralism can aptly be traced and Ulysses envisioned
as straddling the realms of modernist
postmodernist temper. Much in this
line, Graff reveals in the supersedure of modernist fiction by the literature of
deconstruction “a logical evolution” that “connects the romantic and postro
mantic cult of the creative self to the cult of the disintegrated, disseminated,
dispersed self and of the decentered, undecidable, indeterminate text” (51).
as he succinctly sums it up: “The very concepts through which modernism is
demystified derive from modernism itself” (62).
Ulysses is a vivid instance of fresh, postmodern beginnings deriving from the
very womb of modernism, an illustration of how broad and complex the range
of modernism is. Espousing a broader theoretical agenda,
study of Ulysses
traces the elision between modern and postmodern literary values, and serves as
springboard to a more overarching conceptualization of “modernism” and “post
modernism.” A productive relationship between these major theoretical terms,
I argue, eschews their facile classification as oppositional, adverse, and incom
patible. Resisting the urge for safe and clear-cut division between the modern
and postmodern province, one finds an area where they actively overlap. There,
the techniques of both schools prove unexpectedly similar. One thing, howev
er, is indubitably different: the epistemology has shifted, as private knowledge
gives
to a knowledge that persistently defies possession.
Attempting to trace the demise of modernism proper and to uncover the
emergence of a new, postmodern spirit in Ulysses, I
explore the manifesta
tions of a nascent antimimetic impulse in the novel and elaborate on the incip
ient breakdown of the modernist tenets of total subjectivization and authorial
dominion. My further inquiry thus broaches the question of how Ulysses problematizes the conventional concepts of reality, author, and literary character.
Ulysses subverts the notion of a definable literary text whose beginning and
end denote the points of readerly departure and arrival at an ultimate meaning.
All of Ulysses recreates a single day, 16 June 1904, Bloomsday, through which
we, as readers, are invited to cruise and activate complex webs of meaning. The
reader of Ulysses is never a passive receptacle, relying on the authorial agency for
translating into meaningful patterns the omnipotent knowledge assembled in
the novel. Joyce repeatedly frustrates the reader’s expectations for assistance in
solving the riddle of Ulysses, often deliberately thwarting our journey to a more
stable
of fictional
and consistently effacing his authorial presence
in the text.
It is in this sense that Ulysses inaugurates an unprecedented literary prac
tice: it dauntlessly
the prestige traditionally allotted to the idea of a
transcendental signified and denies omniscience to the author. Stepping down
from the pedestal of a divine and godlike creator, in a letter to George Antheil,

Published by eGrove, 1998

realities, 

71

Or,



Albena
Lutzkanova-Vassileva
Journal X,
Vol. 3 [1998], No. 2, Art. 8

185

Joyce jokingly asserts he will be "quite content to go down to posterity as a scis
sors and paste man for that seems to me a harsh but not unjust description” (“To
George” 297). Demystifying authorial dominion, the novel turns to the reader
and places him/her into a field of multifarious relationships. The unweaving of
the entangled narrative web, accomplished with more than the routine
hermeneutical means, demands the reader’s metamorphosis from a passive
receptacle to an active producer of the text. Arguing in favor of the reader’s
aggressive participation in Ulysses, Stephen Heath introduces Julia Kristeva’s
insightful observation: “For the Ancients the verb ‘to read’ had a meaning that
is worth recalling and bringing out with a
to an understanding of literary
practices. ‘To read’ was also ‘to pick up’, ‘to pluck’, ‘to keep a watch on, ‘to rec
ognize traces’, ‘to take’, ‘to steal’. ‘To read’ thus denotes an aggressive partici
pation, an active appropriation of the other. ‘To write’ would be ‘to read’
become production, industry: writing-reading, paragrammatic activity, would
be the aspiration towards a total aggressiveness and participation” (quoted in
Heath 31).
The reader’s participation in the text of Ulysses facilitates his/her commu
nication with the novel. Partaking in an interactive network, s/he is no longer
to look for a transcendental signified where it might simply be missing. On
many occasions where the reader’s comprehension is hampered, and all
attempts to pin down the elusive signified
bound to failure, Ulysses per
at its best, uncovering a comic dimension once relished by its contempo
raries. The reader is no longer to look for the author’s style either. In a network
milieu, any attempt to locate the style of the author as something consistent and
traceable throughout the entire work becomes inappropriate. Joyce does not
express himself in any singular style but actuates a multiplicity of different
styles, each equally important for unraveling the involute network of Ulysses.
The notion of a network pattern in Ulysses seems justifiable because of a
number of specific manifestations: a disrupted linear flow of the narrative; rad
time-axis manipulation; a problematized mimetic view of
a shat
tered belief in the cause-and-effect principle; encroachment on the unity and
coherence of characters; dispersion, dissemination, and fragmentation of the
self — all of these epitomized in the definitive
of the novel to
itself to the logic of secure meaning and a centered universe. It is in this sense
that the labeling of Ulysses's sections with the names of their Homeric analogues
seems an imposition on a narrative network that Joyce
leave indeter
minate and open.
“Wandering Rocks,” the episode often regarded as a small-scale model of
the novel as a whole, is among the most illuminating substantiations of these
tendencies. “Wandering Rocks” topples the notion of an anthropomorphic
authorial dominion and, if read from the perspective of the Homeric narrative,
presents one of the scarce cases where blind mechanism is at work. The sub
version of authorial control is
suggested through the art of the episode,
mechanics, which dislodges the highly celebrated authorial intention in favor of
a practice of unintentionality.
Although postmodernist in flavor, “the creation of a new art having an
organization, and governed by principles, which are at present exemplified
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unintentionally, as it were, in machinery,” was clearly, T. E. Hulme attests, a
major modernist concern (104). Hulme in fact defined the "new and modern
art” as "something which was to culminate in a use of structural organisation
akin to machinery” (98). Similarly, in postmodern conditions, Deleuze and
Guattari launch a ruthless attack on the barrenness of organic as opposed to
machinic structuralization. Arguing in favor of a body without organs, with no
internal organization and differentiation, the critics
to subscribe to
Antonin Artaud’s association of the organs with the tyranny of transcendental
values, personified by God (Artaud 79). Thus, in the distinction between a
constructed and natural art, between mechanism and organicism, both mod
ernism and postmodernism
with the former values.
"Wandering Rocks” illustrates the transition from an organic text, produced
and governed by the intentions of the author, to a mechanical construct in
which the eighteen parts of the episode interlock like a system of cogwheels.
The subversion of authorial command results in disrupting the continuity of
the narrative. On a more concrete level, this is embodied in the textual
instances of recurring detour and reversal of direction, as in the description of
Emmet’s burial: "Corpse brought in through a secret door in the wall. Dignam
is there now. Went out in a puff. Well, well. Better turn down here. Make a
detour” (Ulysses 240). In the severed linear flow of "Wandering Rocks,” the
characters, just like Homer’s prototypical rocks, outline a number of different
and constantly changing configurations. They wander in a labyrinthine, often
stochastic fashion, constantly change their position in the Dublin network pat
tern, move toward
another, confront one another, and sometimes bump
together, alluding to the mechanical movement of Homer’s wandering rocks.
We witness the perambulations of Father Conmee, the movements of Stephen
Dedalus, the one-legged sailor, and Mr. Bloom, the clashing together of Mr.
Dedalus and his daughter Dilly, of Haines and Buck Mulligan, of Lenehan and
Mrs. Bloom, and so on. The network of the episode thus generates a multi
plicity of disparate effects, definable through the complex laws of mechanics.
In the attempt to capture the inchoate postmodern propensities of Ulysses,
the novel’s relation to reality is another controversial knot. It juxtaposes the
belief in the novel as objectively mirroring the outside world to the subjectivism
of a solipsistic reliance on nothing but the knowledge of the self. Ulysses has
often been denied relation to reality: “Joyce, as representative modernist, found
life in the twentieth century too complex and devoid of anchoring and orient
ing values to treat realistically with traditional methods of expression,” Stephen
Tanner claims (276). In a similar stance, David Daiches sees in Ulysses the cul
mination of an antimimetic impulse (94-5). In Daiches’s view, Ulysses creates
its own system "outside of which the author never once
to trespass” (93).
In short,
’s method in the novel "does not involve mimesis at all; it is re
creation, not imitation” (92).
Joyce’s novel signals the impending incertitude around the problematic
provinces of language and reality, heralding the forthcoming autonomy of lan
guage. As John Gross points out, "In Ulysses language is already beginning to
work loose from its hinges; in Finnegans Wake it breaks free completely and
words take on a capricious life of their own” (75). In the network of such self-
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referential, self-sufficient language, whose nascent stages we discern in Ulysses,
there is no difference in nature between creative statements (revealing some
thing new) and imitative statements (repeating known information). We have,
as Foucault argues from a somewhat different perspective, "a domain that is
active throughout,” "not a group of inert areas broken up by fecund moments”
(145).
Disavowing the realist tradition of mimetic representation and hankering
after an interactive network of enunciation, Ulysses enacts the gradual encroach
ment of textuality upon representational narrative. At many points in the novel
textuality foments the genesis of effects rather than stable characters: "What is
produced by this textual production is a physical, rather than representational,
flow of textuality that forges connections and disconnections continually. . . .
Characters and events emerge and function in the literary machine not as sym
bols and meanings, but as temporary entities alongside the machinic movement
of textual production” (Miller 213). Among the whole cast of Ulysses's charac
ters, the one who most stubbornly resists categorization as a full-fledged per
sonality is Molly. Thinking of her in terms of a Molly-effect, defined in its
nomadic passage through the various zones of the novel, appears much more
tenable. To claim, however, that Ulysses is pure text seems rather beside the
point. Reality abundantly informs the novel, at times saturating the narrative
to the point of excrescence. Joyce is often quoted as telling his friend, the
painter Frank Budgen: "I want to give a picture of Dublin so complete that if
the city one day suddenly disappeared from the earth it could be reconstructed
out of my book” (quoted in Chace 153).
Ulysses, however, is much more than the guardian of a singular truth about
reality. The novel demands a rethinking of our readerly habits and, as Hans
Walter Gabler’s edition asserts, supports a distinctly postmodern interaction
with the text. Guided by this conviction, Gabler presents the reader with
intricate Ulyssean network, incorporating all important editions of the novel
from the first edition to the 1961 Random House text. In this network design,
the synoptic manuscript text, that is, the copy- or genetic text, is in inter
minable communication with the reading text of Ulysses, which, provided next
to the synoptic text, represents the ultimate
reached by the continuous
manuscript text. The reading text is ascribed a role only supplementary to that
of the synoptic text, a help in its decoding. "It is, however,” Jerome McGann
argues, "beside the synoptic text, a pallid, chill, and drear document — disap
pointingly abstract, simple, and one-dimensional where the other is rich, com
plex, and many-leveled. Perhaps the most remarkable quality of the
text is its capacity to preserve both the facts and the relationships of many kinds
of detail, from the most dominant to the most marginal and tenuous” (299;
emphasis added).
How should such a "continuous[ly] productive text” (304)
read? By fill
ing in its gaps with
to exterior sources?
restricting our compre
hension solely to the text-provided clues? By letting the blanks function in
their differential relationship to the black letters around them? Or by stuffing
them with heaps of data? As
one of these options/taken by itself, seems
somewhat extreme, it might be appropriate to consider them in their comple-
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mentality, envisaging ourselves as both producing and produced by the text.
Trusting the text’s collaborative effort helps relinquish the passion for
encroaching on and overcoding the story. Joyce himself urges the reader to cede
some of his/her authority to the text itself and let it work on him/her: “Begin
to forget it. It will remember itself from every side, with all gestures, in each
our word” (Finnegans Wake 614.20-21, quoted in Mahaffey 234). Such an
interactive procedure, favoring neither author nor reader nor text, recognizes
that reading is as much a process of pleasure as it is a means of knowing, that
“the reader is in part produced by the effects of the text and is simultaneously
analyzing those effects” (McCormick 63).
On the one hand, the reader is overwhelmed by the all-inclusiveness of
Ulysses. The account of a single day resembles an extensive encyclopedia of
Western culture. On the other, s/he encounters a Ulysses that ceaselessly omits
things. Most of it is one huge gap, waiting to be filled by the reader. Taken
together, the two types of experience testify to the amplitude of a novel that, in
a Bakhtinian sense, accommodates both the centripetal and centrifugal, the
centralizing arid decentering, the homogenizing and dispersing forces. Yield
ing to the urge for interpretative mastery impudently violates this balance, as
Richard Pearce has observed: “Isn’t there something smug about the posture we
have taken toward Joyce after years of rereading him and supporting an indus
try built on the filling in of the holes — or refusing to recognize that Ulysses
was ‘ineluctably constructed upon the incertitude of the
”’ (44).
Within the structure of Ulysses, “Wandering Rocks” could
singled out as
the episode where gaps most threaten to win out over
pattern of coherence
in the novel. Ulysses's defensive response is the vigorous
of
material
designed to smother any further proliferation of gaps. “Wandering Rocks,”
Hugh Kenner asserts, is the end of Ulysses the naturalist novel, and the end of
the book’s first Homer, “a Homer who did not like inventing, based characters
on people he knew . . . and set down words locked to things, places, physical
actualities” (83). The second half of Ulysses abounds in ebullient stylistic exer
cises, various nonfunctional elements and superfluous words, “heaped up,” as
Vincent Sherry argues, “under the sign of gratuity” (72). The novel bursts out
in
onomatopoeic richness of sound. From here on, Sherry remarks, language
“begins to document in earnest what does not happen.”
The strategy of documenting
negatively, looking at what does
happen rather than at what happens in Ulysses, appears particularly intrigu
ing. Joyce’s writing consistently refuses available meanings and explications
and, through evading or baffling the given, defines its negativity. The practice
recalls the negative (apophatic) trend in Christian theology, expounded in the
works of such mystics as Dionysius the Areopagite, whose teachings maintain
that God cannot be expressed through any image nor characterized in words,
for he is greater than all possible knowledge and definitions. A similar
apophatic tactic seems at work in Joyce’s deliberate and persistent documenta
tion of “what does not happen.” As transcendental meaning is greater than all
knowledge, wisdom, and truth, and the Ineffable Word is impossible to grasp
or render in positive terms, Joyce chooses to define it negatively, through what
is not meaningful, what does not happen, what is not seen. That is why, as Der
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rida aptly remarks on the subject of Ulysses, "what remains untranslatable is at
bottom the only thing to translate” that is, the meaning per se (“Ulysses
Gramophone” 28; emphasis added).
For the proper operating of the often untranslatable Ulysses network, the
breakups and the zones of information are equally important. Thinking of
Ulysses in terms of a network configuration is a preeminently postmodern atti
tude. Its rationale, however,
be found in the precepts of modern theories
and thought. It rests on the assumption that the meaning within the elements
that constitute the textual system is in no
more important than the mean
ing situated between the spatially designated and discrete signs, in the space
among them, in the geometrical figure outlined by their arrangement. As
Friedrich Kittler claims from the perspective of German criticism: “The begin
ner has to learn to look, not simply at the form of the letters, but constantly
BETWEEN the letters.... A reversal of every habit or faculty thus grants the
‘BETWEEN’ the same status as the positive
it separates” (255). This
kind of analysis treats with equal esteem both the unities themselves and the
vibrant areas between them, the areas where the letters juxtapose
another
and accentuate the white spaces between each other.
Ulysses teaches its readers to forget about the fear from the black-white con
trast and not to mitigate the shock of opposition by attenuating the contrast.
Does not the black dot at the end of “Ithaca” function as foil to the white back
ground around it? The belief that “letters are what they are only against and
upon a white background” (Kittler 255) is prelude to a much broader problem.
The latter lies at the heart of Foucault’s valorization of archaeology over the
history of ideas. For the history of ideas, “the appearance of difference indicates
an error, or a trap; instead of examining it, the clever historian must try to
reduce it: to find beneath it a smaller difference, and beneath that an even
smaller one, and so on until he reaches the ideal limit, the non-difference of
perfect continuity” (Foucault 171). Archaeology, on the other hand, does not
aim to overcome the differences, but to study them, to explore their character,
to classify them. Instead of yearning for a homogeneous continuity, it seeks a
differential heterogeneity.
If this intrinsically postmodern argument was brought in extenso to my
study, it was for the purpose of delineating the striking resemblance it bears to
a central modernist concern. In his essays on humanism and the philosophy of
art, Hulme speculates on the notions of reality, continuity, and discontinuity,
attributing to these the weight of inherently modernist issues:
For
objective view of reality we must make use both of the categories of
continuity and discontinuity. Our principal concern then at the present
moment should be the re-establishment of the temper or disposition of
mind which can look at a gap or chasm without shuddering. .. . Most of the
errors in certain subjects spring from an almost instinctive attempt on our
part to gloze over and disguise a particular discontinuity in the nature of
reality. It was then necessary first of all to deal with the source of this
instinctive behavior, by pointing out the arbitrary character of the principle of
continuity. (4; emphasis added)
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The profuse incorporation of gaps and discontinuities in the texture of Ulysses
evinces Joyces authorial
to sustain a continuous line of narration
through time.
as Clive Hart observes, “Joyce never abandoned . . . the
realist side of the book represented by the drive towards seamless continuity.
He merely coupled the development of the illusion of continuity with its vig
breakup” (434).
Ulysses exhibits the mastery of creating spatial relationships outside the
dimension of time, of delineating a spatial form while inhibiting action. A look
back at the history of art reveals that the dividing line between literature and
painting has always been meticulously emphasized, especially since Gotthold
Lessings treatise Laocoön, or On the Limits of Painting and Poetry (1766). The
twentieth century, however, ventured the temporalization of painting and spatialization of literature. The famous work of Joseph Frank, “Spatial Form in
Modern Literature,” places the problem in a modernist perspective. Frank rec
ognizes in the introduction of myth and archetype in literary texts an endeavor
to lead literature beyond the confines of time into a spatial dimension of pure
existence — an outlook particularly illuminating as regards the mythologically
based design of Ulysses. From a somewhat different perspective, Mikhail
Epstein remarks on the time and space figurations chiselled out in Joyces writ
ings: “The works of Joyce and Kafka are static, in their structure, and vivid pic
tures of a particular mythical space — unique word sculptures that have stopped
time” (Vera Obraz 143; my translation).
Joyce himself was interested whether the structure of the double storyteller
in the “Cyclops” chapter resembled modern Italian art: “Does this episode
strike you as being futuristic?” he asked Frank Budgen (quoted in Ehrlich 11).
“Rather cubist than futurist,” Budgen answered, and he proceeded by compar
ing the writing of Ulysses to the composition of a cubist painting: “Every event
is a many-sided subject. You first state one view of it and then draw it from
another angle to another scale, and both aspects lie side by side in the same picture” (emphasis added). Alluding to the prevalently spatial design of Ulysses,
Heyward Ehrlich concludes: “Neither Joyce nor Budgen thought it odd to dis
cuss literature as though it were painting” (11). Associated with the mode of
painting, the postcard becomes another of Ulysses's emblems. “Ulysses [is] an
immense postcard,” Derrida observes (“Ulysses Gramophone” 30), and further
on defines it as “a postcard without a text, which could be reduced to the mere asso
ciation ofa picture and an address” (31; emphasis added). In a way, all of Ulysses
is one magnificent performance in space, a performance “inscrib[ing] remote
ness, distance, difference, and spacing in sound (phoné)" (39).
In seeking to explore the incipience of postmodern temperament in a novel
acclaimed to be the vindication of modern sensibility, my study has been con
stantly oscillating between two widely dissimilar theoretical poles. One marks
the encroachment of a new attitude on the already canonized interpretation of
the novel. The other seeks to expand the modernist canon
sustaining a pre
tense of all-inclusiveness and appropriating as its own the seeds of upcoming
developments. “Deconstruction could not have been possible without Joyce,”
Derrida argued at the Ninth International James Joyce Symposium in Frank
fort (quoted in Jones 77). “My own sense is that Modernism, in its fiction in
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particular, is still very much alive, still continuing to change and to grow, and
that the claims for its demise are a sign of our cultural insularity” (Ehrlich 137),
the other pole of the debate asserts.
Whether instituting a postmodernist beginning or enhancing the gamut of
literary practices within the modernist tradition, the novel, as developed by
Joyce, displays immeasurable freshness and originality. Ulysses questions the
unprecedented authority of the author, his/her distant, aloof, and inviolable
posture. Pushing the burden toward the estate of the reader, the novel demands
the readers active collaboration in unweaving the web of character and event.
Joyce undermines the notion of modernist fiction as an elitist activity, designed
solely for the chosen few. In a much more democratic attitude, every reader is
endowed with the potential of producing his/her own Ulyssean net of mean
ings, as the literary text supports myriad plausible
In its abundant references to advertising, radio, newspapers, the typewriter,
and the press throughout the novel — in the journalistic and cinematographic
rendering of the “Aeolus” chapter, in particular — Ulysses attests in yet another
way to the inchoate condition of a literature that has begun to lose its privileged
status as a sacrosanct, singular, and elite system of ideas. Joyce, who, besides
being a writer, took pride in establishing the first movie theater in Dublin,
demonstrates a keen awareness of the extent to which language has
infused with the ramble of competing information technologies, thus acquiring
the multiform dimensions of a discourse network. The written words revered
status in the culture of the West is threatened. “What becomes of it
” the
narrator asks in the “Aeolus” episode, referring to the fate of the “webs of paper”
after they become newspapers (Ulysses 120). The first use mentioned, “O, wrap
up meat, parcels,” trivializes the written document’s effectiveness as a commu
nicative medium. Even in the moments of profuse media babble as in “Aeolus,”
however, Joyce’s writing never utterly shakes free from the prestige allotted to
the realm of modern art, never thoroughly transmutes into a network pattern.
The conception of Ulysses in terms of a discourse network is likewise
encumbered by moments of unforeseen authorial conspicuousness. Joyce is
dispersed in a plurality of possible positions and functions. And yet, it is
probably the awareness of Joyce’s immense artistic erudition and excellence in
all realms of human knowledge that thwarts his dissolution in the network
milieu. “Our admiration for Joyce ought to have no Emit, no more than should
the debt owed the singular event of his work,” Derrida argues in a gesture of
concession, still preferring “to talk of
event rather than a work or a subject
or an author” (“Two Words” 146). Nonetheless, even as we drown in the nar
rative maelstrom of Ulysses, the master’s image continues to loom above the
waves. At these very points, however, where Joyce seems somewhere above,
somehow singular, aloof, he jestingly alerts us to the danger of reading him too
seriously. “I am the foolish author of a wise book,” he claims, dispersing any
fear of authorial dictatorship (quoted in Cixous 15). And Ulysses jokingly
asserts that we can take his word for that.
The first section of this study has attempted to argue that, despite habitually
celebrating the age of modernism as the age of James Joyce, Ulysses consistent-

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol3/iss2/8

after?

78

Editors: Vol.
3, No. 2 (1999):
Journal
x Full issue

192

ly challenges the modernist canon, calling its coherence into question. While
willing to embrace a number of postmodernist tenets, however,
’s novel
ultimately
association with any major literary paradigm, including the
postmodernist one. The subsequent analysis will attempt to read Ulysses as
minor, not in the devalued sense at times ascribed to the word, but in terms of
what Deleuze and Guattari have come to designate a minor literature.
Deleuze and Guattari have laid out the theory of a minor literature in
response to an observation Kafka made on the condition of Czech Jews who
write in German, thereby creating a literature substantially different in cultur
al terms from that of German writers. According to Deleuze and Guattari,
there are three preeminent characteristics of a minor literature: the deterritorialization of language, the connection of the individual to a political immedi
acy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation, announcing the debacle of
regimes of subjectivity (Kafka 18). The ensuing analysis of the “Proteus”
episode will attempt to outline the ways in which Joyce’s seminal work sub
scribes to the condition of a minor literature. As Ulysses, a novel undermining
the political canon in a number of significant ways, yields more easily to a
demarcation as minor in the context of nationalism, I will elaborate on the
more problematic ideas of the collective assemblage of enunciation and deterritorialization of language as explicated in the “Proteus” chapter.
Essential to understanding the relevance of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion
of assemblage of enunciation to Ulysses is an awareness of the tripartite framework of operation shared by representational meaning and oedipal desire, a
framework “Proteus” subverts as it destroys the myth of the omniscient narra
tor who strives to attain transcendental knowledge and pin it down for the
reader in a stable representational form. The principal characteristic of the
oedipal model is that it positions subject against object, with the
of
expression or the realm of representation in a third, transcendental spot. What
is oedipal about this model is its triangularity: subject and object are both envi
sioned as lacking in relation the transcendental term, the governing logos. It
alone is complete, which is how it charges the triangular circulation of desire
(see Mahaffey 220-21).
Deleuze and Guattari call for a reconceptualization of all three terms, so
that subject and object no longer function as lacking with respect to a tran
scendental truth. Some Joyce scholars not only reverse the correlation within
the oedipal triangularity but take this reversal to a terminal degree:
Mahaffey claims, for instance, “that Joyce’s writings reflect the transition from
a representation of desire as oedipal ... to a model that draws its power not
from lack, but from excess, surfeit, waste” (221). This revised model dethrones
representational meaning from the inviolable position of singular and transcen
dental, governing and subordinating, to the status of just one among a multi
plicity of possible meanings.
The “Proteus” chapter epitomizes how the ostensibly fixed and undisputed
being of representational signification is supplanted by an unstable and contin
ually slipping “and-condition” of semantic in-betweenness. My subsequent
analysis attempts to demonstrate that the meaning of “Proteus” is not definitive
and
that no meaning in the episode is at all. Meaning rather emerges in
the constantly evolving chain of this and that and another meaning, each term
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transcendending the previous one, in a ceaseless becoming. Guattari remarks
on this same process: “Subject and object are no longer face-to-face, with a
means of expression in a third position; there is no longer a tripartite division
between the realm of reality, the realm of representation or representativity, and
the realm of subjectivity. You have a collective set-up which is, at once, subject,
object, and expression. The individual is no longer the universal guarantor of
dominant meanings. Here, everything can participate in enunciation” (“Every
body” 91).
The “Proteus” chapter of Ulysses erases the differentiating line between the
realm of reality (the world) and the realm of representation (the book). The
two are in constant interchange, continually effacing their boundaries and flow
ing into one another’s territory. Objective reality invades from outside the tex
tual territory of Ulysses; the two form intercommonalities and eliminate all need
of a mediating guarantor of meaning. When outer reality flows into the novel’s
textual realms, both undergo metamorphosis. If such an intercommunication
between objective and textual reality is accomplishable by itself, the position of
the author as proprietor of universal knowledge becomes obsolete and alto
gether intrusive. The striving after an unattainable transcendental meaning
remains an illusion of the past; rather than impotent and always lacking in rela
tion to the governing and colonizing knowledge, both object and expression
emerge as self-sufficient and excessively empowered to produce this knowledge.
The latter, no longer fixed and singular, irresistibly flows as dynamic and mul
tiple.
“Proteus” makes a very provocative theoretical argument for how Ulysses
should be
for the way art and in particular philology (the art of the
episode) relates to the world, and for the manner in which language (symbol
ized by the tide) brings the realms of reality and representation together
through the textual enactment of metamorphosis. The idea of a continually
transforming reality is active on all levels of Ulysses, In a somewhat larger sense
it is intimately linked to metempsychosis, the Greek faith in the “transmigra
tion of souls,” as spelled out by Mr. Bloom: “Some people believe that we go
on living in another body after death, that we lived before. They call it rein
carnation. That we all lived before on the earth thousands of years ago or on
some other planet” (Ulysses 65). The “Proteus” chapter subscribes in its own
way to the creed of continual existence uninhibited by the transience of indi
vidual life: “See now. There all the time without you: and ever shall be, world
without end” (37).
The engagement of “Proteus” with the idea of transformation is most evi
dent in the Homeric narrative of metamorphosis, depicting the transmutations
of Proteus in the ineluctable grip of his captor, Menelaus. Homer has it that
when Menelaus and his company rushed upon Proteus, who was needed to
instruct Menelaus on the way of his return home, Proteus first “turned into a
bearded lion, and thereafter into a snake, and a pard, and a huge boar; then he
took the shape of running water, and of a tall and flowering tree” (Gilbert 120).
Joyce scholars have long studied the endless series of transformations in “Pro
teus.” Morse Mitchell, for instance, observes a variety of less blatant Protean
changes: “The old terrorist
Egan’s cigarette tobacco
gun-pow-
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der, the match with which he lights it a fuse” (42). Other “changes . . . repre
sent recurrent patterns with variations” (47): dance motions, word reiteration,
rhythm, and word sound, all reflecting disparate literary styles.
The idea of metamorphosis in “Proteus,” however, acquires a much broad
er
with the figures of Stephen and the tide. The chapter renders
Stephen in constant communication with external reality, whose stimuli initi
ate myriad transformations in his inner self. Walking along the shore, Stephen
first attempts to apprehend the external world through his eyes. “The
ineluctable modality of the visible” makes it
for Stephen to communi
cate with the visual signs reality has left behind: “Signatures of all things I am
here to read, seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snot
green, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs” (Ulysses 37). Closing his eyes, Stephen
then switches off the modality of the visible and lets outer reality penetrate him
through the modality of the audible: “Stephen closed his eyes to hear
boots
crush crackling wrack and shells. You are walking through it howsomever. I
am, a stride at a time. A very short space of time through very short times of
space. Five, six: the nacheinander. Exactly: and that is the ineluctable modal
ity of the audible.”
In the “Proteus” chapter, the modalities of the visible and the audible do not
introduce the outward world to the novel’s narrative realm under the disguise
of a mimetic representation that, while incarnating real characters and events,
remains safely autonomous from them. Rather, the outside world vigorously
penetrates Stephen’s personality and deterritorializes it in a number of signifi
cant ways. Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of deterritorialization
in their discussion of “assemblages,” which they define as having “both territo
rial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize [an assemblage], and cutting
edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away” (ThousandPlateaus 88). Deter
ritorialization, Deleuze and Guattari argue, “is the movement by which one’
leaves the territory. It is the operation of the line of flight” beyond which noth
ing can retain its former quality, autonomy, and self (508). Reterritorialization,
on the other hand, “does not express a return to the territory, but rather [the]
differential relations internal to D[eterritorialization] itself, this multiplicity
internal to the line of flight” yet unable to traverse it (509). The concepts of
de- and reterritorialization, I propose, reflect the manifold becomings that
in “Proteus” and reveal the chapter as nomadic, transformational in char
acter.
A close look at the “Proteus” episode reveals numerous transformations of
objective, outer realities into inner, textual events. Stephen’s walk along the
shore communicates to Stephen’s narrative persona thoughts on the modality of
the visible and the modality of the
The subsequent appearance of two
midwives marks externally the inner transformation of Stephen’s musings,
which now center on his life in Dublin: his birth, father and mother, aunt Sara
and uncle Richie, his life as a priest and an artist. Continuing his walk,
Stephen’s thoughts turn to France and signal his encounter with Patrice Egan,
the free spirit, and with Kevin Egan, the rebel. Another outer change marks
the transition to an inner, psychological event. Stephen turns back, sits on a
rock, and the topic of France is deterritorialized into a reflection on Ireland, its
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mythical and medieval history. As a dog bounds down to the shore and runs
over to another dogs corpse, and at the sight of the cocklepickers in the water,
Stephen’s thoughts focus on his present life. Later in the course of narration,
the outer event of Stephens gaze at the movement of the water is transfigured
into the inner truth of
poetic inspiration and his thoughts on love, death,
and metamorphosis.
The list of correspondences, interpenetrations, and mutual transformations
between the different modalities of reality
be further expanded. It will still
remain inadequate, however, without taking account of Stephen’s centrality as
a nuclear knot, a crossroad at which
interference among the multifarious
transformational trends occurs. Stephen is not the agent of this dynamic
exchange, however. He is just the body upon which it inscribes itself and which
thus continually trespasses the limits of a fixed identity.
So multiform are the narrative realizations of Stephen in “Proteus” that it
seems hard to arrest what is traditionally named Stephen’s character. Stephen
resists being pinned down to an assigned space within narrative reality and
refutes
attempt to
read as a symbol, an entity distinct from and standing
for a particular objective reality outside the confines of the text. Stephen is
consistently undermining the possibility of capturing his identity by means of
stable definitions. It is thus in the continuous crossing over the limits of his
former self that Stephen is most approachable. Effacing the line between real
ity and textuality, Stephen joins the cast of Ulysses's personae who (as Joyce once
professed of himself) feel just as comfortable in newspaper excerpts as in the
distant universe of the novel. Partaking of Ulysses's enunciative assemblage,
Stephen seems to fully comply with its demarcation by Joseph Valente as some
thing that “cannot properly be said to be at all, only to become incessantly and
multiply with and as the productive activity it names” (194).
Stephen’s identity is persistently deterritorialized into new dimensions. In
“Proteus” he imagines himself a priest, an artist, a lover, a drowning man, and
he identifies with the philosophers he cites, a basilisk, a girl, Mallarmé’s faun,
and so forth. Sometimes the deterritorialization of Stephen is obvious, marked
by a personal pronoun next to the pronoun denoting the character Stephen
becomes: “Descende, calve, ut ne nimium decalveris. A garland of grey hair on
comminated head see him me clambering down to the footpace (descende),
clutching a monstrance, basiliskeyed. Get down, bald poll!” (Ulysses 40; bold
face added).
in the paragraph where Stephen identifies with Dan Occam:
“Dan Occam thought of that, invincible doctor.... Bringing his host down and
kneeling he heard twine with his second bell the first bell in the transept {he is
lifting his) and, rising, heard (now I
lifting) their two bells (he is kneeling)
twang in diphthong” (emphasis added). Having projected his self into that of
a priest, Stephen undergoes yet another metamorphosis. He
an artist.
Stephen’s deterritorialization into the unattainable image of an artist is ren
dered in terms of a painfùl reminiscence: “Books you were going to write with
letters for titles? . . . Remember your epiphanies on green oval leaves, deeply
deep, copies to be sent if you died to all the great libraries of the world, includ
ing Alexandria? Someone was to read them there after a few thousand years.”
Although I have so far been referring to Stephen’s reincarnations in differ
ent personalities in terms of deterritorialization, they all remain internal to the
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territory claimed by Stephens persona. Deterritorialization is only negative, as
it is
by a compensatory reterritorialization that obstructs the line of
flight and blocks the creation of a new cosmos. Stephen seems never fully
have transcended his identity and supplanted it by a qualitatively new one. The
full-fledged metamorphosis of Stephen’s character into a novel one, be it that
of a priest, an artist, or some other cherished vocation or victimized hero, is
always somehow internally subverted. Stephen never radically diverges from
his true identity. He is repeatedly reminded of the impossibility of completely
escaping from his present self: “Cousin Stephen, you will never be a saint” (40;
boldface added). Or, in the ardor of his artist dream: “You bowed to yourself
in the mirror, stepping forward to applause earnestly, striking face. Hurrayfor
the God-damned idiot!
No-one saw: tell no-one' (emphasis added).
Mitchell points to the continual slippage attending Stephen’s identifications
with different personae. There is something residual in Stephen’s becomings,
something that persistently refuses to
“Thus he begins to achieve
the extremely difficult self-resolving contradiction of genius: to identify with
the beast but retain his critical consciousness” (41).
Sometimes, however, the “I”-“he” articulation in the examples above is
erased in an “unspeeched” (Ulysses 48) interpenetration of mutually transform
ing identities. The self-effacing of Stephen’s identity in the beloved’s “allwombing tomb” is revealed in a roar of effaced word borders as, for instance, in
the “wayawayawayawayawayaway” disarray. This
a transition to a deter
ritorialization termed positive in that it has prevailed over all compensatory
reterritorializations within the ground claimed Stephen’s.
The “Proteus” chapter of the novel provides the most extreme case of
absolute deterritorialization, where Stephen is transformed into another entity;
that is, his present identity crosses and goes beyond “the line of flight or deter
ritorialization,” which Deleuze and Guattari define “as the maximum dimen
sion after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature”
(Thousand Plateaus
At the line of flight some realities disseminate, pulver
ize; others congeal, crystallize, precipitate. Here is how “Proteus” renders the
thrust of absolute deterritorialization: “The man that was drowned nine days
ago off Maiden’s rock. They are waiting for him now. . . . Do you see the tide
flowing quickly in on all sides, sheeting the lows of sands quickly, shellcocoa
coloured? If I had land under my feet. I want his life still to be his, mine to be
mine, A drowning man. His human eyes
to me out of horror of his
death. I. . . With him together down (Ulysses 45-6; emphasis added). Despite
Stephen’s innermost wish to impede it, absolute deterritorialization occurs, and
Stephen sees himself irrevocably transformed into a drowning man. The
process involves a “deterritorializing element” (that is, Stephen’s present self)
and a “deterritorialized element” (the drowning man). The latter are assigned
two asymmetrical roles, however, as elements of a single becoming, currents of
a single flow.
Looking closely at the Stephen-drowning man relation, it seems to subvert
all familiar literary definitions. The drowning man functions neither
metaphorically nor metonymically. Stephen is neither like the drowning man,
nor
his name be substituted for a drowning man on the basis of any com
mon association. Rather, Stephen is the drowning man. There is no inviolable
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border between the two, although Stephen seems to covet one: “I want his [the
drowning mans] life still to be his, mine to be mine” (46). This radical differ
entiation, however, appears altogether impossible. With the metabole, a literary
trope proposed by Epstein, “One thing is not simply similar or corresponding
to another, which presupposes an indestructible border between them, the artis
tic predication and illusory quality of such juxtaposition; rather one thing
becomes the other” (“Afterword” 282). Stephen can no longer retain his safe
autonomy and becomes a drowning man, relentlessly going with him together
down.
The metabole invokes the way a rhizome (as defined by Deleuze and Guattari) functions. It acts as a never-stopping machine that
the flows of
reality and produces between the textual layers assemblages that pilot new real
ities. An agent of vigorous metamorphosis, the metabole marks the surpassing
of both metonymy and metaphor. In deconstructing the fundamental distinc
tion between the literal and the figurative, Joyce makes the very notion of
metaphor impossible. In a text where every element becomes the other, thus
perpetually deferring meaning, there can be no criteria according to which ele
ments can be identified as metaphors. Instead, metaboles function throughout.
It is in their capacity to become that the metaboles are most remarkable.
Metaphors remain just rudimentary tropes, “only the signs of metamorphoses
that have not taken place and in the course of which things really, not appar
ently, exchange their essences” (Epstein, “Afterword” 282). The “Proteus”
of Ulysses, just as the Russian metarealist poems Epstein explores, seeks
intently “for that reality wherein metaphor is again revealed as metamorphosis,
as
authentic intercommonality, rather than the symbolic similarity of two
phenomena.”
the deterritorialization of the subject, object, and expression planes,
a strong deterritorialization of language occurs in Ulysses. “Proteus” is execut
ed on the basis of a minor usage of language. The famously manifold styles and
one in the “Proteus” episode,one
s, appropriated
evoke a typically minor liter 
ary experience —
feels like “a foreigner in ones own language” (Mahaffey
234; emphasis added). This description is particularly elucidative as regards the
nature of a minor language. It is not the Irish language that is minor in rela
tion to the English one. As Marilyn Reizbaum astutely remarks, “not all Irish
writers are minor” (185). Joyce, it seems, is in some way minor even as an Irish
writer, since Ulysses “does not take or, at least, worries the nationalist position
as regards the English language” (184). The central implication of a “minor
language,” however, resides in the minor usage
discerns within the major
English language, in the foreignness within the familiarity of a language one
speaks all one’s life.
There are fragments of French, Latin, Spanish, German, Greek, Italian,
Scandinavian, and other languages in the “Proteus” episode. Everybody in the
chapter has his/her/its own unique language. The animate and inanimate
world converse in countless languages and voices. The sea speaks its own lan
guage: “Listen: a fourworded wavespeech: seesoo, hrss, rsseeiss, ooos. Vehe
ment breath of waters amid seasnakes, rearing horses, rocks. In cups of rocks
it slops: flop, slop, slap: bounded in barrels. And, spent, its speech ceases. It
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flows purling, widely flowing, floating foampool, flower unfurling” (Ulysses 49).
The woman of Stephens dreams “trudges, schlepps, trains, drags, trascines” her
load (47). Touching her womb (“oomb, allwombing tomb”), Stephen’s mouth
“moulded issuing breath, unspeeched: ooeeehah: roar of cataractic planets,
globed, blazing, roaring, wayawayawayawayawayaway” (48).
The most persuasively enacted deterritorialization of language occurs in the
depiction of the sea tide. The latter is defined as the symbol of the chapter
whose art is proclaimed to be philology. The tide is implicitly likened to lan
guage; sometimes the two are even coupled as in the phrase “language tide”
(“These heavy sands are language tide and wind have silted here” [44]). There
is a straightforward connection between the modifications of human speech
and the movements of the tide. The tide and everything related to it, like the
sighing, weary weeds it carries, are in a never-ceasing flux and reflux: “Under
the upswelling tide he saw the writhing weeds lift languidly and sway reluctant
hissing
petticoats,
inflow
whispering
, plateau
22). up theirvainly
axiom assem
or ebb
follywater swaying and upturning

coy silver fronds. Day by day: night by night: lifted, flooded and let fall. . . . 
To no end gathered:
then released, forth flowing, wending back: loom
of the moon” (49-50). Just like the tide, as Stuart Gilbert observes, “[l]anguage
is always in a flux of becoming,
or flow, and any attempt to arrest its trend
is the folly of a Canute” (130). It is equally
to arrest the dynamic mutual
transformations that constitute only in their intercommonality the enunciation
of Ulysses.
The tide, language, as well as everything in the “Proteus” chapter of Ulysses,
evokes the pattern of a system dealing with intensities and medialities, a system
sustaining internal communication between the plateaus of reality and textuality along multiple interconnecting routes. This system of ever-flowing, buoy
ant intensities frustrates a congealing into a stable representational whole and
precludes any possibility of arrest or climax. Gregory Bateson, who gave the
word
a theoretical inflection, uses it to designate “a continuous, self
vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any orientation
toward a culmination point
external end” (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand
Plateaus
Likewise, everything in “Proteus” undergoes constant metamor
phosis, with narrative plateaus situated “always in the middle, not at the begin
ning or the end” (21).
The finale of “Proteus” places the law of metamorphosis within the broad
er philosophical context of universal laws: “God becomes man becomes fish
becomes barnacle goose becomes featherbed mountain” (Ulysses 50). The sen
tence, as pointed out by Gilbert, is a variant of the kabalistic
of
metempsychosis: “a stone becomes a plant, a plant an animal, an animal a man,
a man a spirit, and a spirit a god” (129). In its final judgment, “Proteus” is
definitive. Through the continuous
and transformation of essences, enact
ed on all levels, the chapter topples the tripartite division between the realm of
reality, the realm of representation, and the realm of subjectivity. It bursts out
of the oedipal mold into multiple sites of enunciation. Thus it proclaims the
blage of enunciation as collective body, binding subject, expression, and
object together, and obviates all need of a singular, omniscient guarantor of uni
versal knowledge and power.

Published by eGrove, 1998

85

Journal X, Vol. 3 [1998], No. 2, Art. 8

Albena Lutzkanova-Vassileva

199

This essay has attempted to explore the status of Ulysses as a novel exhibiting
radical resistance to facile classification. By problematizing the notions of
author, reader, and text, it argues that Ulysses goes against the grain of mod
ernist convention in a number of significant ways, thus revealing its untimely
postmodernity. While the novel is obviously one of the
of literary mod
ernism, it is at the same time pregnant with a nascent postmodernism, most
conspicuous, perhaps, in the
’s mischievous refusal to take itself and its
modern entourage in earnest. Despite the overt penchant for postmodernity
that Ulysses shows, however, calling the novel postmodern gives its potentiali
ties a false appearance of completeness. Ulysses thus shies away from close
engagement with any literary movement. In refusing to be assimilated to any
major literary paradigm, and in consistently challenging the very concept of a
literary canon, the novel operates as minor in the sense with which Deleuze and
Guattari have imbued the word.
Joyce’s novel reconceptualizes the notion of writer. The writer emerges as
continually effacing him/herself, leaving us caught in his/her archive as in an
intricate spider’s web. Readers of Ulysses collide with a text that refuses to be
easily consumed or owned. Reading Ulysses is thus necessarily an aggressive
participation. The novel’s text is never closed, and the ideal reader is the one
who accedes to its
incompletion rather than seeking to arrive at an ulti
mate meaning. Instead of the age-old question, What does it mean?, Ulysses
gests a somewhat disparate query: "What allows a text to both belong to a
genre and destroy the idea of genre from within, to tell a story and to alert the
reader to the artifice, the violence, of plot, to present characters and to invali
date the notion of discrete personal identity?” (Boheemen-Saaf 93).
What does it mean? violently disfigures the text by reducing it to a ready
made,
symbolic structure, a home in which answers reside. Relin
quishing our illusions of cognitive control immensely helps us communicate
with the novel. If reading Ulysses produces a kind of response, it is not one that
meets the demands of representational knowledge. Ulysses continuously urges
readers to supply not one persuasive, totalizing reading but a variety of alterna
tive or playful possibilities for meaning. In this, readers are invariably faced
with the problem of how to respond to a narrative that overwhelms them with
more than they can assimilate through hermeneutic means. A hint Ulysses
readily gives is: by eschewing the passion for organizing the text and giving its
corpus the organs it lacks. A body without organs, without any stable internal
divisions, seems a much better image for the continual transmutation of
essences that the novel enacts.
Ulysses is about incessant surprise, and letting the novel divulge its numer
ous secrets seems the only fair relation to it. Everything is unpredictable where
the flow of textuality forges connections and disconnections continually, where
characters stroll nomadically through disparate textual zones and language
flows varied and unperturbed, unwilling to perpetuate representational mean
ing. In such an unabashedly promiscuous environment, the reader often feels a
stranger. Exiled from a secure home within language, s/he continually fails, and
each failure to interpret the idiom that Ulysses speaks
the unique sensa
tion of becoming a foreigner in one’s own parlance. Ulysses is an unparalleled
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literary experience that bears out Prousts remark that ]reat literature is writ
ten in a sort of foreign language” (quoted in Deleuze and Parnet 5).
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Ifyou want to see it
have to see it on its
own ground. If
catch it
lose it. And
where it goes there is no coming back from.
Not even God can bring it back.
—Cormac McCarthy, The Crossing

1. The Dream

In my recurrent dream, I am sitting in a brightly lit
waiting room. Other people may be there, but they
are not speaking, they are not particularly doing any
thing; their presence or absence does not matter. Nor
am I, particularly, doing anything.
What kind of waiting room also does not matter:
hospital, bus station, morgue, unemployment office,
principal’s office. . . . Sometimes the room has banks
of seats, a large round clock on washed-out puke
green walls; sometimes it is merely an empty, glaring
cubicle. Nor does it matter that it’s a waiting room.
This is not a dream about escape
afterlife, else
where or beyond. The room could
in
a 24hour lights-on maximum security prison cell, such as
I saw once on a TV documentary, where women con
victed or suspected of crimes against the state
illuminated and scrutinized as they ate,
shat,
huddled under blankets to touch themselves perhaps,
tried to dream, broke to pieces. All that matters is
that the room is brightly lit, with a flat, steady wash
that exposes every corner, that whitens through shut
eyelids, that holds one pinned, exhausts one with its
immitigably asserted right to probe, intrude, undo.
Life, I begin to suspect in my dream, is nothing
but this brightly lit room. No darkness. No mystery.
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No shadows. Everything has been dragged out into the glare, everything cut to
the measure of the conscious human self.

2. The Numenon of Material Things

Oxford, Mississippi is a boom town. The year-end headline for the local paper,
The Oxford Eagle, says it all: “1998 saw city, county grow, grow, grow.” In the
ten years I have lived here, the changes have been enormous: what was a small,
diversified town of around 10,000 inhabitants and another 10,000 students,
surrounded by country and accessed to the
for instance, by only a two-lane
highway, is well on the way, folks always remark, to becoming another Chapel
Hill. The projected Lafayette County population for 2020, the Eagle reports,
is 60,000 — double what it is now (28 August 1998,1).1
“Every small town sells what it has,” one local official remarked several
years ago, “and what we have is Faulkner.” Since then, and in many different
ways, the decision to promote tourism
been widespread and conscious.
We’re on all the lists: we’ve been named one of the nation’s 100 Best Small
Towns, one of the nation’s 100 Best
Arts Communities, one of the
nation’s Five Best Retirement Communities. Property values have soared:
what went for $70,000 in the historic part of town ten years ago might now
bring in $350,000. The Eagle reports “some 40 subdivisions under construction
in Oxford and Lafayette County” (31 December 1998-1 January 1999, 1). A
Kroger superstore is planned, and a major shopping center on what has been
undeveloped land out by Oxford Elementary School; the landowners, who held
out against the city’s desire to build a power substation on the site several years
ago, now apparently “seek to establish Oxford as a regional retail destination.’”
A new federal building is taking out the last of the vine-tangled, ghost-haunt
ed gully through which Joe Christmas ran after his doomed escape from jail in
Faulkner’s Light in August. Every available morsel of land is snapped up as fast
as it can be.
Lafayette County, surrounding Oxford, has a planning commission but few
regulations regarding development. For the past
of years — since the
widespread community protest I will mention again, below, helped to elect a
new mayor, a new alderwoman, and several new aldermen — Oxford itself has
had a planning commission, and has commissioned a long-range plan from
Georgia Tech called Vision 2020, but the planning commission has inadequate
power to enforce its rulings, and building decisions continue without final input
from the Georgia Tech advisors for Vision 2020. Woods and green spaces are
vanishing. In the rush to develop, what Wendell Berry eloquently describes as
“the margins,” the “
streams, wooded fencerows, and the like” that form
“the landscape of harmony” and “are always freeholds of wildness” (151), are
valued only as real estate. Squirrels, raccoons, possums, deer, which until
recently lived in all the ravines and wooded patches scattered throughout
Oxford, have begun to disappear. Fawns are caught on fences. What was so
rich about this area — its heterogeneity; its fertile, rank, shabby, polysemous
un-fixed-upness; its ditches, privet thickets festooned with honeysuckle and
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trumpetvine, and weedy hot corner lots speckled with coreopsis — is largely a
matter of the past. Development and modernization are
conclusions.
They lead to wealth for some, but when the average price of a house is $125,000
and the average county salary is $20,000, it would be hard to claim that they
lead either to an increasingly diversified community or to wealth for all. And
they proceed at a ruinous pace, with little or no thought for the area’s ecology.
Last week I walked with my husband and dog out toward Thacker Moun
tain on the abandoned railroad tracks just south of town. This is one place we
go when we need to get what Robert Frost, in "Directive,” calls “[b]ack out of
all this now too much for us” (520) — an overgrown trail that winds through
pinewoods some three miles down to a two-lane road that
to the town
called Taylor. We walked past pines and winter-dead, leafless tangles of kudzu,
through rainslick mud and patches of ice from the storm that began ten days
ago. We’ve been there often; it’s one of the places we love. But suddenly, at a
crossroads midway along the trail, we encountered the blue paint of loggers’
slashes on a whole further area of pine trees. Later
learned that more than
800 acres of the some-1400 acres that comprise this forested area will be clear
cut within the next five years; half this clear-cut has already taken place.
Another area of leafiness and shadow, another stand of woods full of summer,
and fall, and snow, and wet and saprife spring in their ordered immortal
sequence, the deathless and immemorial phases of the mother” (Faulkner 326),
will soon be nothing but trash. There has been so much cutting around here
the past two years, I realized that day as I stared at the blue slashes, that I’ve
developed the visceral reaction of a rabbit or rat at harvest time: how they
shrink back into a diminishing circle, only to be forced out at last into the
blades and light.
Aldo Leopold — naturalist, co-founder of the Wilderness Society, and
author of the classic Sand County Almanac — writes of "the numenon of mater
ial things.” The numenon, the spirit
essence of place, cannot be quantified.
It "stands in contradistinction to phenomenon, which is ponderable and pre
dictable, even to the tossings and turnings of the remotest star”; it is easily
ignored, but once it is gone, "there has been an
death, the signifi
cance of which is inexpressible in terms of contemporary science” (146). Sand
County Almanac abounds in examples of numinous presence — specifically in
this passage the ruffled grouse, whose
creates what Leopold calls "the
physics of beauty” when it is seen in the north woods in autumn, among the red
maples. My area also abounds in examples of numinous presence. I understand
the reasons for the building and the cutting. Historically the poorest state in
the Union, Mississippi welcomes growth, which is supposed to bring amenities,
revenue, and jobs. Of course, growth does not always create the benefits it is
supposed to create. And meanwhile we lose the physics of beauty; what we
increasingly, are
of pine debris and mud-choked streams, expen
sive new houses on already cracked foundations, drainage pipes debouching
onto residential streets, earth
in place with bales of hay, with
new
rainfall further erosion. And we lose something else, harder briefly to articu
late. With the outer, the inner landscape is ravaged. What is going on here is
merely the local example of the worldwide, wholesale destruction of wilderness.
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And as Paul Shepard argues in Nature and Madness, when “the wild Other” is
no longer “the context but the opponent of my’ domain . . . [i]mpulses, fears,
and dreams — the realm of the unconscious — no longer are represented by the
community of wild things with which I can work out a meaningful relationship.
The unconscious is driven deeper and away with the wilderness” (35). Finally,
death becomes its only repository. Life becomes a brightly lit room, as in my
recurrent dream.

3. “You Must Change Your Life”

Imagining the wholeness of being embodied in an archaic torso of Apollo, and
the impact upon one who gazes on it, Rainer Maria Rilke ends a sonnet with
the shocking command, “You must change your life” (61). Ive thought of this
line repeatedly while reading environmental literature and theory: works such
as Sand County Almanac, Nature and Madness, David Abram’s The Spell of the
Sensuous, Niel Evernden’s The Social Creation ofNature, and Max Oelschlaeger’s
The Idea of Wilderness. The wholeness of being these works envision, and the
etiologies of destruction they trace, have given me the sense of coming home
my deepest, most enduring passions and convictions. But there has been a spell
on me as I set about struggling with this essay. I am relucant to come into lan
guage, come into print — partly because I’m afraid to expose the limitations of
understanding, but also because I’m haunted
the inadequacy of discur
sive prose to speak powerfully enough of the issues that concern me most near
ly. The more intense my response to the natural world, the more direct shared
activity and artistic experience seem like the best ways to communicate the kind
of truth I am after. This is truth, as Abram writes in The Spell of the Sensuous,
that has to
not just with “static fact” but with “a style of thinking ... a qual
ity of relationship”:

Ecologically considered, it is not primarily our verbal statements that are
“true” or “false,” but rather the kind of relations that
sustain with the rest
of nature. A human community that lives in a mutually beneficial relation
with the surrounding earth is a community, we might say, that lives in truth.
The ways of speaking common to that community — the claims and beliefs
that enable such reciprocity to perpetuate itself — are, in this important
sense, true. . . . Statements and beliefs, meanwhile, that foster violence
toward the land . . . can be described as false ways of speaking — ways that
encourage an unsustainable relation with the encompassing earth. A civi
lization that relentlessly destroys the living land it inhabits is not well
acquainted with truth, regardless of how many supposed facts it has
amassed regarding the calculable properties of its world. (264)
Facts can always be mustered to counter facts; and only when desires change —
when certain things become essential, and other things unthinkable — will
behaviors and choices follow. Therefore, Abram writes, “It may be that the new
environmental ethic’ toward which so many environmental philosophers aspire
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— an ethic that would lead us to respect and heed not only the lives of our
low humans but also the life and well-being of the rest of nature — will come
into existence not primarily through the logical elucidation of new philosophi
cal principles and legislative strictures, but through a renewed attentiveness to
perceptual dimension that underlies all our logics, through a rejuvenation
of our carnal, sensorial empathy with the living land that sustains us” (69-70).
I would make the point more simply. “The body makes love possible,” as the
poet Galway Kinnell has remarked (112).
make contact in our bodies with
the body of the earth, whether in work or play, makes love for the earth possi
ble. Might that love, perhaps, make certain things impossible?
My life and perceptions have been radically altered, these past few years,
both by what I have read and by what I have seen. It seems odd to write of
“reading for pleasure” when the reading has often filled me with bitterness,
anger, and pain. But it has also reinforced my conviction that one’s intellectu
al life and practical experience are not in opposition, and — more deeply —
that what is ethical can be pleasurable. Ones life can be a gift to the earth that
granted and sustains it. And maybe,
Thoreau, I crave reality. “If we are
really dying” — if
have done ourselves in through our disastrous relation
ship with the natural environment — I would just as
not
myself about
“the rattle in our throats” and the “cold in [our] extremities” (88).
Like most people, though, I am still
of laziness and deadness — partly
so as not to be
of despair. Leopold’s famous “land ethic” has become a
foundational statement for deep ecology: “A thing is right when it tends to pre
serve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong
when it tends otherwise” (262). But virtually every policy enacted in our world
flies in the face of Leopold’s realization. Robert Hass writes in his famous
poem, “Meditation at Lagunitas,” “A word is elegy to the thing it signifies” (4).
Nowhere is this more true than in environmental writing, for nearly all writing
about the natural world, these days, is elegiac. Our losses are inconceivable.
Several years ago I began to teach courses in environmental fiction, nonfic
tion, and poetry, and became involved in the Association for the Study of Lit
erature and Environment (ASLE),
interdisciplinary organization that has
grown since 1992 from twenty-five members to over one thousand. I became
involved as well in community activism, as part of a widespread protest against
the city’s ill-considered decision to five-lane a beautiful two-lane road that ran
away from the Square, under a little
railroad bridge, and on past groves and
hills of more than three hundred trees, some more than one hundred years old,
along the campus, out to the mall and eventually to the highway. This street
was far more important than it might seem, because it was the only buffer
between the frenetically growing Strip and the quiet, residentially mixed town;
it was also wonderful in its own right, a serene and scruffy place right in the
middle of the modernization. Issues of development had been fought before in
specific neighborhoods, over specific issues, but this controversy mobilized the
whole community. The plan to five-lane had not been adequately publicized
and therefore not adequately discussed. Beginning in February 1997, when
word finally got out as to what was happening, several local citizens formed a
nonprofit group, Concerned Citizens for Oxford, and started meeting almost
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nightly to decide how we might try to stop the construction. One meeting of
the board of aidermen erupted into a shouting match and ended with the
boards vote to postpone awarding the highway contract for two weeks, in order
to study the issue futher. During that two weeks’ time, several hundred people
(in a town of 11,000) signed a petition and nearly two hundred marched in the
rain
save the trees. But then, at a meeting so full that the audience spilled
out of the courtroom, down the stairs, and out into the street, the board of
aldermen voted four to three to go ahead with the contract — to the rage of
many, many Oxford citizens. That was in early March, 1997.
Then, on March 24,. ten minutes before my graduate seminar, “Writing
Nature,” began, I got a call: “The bulldozers are starting.” Ironically, we were
just about to discuss the poems in “Logging” from Gary Snyder’s Myths £s?
Texts:

The ancient forests of China logged
and the
slipped into the Yellow Sea.
Squared beams, log dogs,
on a tamped-earth still.
San Francisco 2 X 4s
were the woods around
Someone killed and someone built, a house,
a forest, wrecked or raised
All America hung on a hook
& burned by men, in their own praise. (35)
I told my students — several of whom had been involved in the five-laning
protests — that I was dismissing class, that they
free to do whatever they
wanted, but that I didn’t want to talk about trees right then. Nearly all of them
chose to hurry to the site. The scene was one of general confusion, with peo
ple screaming, police and protesters milling around, bulldozers poised to take
the whole hill down — and at a certain point a number of us just decided we
wouldn’t let them do it. With eight others,2 I was arrested, for the first time in
my life. For the few seconds just before and during
actual arrest, I clearly
and simply understood the truth of Leopold’s “land ethic.” What was happen
ing, no matter what the putative reasons, was wrong. It did not preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the town, much less the biotic community.
Police ordered us away from a hillside where flowering dogwoods were being
uprooted and tossed aside, and earth gouged, and pines torn and shredded like
confetti, but like the others arrested with
I finally could not step aside. I
sat with my back against a hundred-year-old oak tree; it was quiet in me and in
the
and time stood still while the bulldozers poised, engines running, on
the ridge, and a policeman — who, it is true, hated to arrest us — pulled us up
and snapped the cuffs. The calm I felt, having crossed that line at last, will
remain with me always.
During the months following the
it seemed as if the five-laning issue
might have an electrifying effect. On June 12, 1997,1 wrote, to members of
ASLE:

Published by eGrove, 1998

95

JournalAnn
X, Vol.Fisher-Wirth
3 [1998], No. 2, Art. 8

209

City elections were held a week ago. Every single one of the officials
who had supported five-laning West Jackson has now been voted out. The
Mayor’s hand-picked successor who had expected to win got 20% of the
There’s a whole new government in Oxford, and at the top of its
agenda are preservation, environmental awareness, recycling. . . The
Mayor-elect has already formed a task force to investigate what can be
changed, undone, about the original five-lane plan. The rest of the fivelane plan, which was conceived as three stages,
go forward now.
The trees that
cut are gone, but the other hundred planned for cutting
will remain, and maybe grass and
and new trees will replace
what was going to be

How wrong I was. After that brilliant flurry, the cutting and paving and
building have gone on much as always.
4. Butterfly, Luna, Gypsy
But ye shall destroy their altars,
break their images, and cut down their groves.
—Exodus 34:13 (quoted in Snyder, "Logging”)

What we are
in Oxford and Lafayette County is merely the local exam
ple of
escalating process of environmental destruction going on all over the
world. In Humboldt County, California, a particularly intense struggle has
been under way these past few years to save the Headwaters forest, a 63,000acre watershed that constitutes “the largest private holding of old-growth red
woods in the world” (St. Clair and Cockburn). As a transplanted Californian,
I’ve followed the story of the fight for Headwaters forest; again and again I’ve
been reminded of Rilke’s line, “You must change your life.”
On December 10, 1997, near the Headwaters forest, Julia “Butterfly” Hill,
a twenty-five-year-old Earth First! activist from Arkansas, used rock climbing
to mount 180 feet up an ancient redwood she calls Luna, and she has been
living on a six-by-eight-foot platform since that time. Luna, also known as the
Stafford Giant, is a thousand-year-old redwood that grows above the town
where seven homes
destroyed on January 1,1998, in a mudslide
by
Pacific Logging’s logging practices. Purchased in 1986 by Maxxam Inc., which
is based in Houston and run by financier Charles Hurwitz, Pacific Lumber has
gone from being a modest family business to the “largest timber organization
in Humboldt County”; it has become “a clear-cutting machine that is responsi
ble, many activists believe, for a large portion of the environmental wreckage in
Humboldt County during the past decade — naked mountainside, silted-up
rivers, mudslides and a rapidly declining salmon population, to name a few
examples” (Goodell 61). Though Luna is not in Headwaters forest, part of
Hill’s purpose is to fight for Headwaters, which Pacific Lumber has been clearcutting, racking up hundreds of violations of the California Forest Practices Act
during the past few years.
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Hill’s journey began in August 1996, when a car wreck left her injured for
nearly a year, and awakened her desire for “the real and important things”
(“Luna”). She began to travel, ending up in California, where she saw the giant
redwoods for the first time. “I knew then,” she says, “that protecting these trees
would become a spiritual quest
me.” The words she uses to describe her
experience with Luna are poetical, replete with a sense of interconnectedness
between the human and nonhuman. Of her fear the first time she climbed the
tree, she says, “I was scared at first, and then I just started paying attention
the tree and drawing strength from it. I saw all the scars and wounds from fires
and lightning strikes.” Shortly thereafter, the worst storms in California histo
ry descended upon her. She hung on through the tumultuous El Niño weath
er: ninety-mile-per-hour winds, battering rains, snow. On January 31 she
wrote in her journal of the winds that threatened to tear her tarps away, leaving
her exposed to the storm, that they howled “like a crazy, wild animal — the
most intense noise I’ve ever heard.” At first as she clung to the tree she
thought, “This is it, I’m going to die,” and then, as she tells it, Luna spoke
her: “She said, Tend,
and let go, and I’ll take care of you.’ I felt such
peace.”
Now, Hill says, “I have become one with this tree and with nature in a way
I would never have thought possible.”
has earned a quiet authority when,
in “Offerings to Luna,” she writes:

She speaks to
though my
bare feet . . . my hands
speaks to
on the
wind . . . and in the rain
telling me stories born long
before my time . . .

She has stuck it out for over fourteen months, through El Niño storms and
what Earth First! reports as Pacific Lumber’s “starve out patrols, climbing
police, insults, flood light, helicopter and siren intimidation.” What she reports
about Luna, and by extension about all trees, will likely be widely taken as
unbelievable. She can see Pacific Lumber headquarters and clearcuts from her
perch, and when they started logging “the steepest part of the ridge,” she found
herself “crying a lot and hugging Luna and telling her I was sorry. Then I
noticed that I was being covered by sap pouring out of her body from every
where, and I realized, oh, my God, you’re crying too.’ The sap didn’t start pour
ing out until the logging started.”
Julia Hill concludes that “[t]rees pass information on how to hold up hill
sides and how to grow, and they also communicate feelings.” This is not gen
y accepted by mainstream American society. Where I live, "tree-hugger” is
a strong pejorative, and not just because tree-huggers insist that the culture is
committing environmental mayhem. Tree-hugging implies that trees are sen
tient, that they matter in and of themselves, simply because they exist, that they
cannot merely be translated into board feet. Tree-hugging implies, as well, that
we cannot begin to calculate the results to the environment — to animals, fish,
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earth, water, birds, as well as to the human community — of large-scale log
ging. This avowal of connection between the human and nonhuman has near
ly the taint of sexual perversion: one might bugger sheep if
hugged trees.
But in fact, Hill’s conclusion, arrived at through personal experience, echoes the
naturalist David Lukas’s research on the communicative
of trees, as well
as research reported in the 1987 text Terrestrial Plant Ecology. A 1983 experi
ment, for instance, showed that leaves of willows declined in palatability fol
lowing attack by tent caterpillars, as did the leaves of nearby unattached trees
of the same species; discussing this case, David Lukas e-mails me: “[A]n
injured tree releases terpenes into the air as a message of warning to its neigh
bors to boost their defenses, nearby trees pick up (smell?) the aerial terpene
messages and immediately begin mounting their own immune defenses.” And
a 1964 experiment "placed radioactively labeled isotopes on a freshly cut stump
and found that the isotopes showed up in 43% of all species in a
radius
around the stump within days, showing the effectiveness of the communication
network of trees via their root systems. [The researchers] concluded ‘it would
seem logical to regard the root mass of a forest... as a single functional unit’”
(Lukas, citing the original experiment). Lukas goes on to conclude:
This underground communication network is facilitated by microscop
ic mycorrhizal fungi which bridge the microscopic gaps betwen the very
finest plant roots. From one plant, through its roots via fungi into the roots
of the next tree, it’s a seamless flow of information that extends throughout
an entire watershed. Our tools allow us to measure this flow of informa
tion as a movement of chemicals, but who is to say what kinds of infor
mation or knowlege are contained therein?
Julia Hill’s conclusion echoes as well Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenolog
concept of “Flesh,” a concept he arrived at shortly before his death, which
— David Abram explains — goes beyond his earlier emphasis on just the
human body and “signifies both our flesh and ‘the flesh of the world’” (66, cit
ing Merleau-Ponty), and which conceives of them as joined in “the mysterious
tissue or matrix that underlies and gives rise to both the perceiver and the per
ceived as interdependent aspects of its own spontaneous activity” (66). This
concept of interconnectedness, combined with a belief in the integrity of all
species — a belief in their right to exist, not merely in order to serve human
needs and desires, but because they exist — is at the foundation of “deep” as
opposed to “resource” ecology, the
expressed in Abram’s statement:
“Many individuals today experience a profound anguish that only deepens with
each report of more ancient forests cleared, of new oil spills, of the ever-accel
erating loss of species. It is an anguish that seems to come from the earth itself,
from this vast Flesh in which our own sentient flesh is embedded” (69-70).3
And it is an anguish that changed, then took, the life of another Earth
First! activist, twenty-four-year-old David “Gypsy” Chain, who died on Sep
tember 17, 1998 in the Headwaters forest, crushed by a redwood
by A.
E. Ammons, an angry logger employed by Pacific Lumber. The sheriff’s
department immediately claimed that the death was “a logging accident”
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(Goodell 86), but a videotape one activist made an hour before Chains death
puts the case in a different light. As the protesters approach and try to talk to
him, Ammons shouts, on the tape, “I wish I had my fuckin’ pistol! I guess I’m
gonna just start packin’ that motherfucker in here. ’Cause I can only be nice so
fuckin’ long.” A few minutes later he adds, “Fuck it, it’s our forest. . . . We can
cut wherever we want,” and, threatening to
a tree on the Earth First! pro
testers, “I’m not going to hesitate like I did last time” (quoted in Goodell 67).
have claimed that Chain and others, such as the activist “Steve” who fell
more than one hundred feet from a redwood on January 22,1999, when a pul
ley broke (Caffrey), are getting what they ask for if they trespass on
property. Of Chain’s death, Jerry Partain, a former director of the California
Department of Forestry, wrote in a local newspaper: “This time their stupidi
ty killed one of their own” (quoted in Goodell 86).
Ninety-seven percent of ancient coastal redwood forest, which used
cover two million acres, has been cut in the twentieth century (“Luna”). In the
Headwaters forest itself, a recent series of compromises and environmental
defeats, bitingly reported by Jeffrey St. Clair and Alexander Cockburn, has
resulted in a plan whereby the US government and the state of California have
purchased from Maxxam fewer than
acres (only 3,500 acres of which are
old-growth redwoods) of the original 63,000-acre watershed, for the vastly
inflated sum of $480 million. Hundreds of violations of the California Forest
Practices Act have been charged against Pacific Lumber but inadequately pur
sued until finally, on November 10, the company’s license was suspended for the
rest of 1998 (Goodell 86). According to Andy Caffrey, media spokesman for
Earth First!, the license remains suspended as of January 26, 1999.4 But the
company has simply hired subcontractors and will doubtless be allowed to liq
uidate nearly everything outside the area bought by the government, wreaking
irreparable damage in the process on local populations of marbled murrelets
(threatened seabirds), coho
and spotted owls. The activists know they
are taking their lives in their hands. But as Earth First! comments: “The sin
gle-minded focus on quick profits precludes concerns about the environment
and long-term economic stability. To the corporate mind, ancient redwoods are
just under-utilized assets to be 'liquidated,’ a means of throwing off cash flow
and servicing debt” (“Luna”). In such a case, St. Clair and Cockburn are right:
“The only restraint left in saving the ancient redwoods is direct action demon
strators like Chain. There is no alternative.”

5. “The Story of Our Brokenness”

The most
chapter of Sand County Almanac, “Thinking Like a Moun
tain,” powerfully exemplifies the kind of ethical transformation the writers I
discuss here are concerned with, and describes one turning point in Leopold’s
own life. A young man working for the National Forest Service in Arizona and
New Mexico in 1918, he shoots a wolf one day and watches “a fierce green fire
dying in her eyes” (138). Trigger-happy, convinced that “fewer wolves meant
more deer, that no wolves would mean hunters’ paradise,” and simply one of the

Published by eGrove, 1998



10,000 

99



JournalAnn
X, Vol.Fisher-Wirth
3 [1998], No. 2, Art. 8

213

millions of Americans who “had never heard of passing up a chance to kill a
” he takes his act for granted until, watching the wolf, he realizes “then,
and [has] known ever since, that there was something new to me in those eyes
— something known only her and to the mountain.”
I began this essay wanting to write about wolves — specifically, about Billy
Parham’s attempt in Cormac McCarthy’s magnificent novel The Crossing to
save the life of a pregnant wolf by returning her the north Mexican moun
tains. But I had to write about trees. Trees, not wolves, are what I love and
know. Still, what Billy experiences once he turns away from his human family
to accompany the wolf across the border, not just into Mexico, but into “a world
burning on the shore of an unknowable void” (73), has haunted my memory of
that split second I experienced two years ago, when the anthropocentrism so
firmly inculcated in me suddenly dropped away and I knew beyond doubt that
I was the guest and not the reason. That the dogwood or pine tree I saw flying
into the air, clawed and shredded, splintering like matchwood, was as much
alive as I was. Or, to change the image to Billy Parham’s, that the blood of the
wolf tastes “no different than [our] own” (125).
Paul Shepard believes that “the framework of nature as metaphoric founda
tion for cosmic at-home-ness is as native to the human organism ... as any
nutritive element in the diet. Lacking it, he will always lack true reverence for
the earth” (quoted in Sale 31). Shepard writes about rituals such as the Indian
vision-quest and solitary hunt as ways in which past communities fostered in
their adolescents the “metaphoric, mysterious, and poetic quality of nature,”
what he calls in his homely way “a good sense of being in the cosmos.” Billy
Parham creates this sense and discovers this reverence, instinctively and with no
community support or affirmation, in his solitary journey into Mexico to return
the wolf to safety. Tragically, he fails to
her. Instead, she falls into the
hands of Mexican villagers whose sport is to chain her and set pack after pack
of dogs on her, and whose cruelty toward wolves, as Barry Lopez abundantly
attests,5 has been manifested for centuries throughout both North America and
Europe. Billy shoots her at last rather than see her tortured and defeated inch
by inch, carries her body to the mountains, and sits with her all night, waiting
for dawn when he will bury her.

He squatted over the wolf and touched her fur. He touched the
and perfect teeth. The eye turned to the fire gave back no fight and he
closed it with his thumb and sat by her and put his hand upon her blood
ied forehead and closed his own eyes that he
see her running in the
mountains, running in the starlight where the grass was wet and the
’s
coming as yet had not undone the rich matrix of creatures passed in the
night before her. . . . He took up her stiff head out of the leaves and held it
or he reached to hold what cannot be held, what already ran among the
mountains at once terrible and of a great beauty, like flowers that feed on
flesh. What blood and bone are made of but
themselves not make on
altar nor by any wound of war. What we may well believe has power to
cut and
and hollow out the dark form of the world surely if wind can,
if rain can. But which cannot be held never be held and is no flower but is
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swift and a huntress and the wind itself is in terror of it and the world can
not lose it. (127)

Billy Parham has learned the thing of which Aldo Leopold speaks, the
thing known to wolf and mountain. Brilliantly McCarthy articulates the dan
ger and beauty of the “fierce green fire” Leopold sees in the dying wolf’s eyes.
But Billy has gone farther, too. He has gazed in perfect darkness upon the
matrix, beyond and before that green fire, the mother in whom or which all
creatures are held, in whom or which there is neither beginning nor ending.
Then — one of the most beautiful things about this book — there is a lacuna.
He carries the wolf into the mountains and buries her “in a high pass under a
cairn of scree.” Thinking “ become again the child he never
” (129), he
whittles a bow, makes arrows, and wanders starving, bereft, through the moun
tains. Weeks pass, about which practically nothing is written. He shoots trout,
eats green nopal; his horse grazes on winter grass, gnaws on lichens. One day,
then, a hawk passes before the sun,
and its shadow ran so quick in the grass before them that it caused the horse
to shy and the boy looked
where the bird turned high above them and
he took the bow from his shoulder and nocked and loosed
arrow and
watched it rise with the wind rattling the fletching slotted into the
and
watched it turning and arcing and the hawk wheeling and then flaring sud
denly with the arrow locked in its pale breast. (129)

Why, I wondered at one point, does McCarthy write so little about the weeks
and so much about the hawk? Perhaps it is because these weeks have consti
tuted the hunt or quest of which Paul Shepard writes. Little is written about
them because little can be written about them; they occur outside narrative,
outside ordinary time.
’s respect and reverence for the wolf, so different
from the hatred accorded her by both North American ranchers and Mexican
villagers, more nearly echoes the attitude of many Native American tribes: of
the Plains Indians, for instance, who viewed wolves, bears, mountain lions, and
wildcats as “the creatures with the greatest power and influence in the spirit
world” (Lopez 102). Fittingly, Billy’s subsequent actions take on a Native
American
too. After burying the wolf, he walks between two
worlds. On the one hand his wanderings seem aimless; on the other, he seems
to be impelled to improvise a vision-quest, a self-winnowing. According to
Native American beliefs, the success of such a quest would be revealed by a
sign, which in turn would reveal to the initiate his place in the universe, his
oneness with nature (Oelschlaeger 12). And indeed Billy does receive a sign:
as the wounded hawk turns and vanishes, a single feather falls.
Linda Hogan, a Chickasaw poet and novelist, writes of feathers, and in
particular of a golden eagle feather that she dreamed, which then appeared
floating through the air outside her window and was subsequently involved in
several marvelous occurrences. For her, the feather is an example of “events and
things that work as a doorway into the mythical world, the world of first peo
ple, all the
back to the creation of the universe” (19). The feather is not
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merely inert matter, but numinous, mysterious, full of power and knowledge.
"There is something alive in a feather,” she writes. "The power of it is perhaps
in its dream of sky, currents of air, and the silence of its creation. It knows the
insides of clouds. It carries our needs and desires, the story of our brokenness”
(20). All the grimmer, then, The Crossing: though Billy sees the feather fall,
try as he might, he cannot find it.
The Crossing would be a very different novel if, beyond the wolf’s death, the
universe offered a feather, a sign — conferred some benison — upon Billy
Parham. But all he ever finds, for his wounding of the
is "a single
of blood that had dried on the rocks and darkened in the wind” (129). Either
the quest has failed, and the universe remains closed, stitched over, or its only
meaning is suffering. As usual, McCarthy is inscrutable.
Billy cuts his own hand then, and watches "the slow blood dropping on the
stone” (130). The questions that arise about his action are ultimately questions
that arise whenever, in our lives, we stumble toward awareness of the depth of
our connection, the enormity of our crime. Does this action, cutting himself,
show admission of
The bloods together, his and the hawk’s — like the
wolf’s, not so different from
own: does
action show acknowledgment of
kinship?

Notes
I am grateful to Jay Watson for inviting me to write this essay, to Andy Caffrey,
Kathy Field, Kristin Harty, and David Lukas for generous assistance over the
months with information, and to Peter Wirth for encouragement, tough edit
ing, and thousands of hours among trees.

1. The projected population is according to Chris Nelson, co-director of
the Georgia Tech planning team hired to develop a plan for the city’s growth,
Vision 2020.
2. We were released on our own recognizance and a trial date was
for
July 10, 1997. In June, however, elections largely reconstituted the city gov
ernment. It was determined that we were arrested on what was, in fact, uni
versity property, and when we appeared in court, charges were dropped.
3. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of "Flesh” closely resembles the Gaia hypoth
esis advanced by James Lovelock: that all living things on earth, as well as the
earth, water, and
that form their environment, function in some respects as
if they
a single living organism, and, like a single living organism, tend
toward an equilibrium.
4. Several minutes short of the deadline at midnight on March 1,1999, a
controversial Headwaters forest
was signed between government agencies
and Pacific Lumber/Maxxam. Earth First! calls the deal a "classic Clinton-era
environmental compromise, trading preservation of a portion of the forest for a
huge sum of money and near-certain destruction of the other old-growth areas.
Pacific Lumber/Maxxam also now holds a ‘license to kill,’ a permit allowing the
company to destroy 17 different endangered species and their habitats” ("Head-
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waters”). Briefly, the headwaters forest deal transfers around 10,000 acres of
redwood forest, including the 3,000-acre Headwaters grove, to public hands, at
a cost of nearly half a billion dollars. But environmentalists find much to crit
icize about the plan; for one thing, only about ten percent of the Headwaters
forest is permanently protected, and for another, the 50-year Habitat Conser
vation Plan associated with the deal provides many loopholes through which
Pacific Lumber can "kill endangered species and destroy habitat protected
under law” by getting around the Endangered Species Act (Pickett).
The area of Julia Hill’s protest is not protected under the plan. As of May
1999, she continues to occupy Luna.
5. Of Wolves and Men remains the classic source for the history of what
Lopez calls "the wolf war in North America” (194). He describes the ways
wolves have been hunted and
surpassing in horror even the ways in
which
killed other predators:
A lot of people didn’t just kill wolves; they tortured them. They set wolves
on fire and tore their jaws out and cut their Achilles tendons and turned
dogs loose on them. They poisoned them with strychnine, arsenic, and
cyanide, on such a scale that millions of other animals — raccoons, black
footed ferrets, red foxes, ravens, red-tailed hawks, eagles, ground squirrels,
wolverines —
killed incidentally in the process. In the thick of the
wolf fever they even poisoned themselves, and burned down their own
property torching the woods to get rid of wolf havens. In the United States
in the period between 1865 and 1885 cattlemen killed wolves with almost
pathological dedication. In the twentieth century people pulled up along
side wolves
airplanes and snowmobiles and blew them apart with shot
guns for sport. In Minnesota in the 1970s people choked Eastern timber
wolves to death in snares to show their contempt for the animal’s designa
tion as an endangered species. (139)

Attempting to account for this hatred, Lopez concludes: "The hatred [of the
wolf] has religious roots: the wolf was the Devil in disguise. And it has secu
lar roots: wolves killed stock and made men poor. At a more general level it
had
do, historically, with feelings about wilderness. What men said about
the one, they generally meant about the other. To celebrate wilderness was to
celebrate the wolf; to want an end to wilderness and all it stood for was to want
the wolf’s head” (140).
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